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
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ART. I.—THE DARK MIRROR

THE need for a return to religion and a recovery of the religious attitude to life which European civilization has lost during the last two or three centuries is very widely recognized in the world to-day. It is no longer confined to the conservatives and the reactionaries, the supporters of the traditional intellectual order, as was largely the case in the seventeenth century. On the contrary, it is especially characteristic of the most modern of the moderns and of those who are in revolt against the existing order of things, of men like Mr. J. Middleton Murry and the late D. H. Lawrence in this country, and of Jean Cocteau and Charles du Bos, Jacques Rivière, and François Mauriac in France.

In the latter country alone it has taken the form of a complete acceptance of orthodox Catholicism. Elsewhere, and especially in England, it still retains to a great extent the ideals of humanism and of the Enlightenment, for it is found most of all among those who have remained faithful to the humanist tradition, while at the same time they feel the necessity of finding a new spiritual basis which may protect it against the standardized mass-civilization of the new age. Consequently they retain the old rationalist hostility to the idea of the supernatural and the transcendent. They have come to realize the dangers that a thorough-going scientific materialism, or even a rationalism of the eighteenth-century type, involves from the point of view of humanism. They are prepared to admit spiritual values and even the validity of mystical experience, but they still hold fast to the fundamental dogmas of Naturalism—the denial of the transcendent and the conception of the Universe as a closed order ruled by uniform scientific law. They seek a *natural* religion in the sense of a religion without metaphysic or dogma or revelation—a religion without God.

Now a religion of this kind would certainly possess

the advantage of being easily reconcilable on the one hand with the ethical tradition of humanism, and, on the other, with the world-view of scientific naturalism, but it does not follow that it would solve our religious problems or provide modern civilization with the spiritual dynamic of which it stands in need. For there are two factors to be considered. Just as it is possible to conceive of a religion which will satisfy man's religious needs without being applicable to the social situation of modern Europe—as, for example, in Buddhism—so we can construct, at least in theory, a religion which would be adapted to the social needs of modern civilization, but which would be incapable of satisfying the purely religious demands of the human spirit. Such a religion was constructed with admirable ingenuity and sociological knowledge by Comte in the nineteenth century, and it proved utterly lacking in religious vitality, and consequently also in human appeal. And a similar experiment which is being carried out, with far less knowledge and greater passion, by the modern Communists in Russia threatens to be even more sterile and inimical to man's spiritual personality.

It is useless to judge a religion from the point of view of the politician or the social reformer. We shall never create a living religion merely as a means to an end, a way out of our practical difficulties. For the religious view of life is the opposite to the utilitarian. It regards the world and human life *sub specie æternitatis*. It is only by accepting the religious point of view, by regarding religion as an end in itself and not as a means to something else, that we can discuss religious problems profitably. It may be said that this point of view belongs to the past, and that we cannot return to it. But neither can we escape from it. The past is simply the record of the experience of humanity, and if that experience testifies to the existence of a permanent human need, that need must manifest itself in the future no less than in the past.

What, then, is man's essential religious need, judging by the experience of the past? There is an extraordinary degree of unanimity in the response, although,

of course, it is not complete. One answer is God, the supernatural, the transcendent; the other answer is deliverance, salvation, eternal life. And both these two elements are represented in some form or other in any given religion. The religion of ancient Israel, for example, may seem to concentrate entirely on the first of these two elements—the reality of God—and to have nothing to say about the immortality of the soul and the idea of eternal life. Yet the teaching of the prophets is essentially a doctrine of salvation—a social and earthly salvation, it is true, but nevertheless a salvation which is essentially religious and related to the eternal life of God. Again, Buddhism seems to leave no room for God and to put the whole emphasis of its teaching on the second element—deliverance. Nevertheless, it is based, as much as any religion can be, on the idea of Transcendence. Indeed, it is an exaggerated sense of transcendence which led to its negative attitude towards the ideas of God and the Soul. "We affirm something of God, in order not to affirm nothing," says the Catholic theologian. The Buddhist went a step further on the *via negativa* and preferred to say nothing.

Now, a concentration on these two specifically religious needs produces an attitude to life totally opposed to the practical utilitarian outlook of the ordinary man. The latter regards the world of man—the world of sensible experience and social activity—as the one reality, and is sceptical of anything that lies beyond, whether in the region of pure thought or of spiritual experience, not to speak of religious faith. The religious man, on the contrary, turns his scepticism against the world of man. He is conscious of the existence of another and greater world of spiritual reality in which we live and move and have our being, though it is hidden from us by the veil of sensible things. He may even think, like Newman, that the knowledge of the senses has a merely symbolic value; that "the whole series of impressions made on us by the senses may be but a Divine economy suited to our need, and the token of realities distinct from them, and such as might be revealed to us, nay, more perfectly,

by other senses as different from our existing ones as they are from one another." *

The one ultimate reality is the Being of God, and the world of man and Nature itself are only real in so far as they have their ground and principle of being in that supreme reality. In the words of a French writer of the seventeenth century: "It is the presence of God which, without cessation, draws the creation from the abyss of its own nothingness above which His omnipotence holds it suspended, lest of its own weight it should fall back therein; and serves it as the mortar and bond of connection which holds it together in order that all that it has of its creator should not waste and flow away like water that is not kept in its channel."

Thus, although God is not myself, nor a part of my being, "yet the relation of dependence that my life, my powers, and my operations bear to His Presence is more absolute, more essential, and more intimate than any relation I can have to the natural principles without which I could not exist . . . I draw my life from His Living Life . . . ; I am, I understand, I will, I act, I imagine, I smell, I taste, I touch, I see, I walk, and I love in the Infinite Being of God, within the Divine Essence and substance. . . .

"God in the heavens is more my heaven than the heavens themselves; in the sun He is more my light than the sun; in the air He is more my air than the air that I breathe sensibly. . . . He works in me all that I am, all that I see, all that I do or can do, as most intimate, most present, and most immanent in me, as the super-essential Author and Principle of my works, without whom we should melt away and disappear from ourselves and from our own activities." †

Or again, to quote Cardinal Bona, God is "the Ocean of all essence and existence, the very Being itself which contains all being. From Him all things depend;

* *University Sermons*, p. 350. In this remarkable passage he develops a parallelism between the symbolic character of sensible knowledge and that of mathematical calculi and musical notation.

† Chardon, *la Croix de Jesus*, pp. 422, 423, in Bremond, *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France*, viii, pp. 21-22.

they flow out from Him and flow back to Him and *are* in so far as they participate in His Being." *

Thus the whole universe is, as it were, the shadow of God and has its being in the contemplation or reflection of the Being of God. The spiritual nature reflects the Divine consciously, while the animal nature is a passive and unconscious mirror. Nevertheless, even the life of the animal is a living manifestation of the Divine, and the flight of the hawk or the power of the bull is an unconscious prayer. Man alone stands between these two kingdoms in the strange twilight world of rational consciousness. He possesses a kind of knowledge which transcends the sensible without reaching the intuition of the Divine.

It is only the mystic who can escape from this twilight world; who, in Sterry's words, can "descry a glorious eternity in a winged moment of Time—a bright Infinite in the narrow point of an object, who knows what Spirit means—that spire-top whither all things ascend harmoniously, where they meet and sit connected in an unfathomed Depth of Life." But the mystic is not the normal man; he is one who has transcended, at least momentarily, the natural limits of human knowledge. The ordinary man is by his nature immersed in the world of sense, and uses his reason in order to subjugate the material world to his own ends, to satisfy his appetites and to assert his will. He lives on the animal plane with a more than animal consciousness and purpose, and, in so far, he is less religious than the animal. The life of pure spirit is religious, and the life of the animal is also religious, since it is wholly united with the life-force that is its highest capacity of being. Only man is capable of separating himself alike from God and from Nature, of making himself his last end and living a purely self-regarding and irreligious existence.

And yet the man who deliberately regards self-assertion and sensual enjoyment as his sole ends, and finds complete satisfaction in them—the pure materialist—is not typical, he is almost as rare as the mystic. The normal man has an obscure sense of the existence of a

* Bona. *Via Compendii ad Deum.*

spiritual reality and a consciousness of the evil and misery of an existence which is the slave of sensual impulse and self-interest, and which must inevitably end in physical suffering and death. But how is he to escape from this wheel to which he is bound by the accumulated weight of his own acts and desires? How is he to bring his life into vital relation with that spiritual reality of which he is but dimly conscious and which transcends all the categories of his thought and the conditions of human experience? This is the fundamental religious problem which has perplexed and baffled the mind of man from the beginning, and is, in a sense, inherent in his nature.

I have intentionally stated the problem in its fullest and most classical form, as it has been formulated by the great minds of our own civilization, since the highest expression of an idea is usually also the most explicit and the most intelligible. But, as the writers whom I have quoted would themselves maintain, there is nothing specifically Christian about it. It is common to Christianity and to Platonism, and to the religious traditions of the ancient East. It is the universal attitude of the *anima naturaliter Christiana*, of that nature which the mediæval mystics term "noble," because it is incapable of resting satisfied with a finite or sensible good. It is "natural religion" not, indeed, after the manner of the religion of naturalism that we have already mentioned, but in the true sense of the word.

It is, of course, obvious that such conceptions of spiritual reality presuppose a high level of intellectual development and that we cannot expect to find them in a pre-philosophic stage of civilization. Nevertheless, however far back we go in history, and however primitive is the type of culture, we do find evidence for the existence of specifically religious needs and ideas of the supernatural which are the primitive prototypes or analogues of the conceptions which we have just described.

Primitive man believes no less firmly than the religious man of the higher civilizations in the existence of a spiritual world upon which the visible world and the life of man are dependent. Indeed, this spiritual world

is often more intensely realized and more constantly present to his mind than is the case with civilized man. He has not attained to the conception of an autonomous natural order, and, consequently, supernatural forces are liable to interpose themselves at every moment of his existence. At first sight the natural and the supernatural, the material and the spiritual, seem inextricably confused. Nevertheless, even in primitive nature-worship, the object of religious emotion and worship is never the natural phenomenon as such, but always the supernatural power which is obscurely felt to be present in and working through the natural object.

The essential difference between the religion of the primitive and that of civilized man is that for the latter the spiritual world has become a cosmos, rendered intelligible by philosophy, and ethical by the tradition of the world religions, whereas to the primitive it is a spiritual chaos in which good and evil, high and low, rational and irrational elements are confusedly mingled. Writers on primitive religion have continually gone astray through their attempts to reduce the spiritual world of the primitive to a single principle, to find a single cause from which the whole development may be explained and rendered intelligible. Thus Tylor finds the key in the belief in ghosts, Durkheim in the theory of an impersonal *mana* which is the exteriorization of the collective mind, and Frazer in the technique of magic. But in reality there is no single aspect of primitive religion which can be isolated and regarded as the origin of all the rest. The spiritual world of the primitive is far less unified than that of civilized man. High gods, nature spirits, the ghosts of the dead, malevolent demons, and impersonal supernatural forces and substances may all co-exist in it without forming any kind of spiritual system or hierarchy. Every primitive culture will tend to lay the religious emphasis on some particular point. In Central Africa witchcraft and the cult of ghosts may overshadow everything else; among the hunters of North America the emphasis may be laid on the visionary experience of the individual and the cult of animal guardians; and among the Hamitic

peoples the sky god takes the foremost place. But it is dangerous to conclude that the point on which attention is focussed is the whole field of consciousness. The high gods are often conceived as too far from man to pay much attention to his doings, and it is the lesser powers—the spirits of the field and the forest, or the ghosts of the dead—who come into closest relation with human life, and whose malevolence is most to be feared.

Consequently primitive religion is apt to appear wholly utilitarian and concerned with purely material ends. But here also the confusion of primitive thought is apt to mislead us. The ethical aspect of religion is not consciously recognized and cultivated as it is by civilized man, but it is none the less present in an obscure way. Primitive religion is essentially an attempt to bring man's life into relation with, and under the sanctions of, that other world of mysterious and sacred powers whose action is always conceived as the ultimate and fundamental law of life. Moreover, the sense of sin and of the need for purification or catharsis is very real to primitive man. No doubt sin appears to him as a kind of physical infection or contagion which seems to us of little moral value. Nevertheless, as we can see from the history of Greek religion, the sense of ritual defilement and that of moral guilt are very closely linked with one another, and the idea of an essential connection between moral and physical evil—between sin and death, for example—is found in the higher religions no less than among the primitives. *Libera nos a malo* is a universal prayer which answers to one of the oldest needs of human nature.

But the existence of this specifically religious need in primitive man—in other words, the naturalness of the religious attitude—is widely denied at the present day. It is maintained that primitive man is a materialist and that the attempt to find in primitive religion an obscure sense of the reality of spirit, or, indeed, anything remotely analogous to the religious experience of civilized man, is sheer metaphysical theorizing. This criticism is partly due to a tendency to identify any recognition of the religious element in primitive thought and culture

with the particular theories of religious origins which have been put forward by Tylor and Durkheim. In reality, however, the theories of the latter have much more in common with those of the modern writers whom I have mentioned than any of them have with the point of view of writers who recognize the objective and autonomous character of religion. All of them show that anti-metaphysical prejudice which has been so general during the last generation or two, and which rejects on *a priori* grounds any objective interpretation of religious experience. On the Continent there is already a reaction against the idea of a "science of religion" which, unlike the other sciences, destroys its own object and leaves us with a residuum of facts which belong to a totally different order. In fact, recent German writers such as Otto, Heiler, and Karl Beth tend rather to exaggerate the mystical and intuitive character of religious experience, whether in its primitive or advanced manifestations. But in this country the anti-metaphysical prejudice is still dominant. A theory is not regarded as "scientific" unless it explains religion in terms of something else—as an artificial construction from non-religious elements.

Thus Professor Perry writes: "The idea of deity has grown up with civilization itself, and in its beginnings it was constructed out of the most homely materials." He holds that religion was derived not from primitive speculation or symbolism nor from spiritual experience, but from a practical observation of the phenomena of life. Its origins are to be found in the association of certain substances, such as red earth, shells, crystals, etc., with the ideas of life and fertility and their use as amulets or fetishes in order to prolong life or to increase the sexual powers. From these beginnings religion was developed as a purely empirical system of ensuring material prosperity by the archaic culture in Egypt, and was thence gradually diffused throughout the world by Egyptian treasure-seekers and megalith builders. The leaders of these expeditions became the first gods, while the Egyptian practices of mummification and tomb-building were the source of all those ideas concerning

the nature of the soul and the existence of a spiritual world that are found among primitive peoples.

It is needless for us to discuss the archæological aspects of this pan-Egyptian hypothesis of cultural origins. From our present point of view the main objection to the theory lies in the naïve Euhemerism of its attitude to religion. For even if we grant that the whole development of higher civilization has proceeded from a single centre, that is a very different thing from admitting that a fundamental type of human experience could ever find its origin in a process of cultural diffusion. It is not as though Professor Perry maintained that primitive man lived a completely animal existence before the coming of the higher culture. On the contrary, the whole tendency of his thought has been to vindicate the essential *humanity* of the primitive. It is the claim of "the new anthropology" that it rehabilitates human nature itself and "disentangles the original nature of man from the systems, tradition, and machinery of civilization which have modified it."* If, then, primitive man is non-religious, the conclusion follows that human nature itself is non-religious, and religion, like war, is an artificial product of later development.

But this conclusion has been reached only by the forced construction which has been arbitrarily put upon the evidence. Because the primitive fetish has no more religious value for us than the mascot that we put on our motor-cars, we assume that it can have meant nothing more to primitive man. This, however, is to fall into the same error for which Mr. Massingham rightly condemns the older anthropology—the neglect of the factor of degeneration. Our mascot is a kind of fetish, but it is a degenerate fetish, and it is degenerate precisely because it has lost its religious meaning. The religious man no longer uses mascots, though, if he is a Catholic, he may use the image of a saint. To the primitive man his fetish is more than the one and less than the other. It has the sanctity of a relic and the irrationality of a mascot. Professor Lowie has described how an Indian offered to show him "the greatest thing

* H. J. Massingham, *The Heritage of Man*, p. 142.

in the world"; how he reverently uncovered one cloth wrapper after another; and how at length there lay exposed a simple bunch of feathers—a mere nothing to the alien onlooker, but to the owner a badge of his covenant with the supernatural world. "It is easy," he says, "to speak of the veneration extended to such badges . . . as fetishism, but that label with its popular meaning is monstrously inadequate to express the psychology of the situation. For to the Indian the material object is nothing apart from its sacred associations."*

So, too, when Mr. Massingham speaks of primitive religion as "a purely supernatural machinery, controlled by man, for insuring the material welfare of the community." He is right in his description of facts, but wrong in his appreciation of values. To us, agriculture is merely a depressed industry which provides the raw material of our dinners, and so we assume that a religion which is largely concerned with agriculture must have been a sordid materialistic business. But this is entirely to misconceive primitive man's attitude to Nature. To him, agriculture was not a sordid occupation; it was one of the supreme mysteries of life, and he surrounded it with religious rites because he believed that the fertility of the soil and the mystery of generation could only be ensured through the co-operation of higher powers. Primitive agriculture was, in fact, a kind of liturgy.

For us Nature has lost this religious atmosphere because the latter has been transferred elsewhere. Civilization did not create the religious attitude or the essential nature of the religious experience, but it gave them new modes of expression and a new intellectual interpretation. This was the achievement of the great religions or religious philosophies which arose in all the main centres of ancient civilization about the middle of the first millennium B.C.† They attained to the two fundamental concepts of metaphysical being and ethical order which have been the foundation of religious

* R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Religion*, p. 19.

† I have discussed this movement at greater length in *Progress and Religion*.

thought and the framework of religious experience ever since. Some of these movements of thought, such as Brahmanism, Taoism, and the Eleatic philosophy, concentrated their attention on the idea of Being, while others, such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Zoroastrianism, and the philosophy of Heracleitus, emphasized the idea of moral order, but all of them agreed in identifying the cosmic principle, the power behind the world, with a spiritual principle, conceived either as the source of being or as the source of ethical order.* Primitive man had already found the transcendent immanent in and working through Nature as the supernatural. The new religions found it in thought as the supreme Reality and in ethics as the Eternal Law. And, consequently, while the former still saw the spiritual world diffused and confused with the world of matter, the latter isolated it and set it over against the world of human experience, as Eternity against Time, as the Absolute against the Contingent, as Reality against Appearance, and as the Spiritual against the Sensible.

This was indeed the discovery of a new world for the religious consciousness. It was thereby liberated from the power of the nature daimons and the dark forces of magic and translated to a higher sphere—to the Brahma-world—"where there is not darkness, nor day nor night, nor being nor not-being, but the Eternal alone, the source of the ancient wisdom," to the Kingdom of Ahura and the Six Immortal Holy Ones, to the world of the Eternal Forms, the true home of the soul. And this involved a corresponding change in the religious attitude. The religious life was no longer bound up with irrational myths and non-moral tabus; it was a process of spiritual discipline directed towards the purification of the mind and the will—a conversion of the soul from the life of the senses to spiritual reality. The religious experience of primitive man had become obscured by magic and diabolism, and the visions and trances of the Shaman belong rather to the phenomena of Spiritualism than of mysticism. The new type of

* This may not appear obvious in the case of Buddhism. It is, however, implicit in the doctrine of Karman as the ground of the world process.

religious experience, on the other hand, had reached a higher plane. It consisted in an intuition which was essentially spiritual and found its highest realization in the vision of the mystic.

Thus each of the new religio-philosophic traditions—Brahmanism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Platonism—ultimately transcends philosophy and culminates in mysticism. They are not satisfied with the demonstration of the Absolute, they demand the experience of the Absolute also, whether it be the vision of the Essential Good and the Essential Beauty, through which the soul is made deiform, or that intuition of the nothingness and illusion inherent in all contingent being which renders a man *jivana mukti*, "delivered alive." But how is such an experience conceivable? It seems to be a contradiction in terms—to know the Unknowable, to grasp the Incomprehensible, to receive the Infinite. Certainly it transcends the categories of human thought and the normal conditions of human experience. Yet it has remained for thousands of years as the goal—whether attainable or unattainable—of the religious life, and no religion which ignores this aspiration can prove permanently satisfying to man's spiritual needs. The whole religious experience of mankind—indeed, the very existence of religion itself—testifies, not only to a sense of the Transcendent, but to an appetite for the Transcendent which can only be satisfied by immediate contact—by a vision of the supreme Reality. It is the goal of the intellect as well as of the will, for, as a Belgian philosopher has said, "The human mind is a *faculty in quest of its intuition*, that is to say, of assimilation with Being," and it is "perpetually chased from the movable, manifold and deficient towards the Absolute, the One and the Infinite, that is, towards *Being pure and simple*."*

A religion which remains on the rational level and denies the possibility of any real relation with a higher order of spiritual reality fails in its most essential function and, ultimately, like Deism, ceases to be a religion

* J. Maréchal, *Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics*; trans. Algar Thorold. 1927. pp. 101, 133.

at all. It may perhaps be objected that this view involves the identification of religion with mysticism, and that it would place a philosophy of intuition like that of the Vedanta higher than a religion of faith and supernatural revelation, like Christianity. In reality, however, the Christian insistence on the necessity of faith and revelation implies an even higher conception of transcendence than that of the Oriental religions. Faith transcends the sphere of rational knowledge even more than metaphysical intuition, and brings the mind into closer contact with superintelligible reality. Yet faith also, at least when it is joined with spiritual intelligence, is itself a kind of obscure intuition—a foretaste of the unseen,* and it also has its culmination in the mystical experience by which these obscure spiritual realities are realized experimentally and intuitively.

Thus Christianity is in agreement with the great oriental religions and with Platonism in its goal of spiritual intuition, though it places the full realization of that goal at a further and higher stage of spiritual development than the rest.† For all of them religion is not an affair of the emotions, but of the intelligence. Religious knowledge is the highest kind of knowledge, the end and coronation of the whole process of man's intellectual development. Herein they all differ profoundly from the conceptions of religion and religious experience which have been developed by modern European thinkers. For the modern mind no longer admits the possibility or the objective value of spiritual knowledge. The whole tendency of Western thought since the Renaissance, and still more since the eighteenth century, has been to deny the existence of any real knowledge except that of rational demonstration founded upon sensible experience. Intuition, whether metaphysical or mystical, is regarded as an irrational emotional conviction, and religion is reduced to subjective feeling and moral activity. Such a religion, however, can have no intellectual authority, and in consequence it also loses its social authority and even

* Cf. Rousselot, *Les Yeux de la Foi*.

† Cf. Postscript on *Spiritual Intuition in Christian Philosophy*, p. 19.

its moral influence. Civilization becomes completely rationalized and secularized, as may be seen from the last two centuries of European history. Nevertheless, man cannot live by reason alone. His spiritual life, and even his physical instincts, are starved in the narrow and arid territory of purely rational consciousness. He is driven to take refuge in the non-rational, whether it be the irrational blend of spirituality and emotionalism that is termed romanticism, or, as is increasingly the case to-day, in the frankly sub-rational sphere of pure sensationalism and sexual impulse.

To-day we are faced with the bankruptcy of rationalism and with the necessity of finding some principle of the religious order which can rescue us from the resultant confusion. One alternative is that of the late D. H. Lawrence, who accepts the failure of reason, and who seeks to find a basis for the religious consciousness not in spiritual intuition, but in that lower intuition of the senses and the physical life, the reality of which cannot be denied even by the rationalist. He writes :

"Come down from your pre-eminence, O mind, O lofty spirit!
Your hour has struck,
Your unique day is over,
Absolutism is finished in the human consciousness too.

"A man is many things : he is not only a mind.
But in his consciousness he is twofold at least :
He is cerebral, intellectual, mental, spiritual,
But also he is instinctive, intuitive, and in touch.

.

"The blood knows in darkness, and forever dark,
In touch, by intuition, instinctively.
The blood also knows religiously,
And of this the mind is incapable.
The mind is non-religious.

"To my dark heart gods *are*.
In my dark heart love is and is not.
But to my white mind
Gods and love alike are but an idea,
A kind of fiction." *

* *Pansies*, pp. 65-66.

This is, so it seems to me, the inevitable conclusion of the religious mind which no longer conceives the possibility of spiritual intuition or supernatural revelation. It is driven back upon the lower type of religious experience which primitive man possessed when he worshipped the daimonic powers which seemed to rule his life. And yet, even so, Lawrence's position is not wholly consistent, for even the lower type of religious experience is in a real sense spiritual. It is the result of a spiritual intuition, even though that intuition is, as St. Paul says, in bondage to "the weak and beggarly elements" of nature. The religion of the blood of which Lawrence writes, the religion of pure sense and animal instinct, can only be attained by the unreflecting animal soul. If we were conscious of it, we should not have it. It is a true spiritual instinct which prompted Lawrence to revolt against the tyranny of "the white mind" and to seek a deeper wisdom than that of the rational consciousness, but, owing to the denial and repression of true spiritual intuition, it has been deflected into a false cult of the primitive and the physical which can afford no true solution of his problem.

This is fully realized by another writer, who has considerable sympathy with his point of view and who also seeks escape from the present *impasse* in a religious experience. Mr. J. Middleton Murry not only admits the possibility of a spiritual intuition, but makes it the centre of his whole theory of life.

He recognizes the insufficiency of the modern scientific point of view which identifies reality with the physical and biological world. The human mind can only achieve unity with itself and harmony with the universe on the higher "metabiological" plane in an experience which transcends both sensible and rational knowledge. This experience finds its highest expression in the life of Jesus, and thereby Jesus was the creator of a new series of values and the starting-point of a new phase in the evolution of humanity.

Nevertheless, Mr. Murry holds that the reality which is apprehended in this way is not metaphysical or transcendent; it is simply the organic unity of Nature,

the unity of biological being. There is no eternal and transcendent being which we can think of as divine, but only the natural organism which is the product of the evolutionary process. For Mr. Murry is an adherent of the dogma of "Emergence," a worshipper of the God whom we create as we go along.* God is a useful fiction, a creature of the human mind, not the ultimate ground of reality. This relativism, however, ill accords with the absolutism of his theory of knowledge. It is difficult to see how we can attain to a metabiological plane of consciousness and activity if there is no corresponding metabiological stage of being. For metabiological activity implies metaphysical being, no less than biological activity involves physical being. We must either accept the reality and autonomy of spiritual being or abandon the possibility of spiritual knowledge. It is true that the intuition of unity of which Mr. Murry speaks does not necessarily involve the belief in the transcendent personal God of Christian doctrine. It has more affinity with the monism of the Vedanta, or still more with that of Taoism. But it does necessitate, no less than Taoism, the idea of an eternal transcendental principle which is the source and not the product of the cosmic process.

It may be objected that Mr. Murry's philosophy has in fact arisen directly from his spiritual experience, and, consequently, that it cannot be inconsistent with it. But this is not exactly the case. Certainly Mr. Murry's theory of the existence of metabiological values and of a higher form of knowledge than the purely rational springs directly from his experience. But this is not so with regard to his denial of the transcendent and the supernatural. That was due not to his mysticism, but to his adherence to the dogmas of scientific naturalism, and he has interpreted his experience to accord with these preconceived ideas.

He himself points out that his first reaction to his experience was purely religious—a conviction of spiritual

* It is true that he does not term this concept God. Unlike Professor Alexander, he reserves this title to the transcendent God of the old religions.

reality and spiritual regeneration, and that his mature philosophy is not so much a logical consequence of his mystical experience as the means by which he succeeded in "disintoxicating" himself from it. It is conditioned throughout by his fundamental hostility to any form of supernaturalism—by his conviction that the introduction of the category of the supernatural involves "mental and spiritual suicide."*

This prejudice has been firmly implanted in the modern mind by two centuries of dogmatic naturalism, but it is difficult to understand its rational justification in the present instance. From the point of view of scientific mechanicism there is certainly no room for the supernatural, but on that assumption Mr. Murry's category of the metabiological must also be excluded. The anti-supernaturalist view rests fundamentally on the hypothesis of a universe in which quality and value have no meaning and where everything is reducible to matter and energy. If we once admit the possibility of a mode of spiritual consciousness or being which transcends the biological, there seems no reason to regard the human mind as its only field of manifestation.

It is no less reasonable to suppose that the metabiological plane is the point at which a higher order of being has inserted itself into the life of humanity than to suppose that it is a completely new order which has "emerged" from below. Even in the sensible world we have an example of the way in which a higher order of being can intervene to modify the natural development of a lower order. From the animal standpoint, man himself is a supernatural being whose action governs their life in a mysterious way and who even creates new creatures like the setter and the racehorse, and admits them to a certain participation in his own life. And

* This dogmatic acceptance of Naturalism has entered so deeply into Mr. Murry's mind that the very idea of the supernatural is rejected with a kind of sacred horror as a blasphemous impiety. He writes: "To introduce, or to be prepared to introduce, the category of the supernatural into my thinking would be mental and spiritual suicide. A world which at a certain point . . . ceased to belong to the natural order is no world for me, a man of the twentieth century, to contemplate or live in; it would be a cheap and vulgar world from which it would be my duty as a man to escape immediately."—*God*, p. 112.

why, then, is it irrational to believe that, as Plato says, mankind is "the flock of the Gods," that human life is susceptible to the influence of a higher power which fosters in it those new capacities and modes of being which we call spiritual and metabiological? Such a belief may seem to us incredible, but it is not really irrational. It would indeed be strange if reality did not transcend man's comprehension qualitatively as well as quantitatively. The refusal to admit this possibility rests not so much on reason as on the humanist prejudice which insists that the human mind is the highest of all possible forms of existence and the only standard of reality. It is this prejudice which prevents Mr. Murry from developing the full implications of his religious experience. He has recognized one truth which is vital for religion—that the path of human development must lie in the spiritual, not the physical, world, and that his nature is not wholly earthbound—that it has a window that is open to the infinite. But, on the other hand, he rejects the other truth that is equally vital—the transcendence and absoluteness of spiritual reality. The religious attitude is only possible in the presence of the eternal and the transcendent. Any object that falls short of this fails to inspire the sense of awe and self-surrender which is essential to true religion. Man cannot worship himself, nor can he adore a Time God which is the creation of his own mind. As soon as he recognizes its fictitious character such an idea loses all its religious power. And for the same reason every attempt to create a new religion on purely rational and human foundations is inevitably doomed to failure.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

POSTSCRIPT.—ON SPIRITUAL INTUITION IN CHRISTIAN
PHILOSOPHY

THE problem of spiritual intuition and its reconciliation with the natural conditions of human knowledge lies at the root of philosophic thought, and all the great metaphysical systems since the time of Plato have attempted to find a definitive

solution. The subject is no less important for the theologian, since it enters so largely into the question of the nature of religious knowledge and the limits of religious experience. The orthodox Christian is, however, debarred from the two extreme philosophic solutions of pure idealism and radical empiricism, since the one leaves no place for faith and supernatural revelation, and the other cuts off the human mind entirely from all relation to spiritual reality. Yet even so there remains a vast range of possible solutions which have been advocated by Catholic thinkers from the empiricism of the mediæval nominalists to the ontologism of Malebranche and Rosmini. Leaving aside the more eccentric and unrepresentative thinkers, we can distinguish two main currents in Catholic philosophy. On the one hand there is the Platonic tradition that is represented by the Greek Fathers, and, above all, by St. Augustine and his mediæval followers such as St. Bonaventure; on the other, the Aristotelian tradition which found classical expression in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. But it is important not to exaggerate the divergences between the two schools. Both of them seek to find a *via media* between the two extreme solutions. St. Bonaventure is not a pure Platonist, nor St. Thomas a pure Aristotelian. The former rejects the doctrine of innate ideas, while the latter finds the source of intelligibility in the divine ideas, and regards the human mind as receiving its light from the divine intelligence.* Hence, although Thomism insists on the derivation of our ideas from sensible experience, it is far from denying the existence of spiritual intuition. On this point I will quote the words of a French Dominican, Père Joret: "Let us not forget," he writes, "that the human intelligence, also, is intuitive by nature and predisposition. No doubt, as it is united substantially with matter, it cannot thenceforth know except by proceeding from sensible realities and by means of images. But, apart from this, our intelligence is intuitive. Its first act at the dawn of its life, at its awakening, is an intuition, the intuition of being, or, more concretely, of 'a thing which is,' and at the same time, as though it already unconsciously carried them in itself, there suddenly appear with an ineluctable certainty the first principles" of identity, contradiction, causality, and the like. It is from our intuition of first principles that all our knowledge proceeds. St. Thomas says: "As the enquiry of reason starts from a simple intuition of the intelligence, so also it ends in the certainty of intelligence, when

* St. Thomas himself insists on the fundamental agreement of the two theories. "*Non multum autem refert dicere quod ipsa intelligibilia participantur a Deo, vel quod lumen faciens intelligibilia participetur.*" Cf. Gilson, *Pourquoi S. Thomas à critiqué S. Augustin*, p. 119.

the conclusions that have been discovered are brought back to the principles from which they derive their certitude." Père Joret insists on the importance of this intuitive faculty as the natural foundation of religious experience. It is not itself mystical, but it is the essential natural preparation and prerequisite for mysticism. The failure to recognize this, which has been so common among theologians during the last two centuries, has, he says, been deplorable not only in its effects on the study of mysticism, but in its practical consequences for the spiritual life.*

It is easy to understand the reasons for this attitude of hesitation and distrust with regard to intuitive knowledge. If the intuition of pure being is interpreted in an excessively realist sense, we are led not merely to ontologism but to pantheism—to the identification of that being which is common to everything which exists with the Transcendent and Absolute Being which is God. And this danger has led to the opposite error of minimizing the reality of the object of our intuition, and reducing it to a mere logical abstraction.

Here again it is necessary to follow the middle way. The being which is the object of our knowledge is neither wholly real nor purely logical and conceptual. The intuition of pure being is a very high and immaterialized form of knowledge, but it is not a direct intuition of spiritual reality. It stands midway between the world of sensible experience and the world of spiritual reality. On the one hand it is the culminating point of our ordinary intellectual activity, and on the other it leads directly to the affirmation of the Absolute and the Transcendent.†

Hence it is always possible, as Père Maréchal shows,‡ that the intuition of pure being may become the occasion or starting-point of an intuition of a higher order. But it is difficult to decide, in concrete cases, whether the supreme intuition of the Neoplatonist or the Vedantist philosopher is simply the intuition of pure being interpreted in an ontologist sense, or whether it is a genuine intuition of spiritual reality. There is no *a priori* reason for excluding the latter alternative; indeed, in some cases

* F. D. Joret, O.P., *La Contemplation Mystique d'après St. Thomas d'Aquin*. Bruges, 1923, pp. 83-90.

† "Cette intuition (de l'être saisi par l'abstraction formel) est fugitive, et cependant l'on comprend en descendant de ce sommet—pour penser de nouveau l'être comme tout universel dans l'abstraction totale—que si l'intelligence n'avait pas foncièrement cette intuition, perpétuelle quoique enveloppée généralement de virtualités, la caractéristique même de son activité disparaîtrait, et il lui serait impossible, en particulier, d'affirmer l'existence inconditionnée d'un Être qui dépasse l'expérience."—P. J. Webert, O.P., *Essai de Métaphysique Thomiste*, p. 52. Cf. the whole of Chaps. II and III.

‡ Cf. *supra*, p. 13.

it seems absolutely necessary to accept it. Nevertheless, this higher intuition is not necessarily always the same. It is possible to distinguish several different types of intuition, or to find several different explanations of it. In the first place there is the possibility of a very high form of metaphysical intuition by which the mind sees clearly the absolute transcendence of spirit in relation to sensible things and the element of nothingness or not-being which is inherent in the world of sensible experience.* This form of intuition seems adequate to explain the spiritual experience which is typical of the oriental religions, e.g., the intuition of *advaita*—non-duality, which is characteristic of the Vedanta. But there are other cases which suggest a higher form of experience, and one which is more strictly comparable to the higher experiences of the Christian mystic. In such cases the obvious explanation is that such experience is mystical in the full sense of the word, since we need not deny the existence of supernatural grace wherever the human mind turns towards God and does what lies in its power—*facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam*.

But while we must admit the essentially supernatural character of all true mystical experience, it is still possible that this higher experience may have its psychological roots in a rudimentary natural capacity of the soul for the intuition of God. This is certainly not the common theological view, but there are, nevertheless, Catholic theologians, such as St. Bonaventure and, above all, the great mediæval mystics of Germany and the Low Countries, who teach that the human soul possesses by its very nature a real but obscure knowledge of God. St. Bonaventure argues that Aristotle's theory of the sensible origin of all human knowledge only holds good of our knowledge of external reality, not of those realities which are essentially present to the soul itself; consequently "the soul knows God and itself and the things that are in itself without the help of the exterior senses."† "*Deus praesentissimus est ipsi animæ et eo ipso cognoscibilis*."

The mediæval mystics base their whole theory of mysticism on this doctrine of the knowledge of God essentially present in the human soul. Underneath the surface of our ordinary consciousness, the sphere of the discursive reason, there is a deeper psychological level, "the ground of the soul," to which sensible images and the activity of the discursive reason cannot penetrate. This is the domain of the spiritual intuition, "the summit of the

* M. Maritain admits the possibility of this kind of intuition, but he regards it as an anomalous form of experience which is neither metaphysical nor mystical. Cf. "Expérience Mystique et Philosophie," in *Revue de Philosophie*, November 1926, p. 606.

† Bon. in *II Sent.*, d. 39, q. 2.

mind," and the spiritual will which is naturally directed towards God. Here the soul is in immediate contact with God, who is present to it as its cause and the principle of its activity. It is, in fact, a mirror which has only to be cleansed and turned towards its object to reflect the image of God. In the words of Ruysbroeck: "In the most noble part of the soul, the domain of our spiritual powers, we are constituted in the form of a living and eternal mirror of God; we bear in it the imprint of His eternal image, and no other image can ever enter there." Unceasingly this mirror remains under the eyes of God, "and participates thus with the image that is graven there from God's eternity. It is in this image that God has known us in Himself before we were created, and that He knows us now in time, created as we are for Himself. This image is found essentially and personally in all men; each man possesses it whole and entire, and all men together possess no more of it than does each one. In this way we are all one, intimately united in our eternal image, which is the image of God and the source in us all of our life and of our coming into existence. Our created essence and our life are joined to it immediately as to their eternal cause. Yet our created being does not become God, any more than the image of God becomes a creature."*

The soul "in its created being incessantly receives the impress of its Eternal Archetype, like a flawless mirror, in which the image remains steadfast and in which the reflection is renewed without interruption by its ever new reception in new light. This essential union of our spirit with God does not exist in itself, but it dwells in God, and it flows forth from God and it depends upon God and it returns to God as to its Eternal Origin. And in this wise, it has never been, nor ever shall be, separated from God; for this union is within us by our naked nature, and were this nature to be separated from God, it would fall into pure nothingness. And this union is above time and space and is always and incessantly active according to the way of God. But our nature, forasmuch as it is indeed like unto God but in itself is creature, receives the impress of its Eternal Image passively. This is that nobleness which we possess by nature in the essential unity of our spirit, where it is united to God according to nature. *This neither makes us holy, nor blessed, for all men, whether good or evil, possess it within themselves; but it is certainly the first cause of all holiness and all blessedness.*"†

According to this view, every man naturally possesses an

* Ruysbroeck, *The Mirror of Eternal Salvation*, Chap. VIII.

† Ruysbroeck, *The Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage*, Bk. II, Chap. LVII (trans. C. A. Wynschenk Dom).

immediate contact with God in the deepest part of his soul; but he remains, as a rule, without the realization and the enjoyment of it.

His soul is turned outwards to the things of sense, and his will is directed to temporal goods. It is the work of grace to reconstitute this divine image, to bring a man back to his essential nature, to cleanse the mirror of his soul so that it once more receives the divine light. Nevertheless, even apart from grace, the divine image remains present in the depths of the soul, and whenever the mind withdraws itself from its surface activity and momentarily concentrates itself within itself, it is capable of an obscure consciousness of the presence of God and of its contact with divine reality.

This doctrine is undoubtedly orthodox, and involves neither illuminism nor ontologism, still less pantheism. Nevertheless, it runs counter to the tendency to asceticism which has been so powerful since the Reformation, and it is also difficult to reconcile with the strictly Aristotelian theory of knowledge and of the structure of the human mind as taught by St. Thomas. Recently, however, Père Picard has made a fresh survey of the problem, and has endeavoured to show that St. Thomas himself, in his commentary on the Sentences, admits the existence of this obscure intuition of God, and uses it as a proof of the soul's resemblance to the Trinity which was so often insisted on by St. Augustine.* He does not, however, base his view on the argument from authority so much as on general theological considerations, as the hypothesis which is most in harmony with the teaching and experience of Catholic mystics. Certainly, it seems, the existence of an obscure but profound and continuous intuition of God provides a far more satisfactory basis for an explanation of the facts of religious experience, as we see them in history, than a theory which leaves no place for any experience of spiritual reality, except a merely inferential rational knowledge on the one hand, and on the other the revelation which is entirely derived from supernatural faith and has no natural psychological basis.

C. D.

* Cf. "La Saisie immédiate de Dieu dans les Etats Mystiques," by G. Picard, in *Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique*, 1923, pp. 37-63, 156-181. The subject is also discussed by Père Hugueny, O.P., in his introduction to the new French translation of Tauler (Vol. I, 73-154). He concludes that Tauler's doctrine is based upon that of Albertus Magnus, and diverges on several points from that of St. Thomas.

ART. 2.—ART AND MR. MARITAIN

1. *Art et Scolastique*. Par Jacques Maritain. Paris: Rouart et Fils, 1927.
2. *Art and Scholasticism with Other Essays*. By Jacques Maritain. Translated by J. F. Scanlan. London: Sheed and Ward, 1930.

THE ostensible purpose of *Art et Scolastique* is to bring to bear what its author calls the wisdom of Antiquity upon the problems which, in his opinion, are now confusing the practice of the arts. Actually, the burden of Mr. Maritain's book is a theory of fine art in general and of poetry in particular, which is neither the Schoolmen's nor the Ancients', but his own. And the theory is false.

If one had to take into account only Mr. Maritain's earnest and persuasive talent, this would be a matter of concern. But additional considerations make it more serious still. There is the breadth and strength of the neo-Thomist movement under the ægis of which the book is put forth. There is the frequent appeal in its pages to the authority of St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, or other mighty expounder of wisdom. And there is the fact that much in the book is incontrovertible: this last a source of peculiar danger, since the unwary reader, coming upon so many self-evident and admirably stated truths, may easily be led thereby to believe that the rest of it is equally true.

So altogether, Mr. Maritain's theory being false, it is imperative that its falsity should be clearly exhibited by someone. The appearance of the book in translation provides the occasion for an Englishman to attempt the task, the more that its author has lately made a round of visits in this country and become known to a wider English circle.

In any case his readers everywhere should welcome an examination of his views by someone outside France, by someone, that is to say, who is free of the political and religious bias without which, as Mr. Thibaudet has pointed out, writing in France is apparently not possible.

Let the two parts of the theory be referred to respectively as the general and the special theory. I confine myself to the general theory.

So far as this general theory is concerned, there will be no need in the following discussion to go beyond the pages of *Art et Scolastique* itself: Mr. Maritain can be condemned out of his own mouth.

The first four chapters of *Art et Scolastique* justify the author's description of his essay as a "study of Thomist æsthetics." In them he points out that for the Schoolmen the province of art was the whole domain of making. In their eyes, art belonged not merely to the activity of Phidias and Praxiteles, but also to that of the village carpenter, the blacksmith, the shipwright, the clock-maker, and to that of the grammarian and the logician. They divided the arts into servile and liberal, according as these called for corporal labour or not; and if in the Middle Ages music was a liberal art, painting and sculpture then ranked as servile.

So the first four chapters. But in the fifth chapter Mr. Maritain comes to treat of beauty, and although at the outset he continues to stick closely to the Schools, he already interpolates interpretations of his own. Eventually he comes to beauty and art, the earliest reference being to poetry, and here the testimony adduced is that of a modern author. After references to Aristotle, Plotinus, Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Augustine, Albertus Magnus, Aquinas and Cardinal Cajetan—references some of which I shall mention later—we come upon a name sharply contrasting with these, a name never before seen among those of the Schoolmen—Baudelaire! And thereafter, in the remainder of the fifth chapter and throughout chapters six and seven, Mr. Maritain is, for the most part, entirely on his own.

The definite break with Scholasticism may be put as occurring with the quotation from Baudelaire on pages 51-2; and quickly there follows, on page 53,* this passage:

* My references are to the French edition; my quotations from Mr. Scanlan's translation, except in the case of a word here and there, where a different reading seems to me, not better of course, but preferable. Mr. Scanlan's rendering of a difficult book into English has not had the notice

Art in general is directed to the making of a work. But certain arts are directed to the making of a work that is *beautiful*, and therein they differ essentially from all others. The work produced in all the other arts is itself ordered to the use of mankind : it is therefore a mere means ; and it is wholly enclosed within a definite material style (*genre*). The work produced in the fine arts is ordered to beauty ; in so far as it is beautiful, it is an end, an absolute, it is self-sufficient ; and if, as work to be done, it is material and enclosed within a style, as beautiful it belongs to the realm of the mind, and is plunged in the transcendence and the infinity of being.

The fine arts thus stand out of the *genus* art as man stands out of the *genus* animal. And like man himself, they are, as it were, a horizon where mind and matter meet. They have a spiritual soul.

This is not Scholasticism. As to that, we find on pages 32-3 the statement :

It is curious to notice that the Ancients allotted in their classifications no separate place to what we call the fine arts.

(Curious, indeed !) This is not Scholasticism, and yet it is the centre of Mr. Maritain's book. And if we ask ourselves whether or not we can accept the theory of fine art thus enunciated, we find that we must first have the answers to two questions :

1. What is beauty in art ?
2. Are the fine arts actually ordered to beauty as their sole end ?

The second question is better taken first. "In the case of the fine arts," Mr. Maritain reiterates (p. 78) "the general end of the art is beauty." But elsewhere (p. 245, note 39) he also says :

One single art may quite well pursue usefulness and beauty at the same time. Such is, *par excellence*, the case with architecture.

in the press it deserves. I take the opportunity as well as the liberty of complimenting him on the extreme care he has evidently lavished upon his task ; his treatment of the notes (which fill a hundred pages of the French edition), where he has translated the Latin, supplied Greek contexts, and now and again elucidated uncommon terms, is especially admirable.

And if we examine the other fine arts, we see that in this respect architecture is not alone. Take the art of drawing, with which may be included the arts of painting and engraving. Mr. Maritain remarks (p. 288, note 114):

In a general way—as appears from a study of the vases recently discovered at Susa, and dating no doubt from about 3000 B.C.—the art of drawing would seem to have begun by being a writing, and by fulfilling hieroglyphic, ideographic, or even heraldic needs, entirely devoid of æstheticism, concern for beauty having been introduced only much later.

The mention here of “concern for beauty” can be disregarded. The point for the moment is that the art of drawing began, according to Mr. Maritain himself, with an end which was not beauty, whatever beauty may be. And, as an instant’s reflection shows us, it has gone on having another end of the same kind. The case is the same with painting and engraving. The end is, in the language of Aristotle, “to imitate and represent various objects through the medium of colour and form.”* Moreover, until recently, the imitating and representing have been for perfectly definite purposes. Italian painting, for instance, was, during a long period, the illustration of incidents in religious history. The Dutch school chose to illustrate domestic life and portray ordinary human beings and scenery. So with sculpture: Greek sculpture was practised for the purpose of representing the personages of mythology and imitating the features of notable or wealthy citizens. So with music and dancing: in Antiquity the dance was a religious rite and designed accordingly; when music reached its full development, in the eighteenth century, its purpose, too, was to play a part in religious worship. One cannot listen to either of what have been declared to be the two greatest of all musical compositions, *The Messiah* and the *Mass in B Minor*, and imagine it primarily ordered to beauty, let beauty be what it may. When music lacks that particular purpose, it is still, as for example with Mozart, Beethoven, or Wagner, essentially what

* *Poetics* (trans. Butcher), 1447a, 19.

Aristotle termed a "mode of imitation": it imitates emotion, and not æsthetic emotion—that is one of the things it arouses in the auditor—but ordinary emotions such as joy or sadness, or the perfectly definite emotion of, say, the overture to *Egmont* on the one hand or of *Eine kleine Nachtmusik* on the other. So with poetry and oratory, if oratory is to be ranged among the fine arts.

It may be said that one cannot attribute to the still life so common in modern painting or, for instance, to several of Bach's organ works any *useful* purpose of this nature. It remains that in the still life there is still an evident imitation of objects. But in any case the answer to the objection is this: if we survey the whole field of fine art productions, we see works devoid of any purpose except that of being beautiful, to be relatively rare—the beautiful having still to be discussed—and such works, examples of which are the organ works of the virtuoso and the studies in still life, should be regarded as having been executed by the artist purely for—not beauty, but exercise. It is because he both must paint and has nothing *useful* to paint, that the painter takes to the still life. It is because Bach had to be exercising and training his *habitus* (a Scholastic term which will be explained presently) that, in addition to his church compositions, he composed *useless* and merely beautiful works on his organ.

Accordingly we may lay it down that *the fine arts are not ordered to beauty exclusively, whatever beauty may be: in a wide sense of the word, works of fine art have a utility.*

Now let us take Mr. Maritain's statement: "But certain arts are directed to the making of a work that is *beautiful*, and therein they differ essentially from all the others"; and examine it from the other side. Let us inquire into our first question: What is beauty in art? And we shall see whether or not beauty in art is confined to the fine arts.

Following Mr. Maritain, we may take St. Thomas's *essential* definition of beauty, as Mr. Maritain quotes it (p. 250, note 49), as follows:

For beauty three things are requisite. First, integrity or perfection: for whatever things are imperfect, thereby are ugly. And due proportion, or consonance. And again clarity or brightness: so brightly coloured objects are said to be beautiful.*

Here St. Thomas, it will be noticed, is not speaking of artistic beauty in particular, but of beauty in general. In so far as the qualities he enumerates inhere in the handiwork of man, surely they may inhere in any thing man makes. To any object that man fashions, he may impart due proportion and clarity, and—not perfection, since nothing human can be perfect—but the earnest of perfection.

That the handiwork, whatever it is, contains no more than the earnest of perfection the Schoolmen indicated clearly enough in their definition of art, as it is expounded in the early chapters of *Art et Scolastique*. Art for them was above all intellectual, a quality of the artificer's intelligence. They held art to be a *habitus* of the practical intellect; and by a *habitus* they of course meant neither a habit nor a gift, but a condition or form to which certainly the artificer may be predisposed, but which invariably and especially he has, just as an athlete has his condition or form, to develop by training and practice. This *habitus*, inasmuch as it overcomes the intellective faculty's initial indetermination and raises it in respect of a definite object to a maximum of perfection, *i.e.*, of operative efficiency, is a virtue; and *qua habitus, qua* virtue, art carries with it an infallible rightness. The infallibility, however, concerns only the mind's regulation of the work, and not the work's actual execution. Art endows its possessor, not with the usage of making well, but only with the power of making well. Art's principal act is not an act of commanding; it is no more than an act of judgment.

Thus no particular kind of man-made work can be credited with possessing actual perfection, and assuredly no particular kind more than other kinds: to the extent there is the earnest, the promise or evidence, of perfection, that may inhere in handiwork of every kind. On this

* *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8.

point, Mr. Maritain himself gives his case away, when he says (p. 31) :

The virtue of the *artifex* was [for the Schoolmen] a virtue of the intelligence, and it endowed *the humblest artisan* with a certain perfection of the mind (*italics mine*).

Again, repeating what it is that the Schoolmen found beauty to consist in, he says (pp. 46-7) :

Beauty for [St. Thomas] is present as soon as the radiation of any form over a suitably proportioned matter comes to please the intelligence, and he is careful to warn us that beauty is in a manner *relative*—not to the disposition of the subject, in the sense in which relativity is understood nowadays, but to the peculiar nature and end of the thing, and to the formal conditions in which it is taken (*his italics*).

Here we see that what pleases the spectator's intelligence in the work of art is what the artificer's intelligence has put into it. In the juxtaposition of the two passages we see how art and beauty are related. And there is no ground in either for separating the fine arts from the others.

The absence of this ground is confirmed if, from St. Thomas, we turn to the facts. There is no ground for the separation of the fine arts from the others in that those who pursue the fine arts exercise, as Mr. Maritain says (p. 62), "a *disinterested* activity" : for disinterestedness is as indispensable to good craftsmanship in carpentry or shipbuilding, as it is to good craftsmanship in painting or music.

Likewise there is no ground in that, according to Mr. Maritain (p. 80) :

It is with prudence, *eubulia*, good sense, and perspicacity, circumspection, precaution, deliberation, and industry, memory, foresight, intelligence and divination—by using the rules of prudence, not determined beforehand but established according to the contingency of the particular circumstances, in a manner ever novel and unpredictable—that the artist applies the rules of his art.

There is no ground here, for the virtues mentioned are as desirable in the artisan as in the artist.

Again, Mr. Maritain quotes Mr. Max Jacob (p. 173) as inquiring: "Chaste fear, piety, strength, counsel, science, intelligence, wisdom, 'what would one say to a work bearing the visible traces of such gifts?'" Does Mr. Maritain wish to suggest that there would be impropriety in the display of these gifts by the artisan?

Evidently, then, when confronted with a job to be done, artisan and artist are altogether on a par.

What of the object to make which is the job? Far more, it will be said, goes into the beautiful painting than technical knowledge and skill. Granted. But so, also, far more than technical knowledge and skill goes into the beautiful motor car, liner, railway coach, aeroplane, etc., to which (as Mr. Maritain notes on p. 282) Mr. Le Corbusier has pointed. Mr. Le Corbusier has indeed made for me my point about the fine arts, since he has said: "Houses are dwelling machines." When, however, Mr. Maritain comments, that because in architecture a building should be given no part merely for decoration, but every necessary part of it be made decorative, it would be a mistake to think "everything must be reduced to what fulfils a useful function," his comment is irrelevant. The point is not that a use has to be found for everything. The point is: Whether the object be made by artisan or artist, it normally has a use or purpose, and whether it be made by artist or artisan, it can equally be a thing of beauty.

In fact beauty, as the earnest of perfection, can be no abstract source of delight wherever apprehended: it must reside in the very essence of what possesses it. What could be perfect must be the object itself. The beauty of a beautiful horse, for instance, is the approximation of that individual horse to the perfect horse, *i.e.*, the horse which would be in every respect perfect horseness. And it cannot be otherwise with the beauty found in the handiwork of man.

That is why, incidentally, only the expert, only the man familiar with the science and art of painting from

the painter's standpoint, can tell *why* and *how* a particular painting is "good," *i.e.*, beautiful.

Accordingly we may lay it down that *beauty, as it may be apprehended in man-made things, is simply the result of happily adequate craftsmanship.*

And if it is indeed true that the fine arts are not ordered to beauty exclusively, and that beauty, in man-made things, is simply the result of happily adequate craftsmanship, then we can understand what puzzles Mr. Maritain, how "the Ancients allotted in their classifications no separate place to what we call the fine arts"; and we may wonder at the same time if we ourselves have come to make that separate place for any but reasons of social evolution.

Both the surgeon and the artist have risen in social status since the Middle Ages (and on this rise Mr. Maritain has an interesting note, pp. 246-9); but whereas there is a sound reason why to-day the surgeon should no longer rank with the barber, *viz.*, that the science and art of surgery have tremendously advanced in the interval, no like reason exists for our not ranking the artist with the artisan: the science and art of painting, for example, were, if anything, greater at the time Leonardo protested against the inclusion of painting among the servile arts than they are at present.

Now with that enough has been said, I think, to dispose of Mr. Maritain's assertion: "Certain arts are directed to the making of a work that is *beautiful*, and therein they differ from all the others." But as one pursues the examination of *Art et Scolastique*, one finds that he shifts his ground. After first contending that the fine arts differ from the other arts in that the fine arts "are directed to making a work that is *beautiful*," he later seeks to maintain, instead, that it is the beauty in works of fine art which differs from the beauty in works produced by the other arts. Next, then, this second claim has to be examined.

That the fine arts are not "pure," he not only admits, but insists. He says (pp. 148-9):

Where would the notion of "pure art," driven to its ultimate
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logical extremes, lead one? To an art altogether isolated from everything but its own peculiar rules. . . . [An art thus isolated] by dint of being itself destroys itself, for its existence depends on man, in whom it subsists, and on things, which are its nourishment. The *angéliste* suicide—through forgetfulness of matter.

So far, so good. But also he argues that that whereby the fine arts are "impure," that in which they are to be distinguished from the others, is the nature of the beauty they produce. Through their beauty, works of fine art are, he says, symbolic!

Having quoted Aristotle on imitation in art,* he says:

If the Philosopher, pursuing his usual method, goes straight to the primitive elementary case, it would be a complete mistake to stop there and to restrict the word "imitation" to its popularly accepted meaning. . . . [Since the time of the man of the reindeer age] the *joy of imitation* has become remarkably purified (pp. 91-2, his italics).

And with what result has the "joy of imitation" been purified? That he at once goes on to tell us (pp. 92-3):

Art, in so far as it is ordered to beauty, does not stop—at least when its object permits—at shapes or colours, or at sounds or words, considered in themselves and *as things* (they must be so considered to begin with, that is the first condition), but considers them *also* as making known something other than themselves, that is to say *as symbols* (his italics).

To which he adds:

The beauty of a picture or of a statue is thus incomparably richer than the beauty of a carpet, of a Venetian glass, or of an amphora.

As to this last remark, obviously in itself the beauty is not richer. In a picture or a statue there is not necessarily any greater evidence of perfection than in an amphora, any better proportions than in a Venetian glass, more clarity or brightness than in the texture and design of a carpet.

* *Op. cit.*, 1448b, 5-14.

How, then, can the media employed in the fine arts "make known something other than themselves"? How can the beauty of works of fine art be specially transcendental, be "metaphysical or spiritual"? (p. 249, note 43)

Mr. Maritain appeals to St. Thomas. But, of course, such a notion of a peculiar beauty in fine art has no connexion whatever with St. Thomas. Here, according to Mr. Maritain himself (pp. 260-1, note 56), are St. Thomas's words: "The beautiful, however, concerns the force of knowledge; for things are said to be beautiful when they give pleasure at sight" ("*Pulchra enim dicuntur, quæ visa placent*"); and: "Let that be termed beautiful the mere apprehension of which gives pleasure."† These statements can only mean: Beauty is apprehended or known immediately, and the apprehension, *alias* knowledge (for apprehension is of course knowledge) is a pleasure. And the pleasure is not a mere emotion, but a pleasure for the intelligence. As Mr. Maritain says (p. 26): "Beauty is essentially the object of *intelligence*, for what *knows* in the full meaning of the word is the mind" (his italics).

Thus St. Thomas. But Mr. Maritain, speaking of the *per effectum*, as distinct from the (already given) *essential* definition of beauty by St. Thomas, *i.e.*, speaking of the words *id quod visum placet*, says (p. 35):

The four words say all that is necessary: a vision, that is to say an *intuitive knowledge*, and a *joy* (his italics).

And the exegesis: "a vision, that is to say, an intuitive knowledge," is all Mr. Maritain's own. If St. Thomas had affirmed the apprehension of beauty to be intuitive, in the Scholastic sense of intuitive, he would certainly be quoted in the book before us as doing so. Evidently he never affirmed anything of the kind. And for a good reason. It is nonsense! The suggestion is nothing less than that when we have immediate knowledge, we are angelic. Yet all our perceptual knowledge is thus

* Mr. Scanlan's translation.

† *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4 and I-II, q. 27, a. 1 respectively.

immediate; and, further, it has been pointed out by a master in philosophy* that so likewise is all inference strictly immediate. Perhaps Mr. Maritain believes we are angels unawares?

In the passages cited, St. Thomas is clearly speaking either of beauty in general, or of the good as beautiful. No doubt for him there were kinds of beauty which can be known only intuitively, in his sense of intuitively; but that he ranged artistic beauty among them is not to be supposed for an instant.

I have not seen the article in which, according to Mr. Maritain (p. 265, note 63b), Father de Munnynck has taken "the 'quod visum placet' and what the Schoolmen say about the beautiful in a quite material sense." But despite Mr. Maritain's ingenious exegesis of two passages from the *Summa*,† dealing with the good and the beautiful, it is Father de Munnynck's reading, as reported by Mr. Maritain, which is alone in accordance with the facts.

At all events certainly nothing in St. Thomas can warrant Mr. Maritain's asserting that the shapes or colours, sounds or words, which are utilized in fine art, make known "something other than themselves," that is to say, are "symbols." And certainly this cannot be the fact. These media can of course be hieroglyphics. But Mr. Maritain is careful to insist (*loc. cit.*) that what the shapes or colours, sounds or words signify, is not something hieroglyphic, but something spontaneously and intuitively grasped. Now that is impossible for a very simple reason. Nothing in the world *in itself* ever "symbolizes" or "stands for" anything else. Symbolization is our subjective act. Nothing has a *meaning* in itself. It is *we* who "mean." It is *we* who make something represent something else, something other than itself.‡ Accordingly, all symbolization must be hieroglyphic.

Indeed, the matter is easily settled by putting to Mr.

* J. Cook Wilson, *Statement and Inference*, Part III, Chap. I, and p. 449.

† I, q. 5, a. 4 and I-II, q. 27, a. 1.

‡ Paraphrased from J. Cook Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 770.

Maritain this question: *What* that is spontaneously and intuitively grasped do the shapes or colours, sounds or words symbolize, and *how* do they symbolize? For this question he cannot answer. It is unanswerable.

His error consists in confusing symbolization with imitation. In fine art there is no symbolization, but there is imitation. For instance, music—apparently the least imitative of the imitative arts—imitates, as Aristotle said that dancing imitates, emotion. If *The Flowers of the Forest* is called a lament, lament is not a mere name; if Beethoven's Third Symphony is called the *Eroica*, it is because the composer imitated in it the emotion which in his day the political liberator aroused. Recall how the melody and rhythm of *Voi che sapete* are married to the words: all three are expressing the same feeling.

It is indeed undeniable, to revert to Mr. Maritain's comparison, that we enjoy the contemplation of a picture or a statue much more than we do that of a carpet, a Venetian glass, or an amphora; and we can now see why this is. It is not because the beauty of the picture or statue is richer, is "metaphysical or spiritual," or makes known something other than the shapes or colours. It is because, as the material of the other arts is not, the subject-matter of the fine arts is related to the whole mental fabric of our lives. As Mr. Maritain says in his not entirely satisfactory language (p. 295, note 121): "The sensations" [produced by works of art] "are perceived by us only as refracted by an inner atmosphere of recollections and emotions." It is on account of those recollections and emotions that pictures or statues excite and interest us more than carpets, Venetian glasses, or amphoras do. In other words, it is the associations works of fine art have for us, and not anything transcendental in their beauty, that confers upon them their superior value over other human handiwork.

And this being so, it follows that if there are, as mentioned by Mr. Maritain (p. 256), works of art "accessible only to a few," those few are not, as he thinks, "the artist's friends, persons in the know of the artist's intention," and the beauty of such works is not "a

hidden beauty"; for artists can have strictly no secret intentions and works of art no hidden beauty. The beauty of such works is just beauty, and the few to whom they are accessible are those whose associations—from past experience, including past knowledge—the artist, in the non-beautiful elements of his work, has relied upon. Further, upon these associations in the mind of the spectator the artist nearly always does rely: all great works of fine art are for a relatively few, and the art which can be immediately and fully fathomed by anyone is inevitably gross.

Thus Mr. Maritain's theory, as it concerns fine art in general, is a theory of his own, and it is false. Beauty in fine art is identical with beauty in other arts, and if, as he says (p. 254), "the perception of the beautiful" [in works of fine art] "is accompanied by a curious sense of intellectual completeness," first, intellectual completeness may not be the correct diagnosis of the feeling we have, and, second, what we do feel must be solely the result of the beauty's earnest of perfection; an earnest which is borne by man-made beauty of every kind.

If the theory is Mr. Maritain's own, however, it yet belongs to a tradition. Which tradition we can see from a statement made by the late Jacques Rivière to the *Journal du Peuple* in April, 1923, and repeatedly quoted since. He said:

If in the seventeenth century Molière or Racine had been asked why he wrote, no doubt he would have been able to find only one answer: "That he wrote for the entertainment of decent people." It is only with the advent of Romanticism that the literary act came to be conceived as a sort of raid on the absolute and its result as a revelation.

From this we can see to what Mr. Maritain is affiliated when he argues that the beauty of works of fine art is transcendental, is "metaphysical or spiritual." It is only necessary to substitute for the words "literary act" in the above statement, the words "artistic act," and Mr. Maritain's theory appears as but a variant of the great Romantic theory!

No wonder he appeals as freely as he does to Goethe,

Delacroix, Baudelaire, and Rimbaud, and to Mr. Jean Cocteau !

But readers of *Art et Scholastique* will protest that in this book Mr. Maritain is constantly denouncing Romanticism and the Romantics. Precisely. He is the apologist of what he professes to condemn !

MONTGOMERY BELGION.

P.S.—A leading article in *The Times Literary Supplement* of July 31, 1930, shows me that in endorsing above Mr. Le Corbusier's definition, "Houses are dwelling machines," I am exposing myself to misinterpretation. The article considers Mr. Le Corbusier to believe that the beauty of a simple and useful object consists in its fitness for its purpose and declares that the belief "obviously cannot be supported by logical argument." It has not been my intention to convey that I at least hold any such belief. I say, first, that "useful" objects can be and often are beautiful; conversely, that nearly all objects of so-called "pure beauty" have a use. I say, further, that in the case of some recent mechanical inventions, at the same time as the type has been modified the better to fit its purpose, it has become beautiful, *i.e.*, delightful to the eye; and yet nothing merely decorative has been added. That this has happened for the motor car and the steamship is not a belief: it is a fact. The beauty of an object cannot reside in anything extra. The beauty of a beautiful house must be, as it were, contained in the house's fitness for residence; a beautiful painting is a painting which has been well-painted for its non-beautiful purpose, whatever that may be. Of course, a house may be admirably fitted for its purpose and yet be ugly, as, for instance, many types of locomotive are; but that is not the point.

ART. 3.—AUGUSTINIANISM IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

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- Gilson, Etienne. *La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure*. Paris, Vrin, 1924. *Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin*. Paris, Vrin, 1929. Articles in *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*. Paris, Vrin. (1) *Pourquoi S. Thomas a critiqué S. Augustin*, Vol. 1, 1926, pp. 6-127. (2) *Avicenne et le Point de Départ de Duns Scot*. Vol. 2, 1927, pp. 89-149. (3) *Les Sources Gréco-Arabes de l'Augustinisme avicennisant*, Vol. 4, 1929, pp. 5-149.
- Rohmer, Jean. *Sur la Doctrine franciscaine des deux Faces de l'Âme* (Archives, Vol. 2, pp. 73-77). *La Théorie de l'Abstraction dans l'Ecole franciscaine d'Alexander de Hales à Jean Peckam*. (Archives, Vol. 3, 1928, pp. 105-184).
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BETWEEN Augustine and Aquinas there elapsed 800 years during which the Christian world thought mostly Augustinewise. There had been developments, and on many points of secondary importance there had arisen considerable divergence of opinion, as is apparent both in Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and in John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon*, the one a textbook of Christian doctrine, so famous that on it some 246 commentaries have been written; the other a history of philosophic thought in the twelfth century, of which Professor Clement Webb has just published a new and critical edition. Philosophically these divergences concerned mainly the theory of universals—a significant fact in view of what was to happen in the thirteenth century. Roscelin said that universal ideas are mere words (*flatus vocis*). Abelard said that they were *voces significativae*; a very different thing, since what they signified in his opinion were ideas derived by abstraction from sense experience. Gilbert de la Porrée also taught a doctrine of abstraction akin to that of Aristotle. Plato, on the

other hand, so John of Salisbury tells us,* had still a host of philosophic followers. In short, with the synthesis that Augustine had effected between Christian dogma and the philosophy of Plotinus† no one in the twelfth century felt the least dissatisfaction on theological grounds, but as to whether all was well with the philosophy upon which it had been based, there were already marked signs of uneasiness.

In the thirteenth century the genius of St. Thomas Aquinas constructed a new synthesis of philosophy and Christian dogma. On this occasion it was the philosophy of Aristotle that was used, and in terms of this philosophy that St. Thomas sought to express and elaborate Christian doctrine. He did not reject the old synthesis. On the contrary, wherever possible, he quotes Augustine in support of his own theses. Rarely does he cite Augustine as an objicient. The terminology is different, and Aquinas lays great stress on the distinction between potential and actual existence, terms that Augustine rarely uses. But St. Thomas's doctrine of the nature of being, the attributes of God, creation, exemplarism, good and evil, sin and grace, and the utter impossibility of anything passing from a lower to a higher grade of being without divine concurrence, is in all essentials identical with Augustine's. There is no discrepancy between the two syntheses in their theory of being. It is otherwise, however, in their theory of knowledge. "*Avant*," says Gilson,‡ "*l'accord est à peu près unanime pour soutenir la doctrine augustinienne de l'illumination divine ; après saint Thomas d'Aquin, cet accord cesse d'exister, à tel point que le docteur franciscain Jean Duns Scot abandonne lui-même, sur ce point essentiel, la tradition augustinienne dont son Ordre était demeuré jusqu'alors le plus fidèle soutien. Le fait est difficilement contestable, et le nombre de ceux qui s'obstinent à soutenir que le thomisme et l'augustinisme n'ont qu'une seule et même théorie de la connaissance diminue de jour en jour.*"

Any serious difference in the theory of knowledge is

* *Metaphysicon* II, 20, 888 b & c. Webb's Ed. p. 115.

† cf. Art. *The Philosophy of Augustine in the Dublin* for July.

‡ *Archives*, Vol. I, p. 5.

bound to have repercussions elsewhere. It will be likely to affect, for instance, one's proofs of the existence of God; and this is precisely what we find. There is more than one proof of the existence of God in Augustine's writings, but that on which he relies most and which is most characteristic of his thought is the argument which, from the immutability and coherence of truth, infers as its ground the existence of one eternal and immutable being. This argument does not appear amongst the five ways in which St. Thomas approaches the existence of God; nor does the Thomist admit its validity. "*On se donne trop facilement*," says Père Sertillanges,* "*ce qui est à démontrer ; on décrète arbitrairement la prétendue évidence*."

There is another argument of the Augustinian type, yet more simple than that used by Augustine himself; the famous Ontological Argument first formulated by St. Anselm. It is an argument which seeks to justify the transition from the idea of God to his existence, on the ground that to think of him as non-existent implies a contradiction. For, if we conceive God, as legitimately we may, to be that-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, then in thought and for thought God exists already. But, if he exist merely in and for thought, *i.e.*, human thought, he is inferior to a being who exists also independently of human thought. But inferior he cannot be, if in truth he be that-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought.

During the twelfth century one finds scarce any mention of the Ontological Argument, not because its validity was questioned, but because the main concern of theologians in that century was to expound rather than to prove theological truths.† When, however, towards the close of the century the need and value of an appeal to reason came again to be recognised, the Ontological Argument, together with other arguments of an Augustinian type, found no less favour than did empirical arguments of

* *Les Grandes Thèses de la Philosophie thomiste*, p. 54.

† *Haec omnia frequenter audio vel lego ; sed unde haec omnia probentur me legisse non recolo ; abundant in his omnibus auctoritates, sed non aequae et argumentationes ; in his omnibus experimenta desunt, argumenta rarescunt.* Richard of S. Victor (d. 1173) *de Trinitate* I. 5.

the type introduced by Richard of St. Victor,* and used later on both by St. Bonaventure,† and by St. Thomas. William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Richard Fitzacre, Matthew of Aquasparta, Aegidius of Rome, John Peckham, William of Ware, and Duns Scotus all think the argument valid and make use of it.‡ St. Thomas is the first to deny the validity of the argument, and the fact that he should have done so is indicative of the great change that is taking place in the theory of knowledge.

St. Thomas rejects the Ontological Argument on the ground that, though its upholders seek to justify the transition from the realm of thought to that of reality on pain of contradiction, the transition is in fact unwarranted. We do not see God, he urges, nor do we know his essence as a whole (*rationem totius*).§ Hence, although in reality his essence implies his existence, we are not justified in inferring from the concept of his essence anything more than his existence in thought (*non sequitur Deum esse nisi in intellectu*). To which St. Anselm might well reply that, if our knowledge of the divine essence is so inadequate that we cannot thence infer its existence, it is difficult to see how we can know that in reality the divine essence implies existence. But in point of fact Anselm does not claim either that we see God, or that we know His Essence as a whole. It suffices that we know God to be that-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought; for if God be this, he cannot exist merely in our thought, since in that case he will be dependent upon it, and so not be that of which we are thinking, namely, that being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought. The transition from the ideal to the real order is thus justified, *if indeed there be such a transition*. But for Anselm, as for Augustine, there is no such thing. There is need to show—as Anselm seeks to show; (1) that the idea of that-being-than-which-a-greater-

* *de Trinitate* I. 7.

† cf. Gilson, *La Philosophie de S. Bonaventure*, pp. 125, 126.

‡ This being so, it is surprising to read in that delightful little apologetic work, *Caliban in Grub Street*, by Fr. Ronald Knox, that the ontological argument "was invented by St. Anselm, but the flaw in the argument has been pointed out by every theologian of consequence since." p. 86.

§ cf. *Contra Gentiles* I. caps 10 & 11.; *Summa* I, q. 2, a. 1.

cannot-be-thought involves no contradiction, and (2) that to deny that such a being exists independently of our thought, does involve contradiction. But this done, we have shown that the idea of God pertains truly to the ideal order of being, and this is all that has to be done. For the ideal order is for Anselm and Augustine *eo ipso* the real order, an order far more real than the physical order, which *is* only in so far manifests the ideal order, and this ever imperfectly, by means of images, shadows, *vestigia*, which inevitably fall short of the real thing. St. Thomas does not deny either that there exists an ideal order, or that the physical order is related to it as are images, shadows, and *vestigia* to realities. What he does deny is that naturally we have knowledge of the ideal order except by way of abstractions and analogies based on perceptual experience. Hence the need of making, and also of justifying, transitions from the ideal order as we know it to the ideal order as it is.

Whether or not, then, the Ontological Argument presupposes an Augustinian theory of knowledge, St. Thomas's refutation of it is certainly based on his theory of knowledge. There is a realm in which, to those who behold it, *per se notissimum est Deum esse ex hoc quod sua essentia est suum esse*; but owing to "the weakness of our intelligence," we are unable to behold this realm. We catch but a glimpse of it as an owl does of the sun. St. Augustine also admits that we catch but a partial glimpse of the realm of ideas. There is no difference there. It is in the reasons assigned for this weakness of vision that the difference between the two theories lies. St. Augustine ascribes it to a fault which had its origin in Adam. Our powers of vision have become weakened by sin. St. Thomas, on the other hand, regards the weakness as inherent in the human mind, which neither has knowledge, nor can acquire knowledge, save through the medium of the senses, in accordance with the Aristotelian dictum; *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu*. There is no exception. Even revealed truth comes to us *via* the senses in so far as faith comes through hearing; and it was in accordance with this principle that the Son of God, in order to reveal Himself, became incarnate.

John of Salisbury says of Bernard of Chartres and his followers that they strove hard to reconcile the difference between Aristotle and Plato, but that in his opinion they laboured in vain.* He was right, for the differences were to manifest themselves in a still more acute form in the thirteenth century. John also says that those who follow after invariably modify the views of those who go before, with the result that in his day there seemed to be almost as many theories as there were philosophers.† This again is true no less of the thirteenth than of the twelfth century. When Aristotle's *de Anima*, his *Metaphysics* and his *Physics* came to be studied, together with the writings of various commentators, notably Avicenna and Averroes, the reaction of Christian thinkers was very diverse. Prior to St. Thomas no scholastic adopted in its entirety the philosophy of Aristotle, not even with such modifications and adaptations as St. Thomas saw fit later on to introduce. They had their own tradition, that of Augustine, and were convinced of its substantial truth. With that tradition neither the interpretation put upon Aristotle by Avicenna, nor yet that preferred by Averroes, would harmonise, for in both cases between the divine and the human there intervene a number of subordinate intelligences, mediating the divine action in the sphere alike of mind and of body. Already Augustine, encountering this doctrine in Plotinus, had rejected it as unwarranted and altogether inferior to the Christian doctrine of a Trinity in God. To William of Auvergne, first a professor and then Bishop of Paris (1228-1249), Aristotle, as interpreted by Avicenna, appears "not merely to have erred but rather to have gone clean off his head."‡ That a donkey should turn a mill wheel may serve a useful purpose, but that pure spirits should

* *Egerunt operosius Bernardus Carnotensis et auditores ejus ut componerent inter Aristotilem et Platonem, sed eos tarde uenisse arbitror et laborasse in uanum ut reconciliarent mortuos, qui, quamdiu in vita licuit, dissenserunt. Metalogicon II, 17, 875 d. Webb's Ed. p. 94.*

† *Ibid. Cap. 18. Quod posteriores semper priorum opiniones immutant. —Longe erit et a proposito penitus alienum, si singulorum opiniones posuero uel errores; cum, ut verbo comici utar, fere quot homines, tot sententie. 876 b & c. Webb's Ed. p. 96.*

‡ His words are: *non tam errasse quam etiam insanissime delirasse videbitur euidenter.* Cf. Gilson. *Archives I. p. 51* note, and see pp. 49-55 for an account of William of Auvergne's criticisms of Avicenna's doctrine.

derive benefit from the turning of heavenly spheres is inconceivable. St. Thomas is more lenient in his judgment of this feature in Avicenna's doctrine. He maintains not only that all corporeal beings are ruled by angels, but also that in particular they have charge of the local motion of heavenly bodies.*

If there were doctrines in Avicenna's philosophy which Augustinianism could not assimilate, there were others with which it found itself largely in accord. First, Avicenna, in common with all great philosophers, whether Pagan, Jewish, Christian or Mohammedan, recognised that between mind and body, intelligence and sensation, there is a radical difference; intelligence connotes a higher order of being than does mere perception, or imagination, or sense-awareness. Secondly, Avicenna agreed with Augustine in holding that the lower cannot act on the higher. Knowledge, therefore, cannot be due to the action of body on mind. It must, therefore, arise from the operation of some higher intelligence upon our human minds. Avicenna calls this intelligence an *Intellectus Agens*. The function of sense-perception is to prepare the way for the operation of this *Intellectus Agens*. Sense-perception cannot, however, be the cause of knowledge, because knowledge is of a higher order than sense-perception.†

Thus far Avicenna is at one with Augustine. Knowledge proper, the apprehension of a truth which is eternal and immutable cannot arise from the perception of bodies which are mutable and transitory, nor yet be due ultimately to a mind which passes from potentiality to act. Above that mind there must be another which is changeless and possesses eternally all knowledge. Wrongly, and stupidly in the view of William of Auvergne, Avicenna locates his *Intellectus Agens* in the moon. Remove, however, this and other subordinate intelligences which Avicenna places between man and God, and his doctrine of intelligence is brought into harmony with that of Augustine. God is the source of knowledge proper, of truth eternal; the fact that we possess this knowledge

* *Summa I*, q. 110, a 1 & 3; *Contra Gentiles III*, c. 23.

† cf. Gilson. *Archives I*, pp. 40, 41; *IV*, pp. 57-74.

at all, that we catch at least a glimpse of eternal truth, can only be accounted for on the supposition that it is due to divine illumination. The function ascribed by Avicenna to an *Intellectus Agens*, is by William of Auvergne ascribed to God. Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta (d. 1302), general of the Franciscans and a friend of Boniface VIII, teaches the same doctrine; neither the immutable character of truth, nor yet certainty, which implies immutability, can be accounted for, unless there be a divine light through which and in which we see objectively and, so to speak, effectively.* John Peckham, Franciscan Archbishop of Canterbury (1279-1292), points out that the properties assigned to the *Intellectus Agens* by Avicenna, its independence of anything corporeal, its impassibility, its changelessness, its infinite knowledge which is eternally actual, are in reality attributes of God.† Roger Bacon not only has the same doctrine, but expressly identified the *Intellectus Agens* with God. Philosophic wisdom, therefore, since it is due to divine illumination is a kind of revelation.‡

On account of the affinity of some of their philosophic doctrines to those of Avicenna, William of Auvergne, Roger Bacon, Roger Marston, *et peut-être même Jean Peckham*, are classified by Gilson as *augustiniens avicennisants*.§ The expression is *facheusement pedante*, Gilson admits, and it certainly seems hard lines on so outspoken a critic of Avicenna as was William of Auvergne, to describe him as *avicennisant*. But to classify the doctrines held in common by these thinkers, with Otto Keicher, as *un platonisme augustinien* also is open to objection, since it fails to indicate their connection with Avicenna. Moreover, the philosophy of another group of Franciscan writers, Alexander of Hales, John de la Rochelle, and Bonaventure, can also justly be described as *un platonisme augustinien*, since it retains in all essentials that interpretation which Augustine put upon Platonism. On the other hand, Alexander of Hales, John de la Rochelle,

* cf. Rohmer. *Archives III*, pp. 170-172.

† cf. Rohmer. *Archives III*, p. 178-179. Gilson, *Archives I*, pp. 99-100.

‡ cf. Gilson. *Archives I*, pp. 104 *et seq.*

§ *Archives I*. pp. 102, note 3.

and Bonaventure not only account for our knowledge of the physical world by a process of abstraction akin to that of Aristotle and St. Thomas, but also—in opposition to Avicenna and in accord with St. Thomas—assign to man both an *intellectus agens* and an *intellectus possibilis*. There is, therefore, ground for classifying the latter groups in contradistinction from the former group, as *Augustiniens aristotélécants*. “*Pour nous*,” says Gilson, “*saint Thomas avait devant lui deux écoles d’orientations nettement distinctes*,” whereas “*pour saint Thomas, les deux écoles se valent et leurs solutions du problème de la connaissance reviennent finalement au même, parce qu’il est contradictoire d’attribuer à l’homme l’intellect agent que lui reconnaît Aristote, si l’on veut lui conserver en même temps l’illumination divine que nous accord saint Augustin*.”*

In spite of apparent differences St. Thomas thinks that the two groups of Franciscan writers teach essentially the same doctrine, a doctrine which, as an Aristotelian, he cannot accept. Gilson and Rohmer, on the other hand, reviewing the question historically, are of opinion that the orientation of the two groups is very different. It must be admitted that both have made out a very strong case, though it may perhaps be questioned whether they have allowed sufficiently for the fact that different philosophers often use the same terms with very different meanings, especially when they are confronted, as the Augustinians were in the thirteenth century, with alien philosophies which they are seeking, as far as possible, to assimilate. If we take the statements of individual writers at their face value, then it is even more true of the thirteenth century than it is of the twelfth, that there are *quot homines, tot sententiae*. But, if we allow for the fact that the same term, on account of its diverse associations, may be used by some, and avoided by other, writers who teach essentially the same doctrine, or again may acquire in a new setting a somewhat different connotation, the apparent diversity of the thirteenth century to a certain extent disappears.

Take, for instance, the term *intellectus agens*. If, by an *intellectus agens*, we mean an intelligence which is

* *Archives I*, p. III.

in actual possession of a plenitude of knowledge, then there is but one being to whom that term is strictly applicable, and whether with Roger Bacon we do identify, or with the majority of his contemporaries refrain from identifying, Avicenna's *intellectus agens* with God, is a mere question of terminology. Contrariwise, if, in using the term *intellectus agens*, we intend merely to emphasize the activity of intelligence in knowledge, then every Augustinian must, and every Augustinian in the thirteenth century in point of fact does, teach that man has an *intellectus agens*, whether or not he actually uses that term, as most do. Even if to the term *intellectus agens* we assign the precise meaning which St. Thomas assigns to it when he says that it is a power which renders the phantasm or sensible image actually intelligible,* the dispute between Augustinian and Thomist is not as to whether such a power resides in the human soul, but as to whether it can be exercised unless God so illumine the soul that it beholds also the truth which the image faintly symbolises.

Similarly no Augustinian denies that human intelligencies are capable of acquiring knowledge, or that they pass gradually from a state of ignorance to one of comparative knowledge, or that this process entails a passage from potentiality to act. Even William of Auvergne admitted an *intellectus possibilis* in this sense, though he strenuously opposed the theory, already current amongst the younger men of his latter years,† that there are two intellects in man, one *active* and the other *passive*. The soul performs diverse functions (*officia*), but its so-called faculties (*potentiae*) cannot be powers distinct from the soul; he urges, since to affirm this is to deny the soul's unity; nor can the same power be both active and passive with respect to the same object. William's aversion to a faculty-psychology distinguishes him both from other Augustinians and from St. Thomas, but on the question whether the acquisition of know-

* *Contra Gentiles* II, c. 77. *Est igitur in anima intellectiva virtus activa in phantasmata, faciens ea intelligibilia actu; et haec potentia animae vocatur intellectus agens.*

† cf. Roger Bacon, *Opus Tertium*, c. 23, ed. Brewer, pp. 74, 75; and *Opus Majus* II, 5, ed. Bridges. Vol. III, p. 47.

ledge involves a passage from potentiality to act, all are at one, as they are at one also in affirming that such a passage cannot take place without divine concurrence. The difference between the Augustinians and St. Thomas turns here, as in the former case, upon the nature and scope of this concurrence. St. Thomas defines the potential intellect to be that power of the soul which is capable of acquiring determinate similitudes of sensible things.* Alexander of Hales defines it to a power of apprehension, which is concerned *rather* with forms abstracted from the phantasm *than* with pure forms, for, when it understands these, it does so in material fashion.† The two definitions are almost equivalent, but not quite. For Alexander of Hales admits that we can have knowledge of pure forms, however crude that knowledge may be, and, in order to account for our apprehension of these forms, which are of a higher order than our rational intelligence, he introduces the Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination.‡

Gilson thinks that there is question here not of natural, but of revealed truth; which, if it were so, would make Alexander of Hales in this respect a Thomist. Rohmer and Keicher, however, differ from Gilson here,§ and in any case it is certain that Alexander's disciple and successor, John de la Rochelle, did not restrict the function of illumination to revealed knowledge. In his view the *similitudines rerum*, of which our intelligence has natural cognizance, comprise those which pertain to the realm of pure spirit, as well as those which pertain to the realm of body.|| Our intelligence, in short, faces two ways, towards what is higher as well as towards what is lower. In the latter case its illumination is concerned with perceptible objects and is mediated by the senses and by imagination. In the former case it is concerned with

* *Contra Gentiles* II, c. 77. *Est enim in ea (anima) virtus quae est in potentia ad determinatas similitudines rerum sensibilium; et haec est potentia intellectus possibilis.*

† *Summa Theol.* Ed. Quarrachi II. p. 454, n. 2. *Intellectus possibilis est vis apprehensiva quae magis se habet ad formas abstractas a phantasmatibus quam ad formas separatas simpliciter; nam si intelligit separatas, intelligit eas aliquomodo ut materiales.*

‡ *Ibid.* p. 452.

§ *Archives* III, p. 116; cf. for Gilson's view I, p. 86.

|| *Summa de Anima* I. c. 36. Ed. Domenichelli, p. 164.

ultimate truth, and here imagination and sense is a hindrance rather than a help.*

Other terms which give rise to a diversity which is apparent rather than real, are the contrasted pair "active" and "passive." All are agreed that God can act on the human soul, but that the human soul cannot act upon God. Relatively to God, the intelligence of man is passive. But relatively to corporeal being no loyal Augustinian can admit that either the soul or intelligence is passive, whereas the Aristotelian group seems to agree with St. Thomas in affirming that there is a sense in which both are passive. Recognising the difficulty, John de la Rochelle points out that the term *passio* may be used in two senses. It may be used of the effect produced by the action of one body upon another, in which case it is equivalent to *mutatio* or *motus*, and is strictly applicable only to interaction between bodies or between minds, but not between bodies and minds. It may, however, be equivalent to *receptio*; and in this sense the term *passio* is applicable to mind as opposed to body; for both intelligence and sense are receptive of forms or *similitudines rerum*.† When we perceive it is of the body that the term *patis* is strictly predicable, since it is upon the body that an impression is made by the external object, but the mind also may be said to suffer with it (*compati* or *condolere*), since, on account of its union with the body (*colligatio corporis et animae*), a similitude of the object which affects the body is formed by the mind.‡

In spite of his Aristotelian tendency, Alexander of Hales holds fast to the Augustinian principle that what is of a lower order cannot act upon what is of a higher order. Nor, if we examine his doctrine carefully, does St. Thomas deny the truth of this doctrine. Against Plato he urges that, if in perception the soul is active

* *Ibid.* I. c. 43, p. 189, cited in *Archives III*, p. 123.

† *Summa de Anima* I, c. 45. Ed. Domenichelli p. 191: cf. II, c. 21, p. 257. Both passages are cited in *Archives III*, p. 124, note 3, and p. 126, note 4.

‡ *Summa de Anima* I. c. 47, p. 194, and cp. II, c. 4, p. 221. I do not see in the latter passage any suggestion that the *similitudines quae in spiritu formantur* "sont tirées de l'esprit mêmes," as Rohmer thinks (*Archives III*, p. 127 note 3). Nor do I think that Augustine holds this in the case of sense-perception. To be formed by the mind is not the same thing as to be drawn from it.

but the body passive in precisely the same sense, then they must be distinct substances, so that the destruction of the body need not entail that of the soul even in animals.* He is likewise dissatisfied with the Platonic theory that the body is an instrument which the soul uses, for in that case body and soul need not be substantially one.† Augustine's terminology suggests this theory, as, for instance, when he says that the body does not feel, but the soul through the body.‡ Hence St. Thomas does not like the phrase on account of its *suggestio falsi*. To feel, he urges, is not an act of the soul only, but of soul-conjoined-with-body. It is on soul-conjoined-with-body, therefore, that sensible objects produce an effect;§ and in this sense both are passive, relatively to the object producing that effect. There is none the less a distinction between soul and body even on the lower level of perceptual experience, for it is only when bodies have a soul that they perceive. Moreover, the soul is not *id quod patitur*, but *id quo patitur*.|| Primarily it is in the sense-organ that a change is brought about. It is brought about in the soul only because it is conjoined with a body. Hence, that such a change mediates perception is due primarily to the soul, and is of the nature not of a *passio* but of an *operatio*. St. Thomas is no less convinced than was Augustine that *nihil corporeum imprimere potest in rem incorpoream*.¶ It is, in fact, because he admits this principle that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, he has to introduce an *intellectus agens* which shall purify and spiritualise the sensible image that is to be impressed as a *species intelligibilis* upon the *intellectus possibilis*. But the same principle is applicable also to the lower order of sense-perception. Every kind of cognition, as such, he says, is immaterial, and it is impossible for the effect to be more immaterial than its cause. Knowledge, therefore, cannot be caused by a mere combination of chemical elements.

* *Contra Gentiles* II, c. 57. *Praeterea : licet motus.*

† *Contra Gentiles* II, c. 58. *Amplius : si homo. . . .*

‡ *Summa* I, q. 84, a. 6 : cf. q. 75, a. 5.

§ *Ibid.*

|| *Contra Gentiles* II, c. 57. *Sed hoc esse. . . .*

¶ *Summa* I. 1. 84, a. 6. *Aristoteles, autem. . . .*

It implies, even on the lower level, a principle that is receptive of *species sensibiles sine materia*.*

In substance St. Thomas agrees with Alexander of Hales and with Augustine. The body is passive in the physical sense; bodies acting upon it produce therein an *immutatio*. The soul is not passive in this sense, but in the sense that it is receptive of sensible forms. Nor does the form received constitute all that there is in an act of perception, even for St. Thomas. It is but the *medium quo percipitur*; which in substance is what Augustine says, when he claims that the object perceived produces in the body a similitude of itself, and that the soul uses this as an instrument in performing the act of perception.† He agrees, too, with St. Thomas, in affirming that, when we are misled by appearances, it is not the senses that err, but judgment.‡ There is but little difference between St. Augustine's theory of perception and St. Thomas's, save in terminology.

St. Augustine also states that unity, number, beauty and goodness exist in things as well as in the ideal order. Whence Père Boyer concludes that, since "*les deux métaphysiques, pour l'essentiel, coïncident, ils doivent aboutir à une même théorie de la connaissance*."§ The Thomist theory of abstraction, in his opinion, is not only compatible with, but even is implicit in, Augustine's metaphysic. Gilson dissents.|| We do indeed recognise unity, number, beauty and goodness in things, but it is not thence that, according to Augustine, we derive a true notion of unity, number, beauty and goodness, but from communion with an ideal world in which they exist eternally and immutably; and it is because we have this other knowledge, derived from an ideal world, that we are able to judge of the extent to which unity, number, beauty and goodness are realised in this imperfect physical world. Boyer, in point of fact, admits this, for he says that for Augustine the perception in particular beings of being, unity, beauty, truth and goodness,

* *Contra Gentiles* II, c. 62. *Adhuc : agens*. . . .

† *de Trin.* XI, c. 2 : cf. *de Musica* VI, c. 5, n. 10.

‡ *de Vera Relig.* c. 32 : *de Lib. Arbit.* II, c. 16, n. 44.

§ *L'Idée de Vérité*, p. 213.

|| *Introduction à l'Étude de S. Augustin*, p. 115.

"implique que notre intelligence est en relation actuelle avec l'Être en soi, l'Unité en soi, la Beauté en soi, la Vérité en soi, le Bien en soi," et que "cette relation consiste en une participation de la connaissance qui est en Dieu et qui est Dieu même, mais . . . pas nécessairement l'intuition immédiate de Dieu lui-même."*

But, this being so, it is difficult to see how a theory which admits two sources of natural knowledge can be consistent with a theory which denies that there is more than one, in accordance with its basic dictum that *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu*.

On this question the theories of abstraction which were current in the thirteenth century, and of which Rohmer's article gives us a detailed and well documented account, throw considerable light. First, it is worthy of note that no Augustinian in the thirteenth century finds serious difficulty in grafting a theory of abstraction upon the epistemological root which Augustine planted. Moreover, as Rohmer has pointed out, Alexander of Hales's theory of abstraction, and John de la Rochelle's, differ but little from that of St. Thomas. Abstraction, as they understand it, does not consist, as it did for William of Auvergne, in the mere stripping away of individualising features, or in the consideration of just one feature to the neglect of others: it involves, as with St. Thomas, the formation of an intellectual similitude or *species intelligibilis*, distinct from the mere image. They differ from St. Thomas in that they admit also a world of pure ideas, for the knowledge of which divine illumination is needed; but they agree with him in thinking that the intelligibility of the physical world is inherent in it, and that for the understanding of it, the light of natural reason alone suffices.†

For St. Bonaventure it is not an act of abstraction that converts the sensible image into something spiritual, immutable and independent of space and time: it is judgment (*dijudicatio*), a judgment of value or spiritual worth in which we recognise what it is that makes a

* *L'Idee de Vérité*, p. 162.

† For a full account of Alexander of Hales and of John de la Rochelle's theories, cf. *Archives III*, pp. 106-140. *I*, pp. 85-88.

thing beautiful or pleasing.* In itself this is not perhaps of much consequence, for St. Thomas also recognises a close connection between abstraction and judgments of value. He says, for instance, that we do not merely apprehend an object present to intelligence, we apprehend also its connection with something further, to be known or to be done; and so upon further examination come to recognise its truth, an operation which involves not merely apprehension, but judgment.† To attain truth it does not suffice merely to possess the similitude of a changeful object; for this cannot be an infallible rule of truth. Besides abstracting the universal, we have to consider or judge concerning its common nature.‡ This judgment, moreover, is bound up with the act of abstraction itself, for in apprehending being, we straightway, says St. Thomas, *absque studio et inquisitione*, recognise the first principles which govern all being and all truth, alike in the sphere of knowledge and of action.§ St. Bonaventure says substantially the same thing: *Prima species est sicut pictura, et ab hoc creata est anima nuda: secunda species est impressio aliqua summae veritatis in anima.*”|| But, whereas St. Thomas held that for a true judgment, it suffices that our human intelligence be confronted with data derived wholly from perceptual experience, St. Bonaventure argues that, since the truth which many minds share, is one, it can only be God. Hence the *ratio intelligendi unumquodque est ipsa veritas quae est Deus.*¶ Similarly Matthew of Aquasparta teaches that for the attainment of truth the natural light inherent in human intelligences is inadequate

* *Itinerarium*, c. 2, n. 6., and, for a full account of Bonaventure's theory, cf. *Archives III*, pp. 141-161.

† *de Intellectu et Intelligibile*. — *Sciendum quod potentia intellectiva primo simpliciter aliquid apprehendit, et hic actus dicitur intelligentia: secundo vero id quod apprehendit ordinat ad aliquid aliud cognoscendum vel operandum, et haec vocatur intentio: dum vero persistit in inquisitione illius quod intenditur, vocatur excogitatio: dum vero id quod excogitatum examinat ob aliqua certa, dicitur scire vel sapere, quod est phronesis, idest sapientia, quia sapere est judicare, ut dicitur in I Metaph.*

‡ *de Spiritualibus Creaturis ad 8 and corp. art.*

§ *de Virtutibus in Communi*, q. 1, a. 8: cf. *de Anima III*, Lect. 5, *prosequitur intentum*. . . .

|| *In II Sent. d. 17, p. 1, q. 4.*

¶ *de Scientia Christi*, IV, 28: cf. *Archives III*, 141-161 for Bonaventure's theory.

unless it be subject to, and conjoined with, that eternal light which is the perfect and adequate ground of knowledge.* Grosseteste, Roger Bacon and John Peckham teach identically the same doctrine.† Not without reason, then, does Rohmer remark that "*Pillumination augustinienne, un instant déroutée* [in Alexander of Hales and John de la Rochelle], *a repris finalement tous ses droits.*"‡

In their metaphysic Augustine and Aquinas are fundamentally at one; but that there is a difference between their theories of knowledge is apparent no less from a comparison between their writings than from a study of the writings of those who, in the thirteenth century, loyally defended the Augustinian tradition against what was then an alien doctrine, derived not from Plato and Augustine, but from Aristotle. It is apparent also from the fact that St. Thomas drops one Augustinian argument for the existence of God, and expressly rejects a second; for it is inconceivable that he should have done this, had there not been a radical difference between the two theories of knowledge. It is no less apparent where the difference lies. St. Thomas restricts our knowledge to the perceptual world, and to what can be learnt from the perceptual world by means of abstraction, judgment and ratiocination. It is thence our ideas are derived; and hence it is to this world, and not to a world which we do not perceive, that primarily they are applicable. We cannot, therefore, argue from the nature of our ideas to the nature of God, until we have proved by ratiocination that the existence of this world implies the existence of God, and, even then, it is only by analogy that we can arrive at a concept of the nature of God. Augustine does not restrict the scope of intelligence to the phenomenal world. Within its scope, thanks to divine illumination, falls another world, a world that is distinct from this world and exists in the divine mind, in the knowledge of which we

* *Quaestiones Disputatas* (Quarrachi Ed.) p. 258: cf. *Archives III*, pp. 161-178.

† cf. *Archives I*, pp. 90-111; *Archives III*, pp. 178-182.

‡ *Archives III*, p. 184.

participate. It is this other world that renders ours intelligible; and it is because, and in so far as, we behold this other that we are able to understand the nature and to grasp the significance of this. Doubtless the physical world, in so far as it resembles the other, shares also in its intelligibility. But this it does but partially, imperfectly, by way of inadequate images and symbols. Perfection, beauty, truth, goodness are not there in their fulness, and so cannot be got out of it, either by abstraction or in any other way. Neither is necessity there in the strict sense, or universality or immutability; for this world is finite, changeful, contingent. It may be possible to discover the nature of this world and to formulate the laws that govern it. In view of the conflicting theories which confront him, Augustine doubts whether such enquiry will succeed, but he does not deny the possibility, nor yet that abstraction and ratiocination may be useful to this end. Alexander of Hales and John de la Rochelle, therefore, though they modify in this respect the Augustinian tradition, are not unfaithful to it, since also they admit another source of knowledge derived direct from the world of eternal laws and values. They differ, however, from Augustine in that they divorce the two sources of knowledge, as Kant separates pure reason from practical reason and æsthetic judgment. They are not thus divorced for Augustine, but function together in one and the same intelligence, and co-operate in one and the same judgment, as Bonaventure points out.

As measured by centuries, the distance between St. Augustine and St. Thomas is much greater than that which separates St. Thomas from Kant. As measured by the difference between their philosophies, it is indefinitely less. There are none the less two positions, common to St. Thomas and Kant, which are not to be found in the philosophy of Augustine. Their psychology is very different, but in both cases it is a psychology of the type against which William of Auvergne voiced so vigorous a protest, *i.e.*, a faculty-psychology. Both, too, differ from Augustine, but agree with Aristotle, in restricting the scope of human intelligence to the

phenomenal world and its implications. An *intellectus agens*, operating in conjunction with an *intellectus possibilis*, enables us, so St. Thomas maintains, to discern within the phenomenal world not only intelligibility, but also necessity.* Kant, on the other hand, unable to discover either intelligibility or necessity in the phenomenal world as such, yet constrained to admit their existence at least for thought, argues that they must arise from the nature of mind, and be a condition which makes thinking about the phenomenal world possible. Hence the difference between their philosophies, and between their attitudes towards proofs of God's existence. From the restriction imposed upon the scope of human intelligence, St. Thomas is able to escape at least in part, for since intelligibility exists for him, not only in mind, but also in the physical world, he is able, by arguing from effect to cause, to prove that there must exist a First Cause not only in idea but in reality. Escape by this route is impossible for Kant, for in his view intelligibility is due to mind, a human mind, and so is anthropomorphic. Moreover, the laws which mind imposes upon phenomena in order to render them intelligible, have reference only to phenomena, and so can have no implications beyond them. There are, however, other laws, namely moral laws, and also æsthetic and teleological values. These point to God, and in the former case constrain us also to postulate his existence as a means of reconciling the conflict between happiness and right doing. In his appeal to the existence of moral and æsthetic values as evidence of the existence of God, Kant resembles Augustine, but the resemblance is not far-reaching, for even in the realm of practical reason and æsthetic judgment, Kant cannot get rid of anthropomorphism. It is not in God that we contemplate moral laws: we impose them upon ourselves. They originate not in the divine mind, but in a human faculty, and æsthetic values originate likewise in another faculty.

In his treatise *de Spiritualibus Creaturis* (a. 16, ad 8), St. Thomas says—apropos of Augustine's doctrine—that

* cf. esp. *Contra Gentiles* II, c. 30. *Quod in rebus creatis possit esse necessitas absoluta.*

"it does not matter much whether we say that intelligibles are shared, or that the light which renders them intelligible is shared." It would not make much difference if, by "intelligibles," St. Thomas meant ideas as they exist in the mind of God, and by "light" meant a *lumen Dei*. But he does not. By "light," he means the light of natural reason, a faculty inherent in man, and the only intelligibles of which this faculty has immediate cognizance, are—in his theory—those which exist in nature. When mediaeval science broke down, or apparently broke down, it was inevitable that man should begin to doubt whether intelligibles do exist in nature. The revolution in the thirteenth century thus prepared the way for that of Kant in the eighteenth. Augustine ascribes to man but one intelligence, an intelligence that is cognisant alike of the phenomenal world and of eternal values and immutable truths. Introduce diversity into that intelligence, and the two worlds begin forthwith to fall apart. Deny that intelligence can know the eternal and immutable, save in and through the temporal and mutable, and it is almost inevitable that within a concept thus derived there will arise anomalies which will render it suspect. Ascribe our knowledge of the eternal and immutable not to apprehension, but to ratiocination, not to divine illumination, but to the power of human reason, not to a vision of it in God, but to the formation of it by an active intellect in man, and sooner or later someone is bound to call in question the validity of a concept thus formed, even as St. Thomas called in question the validity of the concept of *id quo magis cogitari nequit*. If history has not vindicated Augustine's position, it has at any rate made plain the consequences of forsaking it, and to that extent has justified the tenacity with which St. Bonaventure and others of the Franciscan school clung to older tradition.

LESLIE J. WALKER.

ART. 4.—CICELY BURTON

A RECORD of the troubles of a Catholic "delinquent," as the Royalists of the Civil War were named by their enemies, is set forth in the following pages. It is compiled from the notes and letters of William Blundell (1620-1698), some of which are quoted in *A Cavalier's Note Book*,* while some are here published for the first time. Their author seems to have been acutely conscious that history was being made before his eyes. Although, after the Restoration, he lived for the most part in retirement, entirely absorbed in the struggle to educate and provide for his ten children, he kept copies of his letters as though aware that they would be of interest to future generations. It is only through the allusions made in these letters written in later life to his whereabouts while the Civil War raged, that his story during that period can be reconstructed.

He gives his address as "Crossby, my house in Lancashyre," when writing to a new acquaintance. To his intimates it is abbreviated thus + B. Here the three volumes of his MS. letters, and five books of his notes (he was a great student), are in the possession of his descendant, and his portrait hangs upon the stairs. It shows him as a middle-aged man of slight build in his coat of mail. Though his fighting days were then long past, he was evidently determined to be remembered as a soldier of the King. His dark blue eyes look out with an expression at once shrewd and sad. From his own statement that he was five inches shorter than Charles II, he was evidently a man of medium height. His long hair is grey in the picture, but he had evidently been fair, for in a letter in which he orders a new perruque to be made for him, he desires that fair and grey hair should be mingled in it, "but no red."

In a letter written in 1656 he has left a pen-picture of himself as he was at the age of fifteen, when he went to woo his bride, Anne Haggerston, of Haggerston in Northumberland.

* Edited by Father Ellison Gibson. Published by Longmans, Green & Co., 1880.

"I was a pretty young thing, all dashing in scarlet," he says, looking back at his own youthful figure across the adventurous years that had passed.

This Squire of Crosby received his commission to raise a troop of horse in the King's service in December 1642. Although only twenty-two, he had then been married six years, and was the father of three or four children. His commission was signed by Colonel Tildesley, in whose company he marched to meet Lord Derby on his way to regain Lancaster for the King.

On Saturday, March 18th, the Royalist force assaulted and took the town, Lord Derby leading the attack. William Blundell received wounds which disabled him for life in this his first and last battle. He has left in his notebook a brief summary of the disasters suffered by him in the Royal cause.

The warre between King Charles ye First and his parliament began A.D. 1642. That year my thigh was broken with a shot in ye King's service. Anno Domini 1643 all my lands and most of my goods were sequestered for being a papist and a Delinquent (as ye prevailing part called ye King's partakers).

In ye yeare 1645 my Wif farmed my demesne of Crosby. And all her quick goods being lost she bought one horse and two oxen to make up a teame.

A.D. 1646. Novem: 13. I valued all my goods, and comparing them with my debts found myself to be worse than nothing by ye whole sum of £81 os. 8d.

In short, at the age of twenty-six he faced the world a maimed and ruined man. But he faced it in the company of an indomitable "wif"—"the ark," he writes long afterwards, "which hath saved our little cock-boat at Crosby from sinking in many a storm"—and of a sister of whom he said in the closing years of his life: "She hath been the best spoke in the wheel of our fortune."

We only have glimpses of these two women farming the demesne, burying the loaf after breakfast and digging it up again for supper, harried now by the demands of fugitive Royalist soldiers, now by Parliamentary troops quartered upon them.

Where, meanwhile, was the wounded cavalier? His first refuge when carried from the field of battle was Dinckley Hall, the home of Colonel John Talbot, a fellow Royalist, destined also to become a fellow sufferer in having his lands sequestrated.

When, after the lapse of thirty-seven years, William Blundell wrote to condole with Mrs. Talbot on the death of her husband, he recalled his debt of gratitude to them both.

I lodged a long weeke in your house in my very sore infirmity; from whence I went, by your charity, in a much better estate. I must not forget ye friendship contracted in the days of captivity with him that now is gone.

It must have been difficult to move a man with a shattered thigh at the end of even "a long weeke," but Dinckley Hall was no place for him to linger. His host's father, Sir John Talbot, had earlier in the same year drawn the vengeance of the Parliamentary party upon himself and his Manor of Salesbury by conspiring to capture some of their leaders in Manchester. Salesbury had already been pillaged by Parliamentary troops, and the Talbots, father and son, were marked men.

After his initial successes at Lancaster and Preston, the fortune of war went against Lord Derby. His little army was divided by the intervention of the King, who ordered Lord Molyneux to join him in the South with the troops he had raised. He further commanded that their losses in the recent fighting be made good from the ranks of Lord Derby's men. The Royalists remaining in Lancashire consequently found themselves heavily outnumbered by the Parliamentarians.

Soon only a few strong places still held out for the King, among them Lathom House, which sustained its famous siege under the stout leadership of Lady Derby.

Probably William Blundell lay hidden in one of the lonely farmhouses of what was then wild moorland country, until he could travel. We may hazard a guess that some Catholic family sheltered him, for the farmer folk of Lancashire clung indomitably to the old faith.

When agricultural depression drove their descendants to the cotton looms for a livelihood, they took their Catholicity with them, as Preston and other mill towns bear witness to-day.

Leaving his native county a battleground, and his home in the hands of the sequestrators, the Squire of Crosby fled into Wales. His wife and children may have preceded him thither and found refuge in the house of a friend, for he records having *sent* valuables and family papers into Wales in 1642, "which," he says, "were finally lost there." His statement that his wife farmed his demesne in 1645 also suggests that she was absent from Crosby prior to that date.

The Commonwealth's order to the sequestrators was couched in the following terms :

You are to seize two parts of the estates both real and personal of all Papists (as they are papists [*i.e.*, for the sole reason that they are papists]) and the whole estates of all other sorts of delinquents mentioned in the said ordinance, whether they be Papists or others, and you are to understand by two parts of Papists' estates, two of their whole lands and two of their goods into three to be divided.

Challoner quotes from a contemporary manuscript to describe the powers given to the sequestrators :

. . . For the more speedy and effectual seizure of the personal estates of the said delinquents and Papists, the commissioners had power to authorise their several collectors and agents employed under them to break open all locks, bolts, bars, doors or other strength where monies were on probable grounds suspected to be concealed, and seize the same into their possession ; with this further engagement to such as were assisting the sequestrators, that for their reward they were to have one shilling in the pound of all monies, lands or goods as they could discover.

As the property of a Catholic Royalist soldier, the whole of the Crosby estate was forfeited to the Government.

In those days, when he and all who befriended him were at the mercy of informers, William Blundell never committed to writing the names of persons who had succoured him or of places where he had found shelter. We do not know therefore where he "tarried" in Wales,

but probably his means were exhausted when Mrs. Blundell returned to Crosby to claim the fifth part of the estate which the law allowed for the maintenance of the wife and children of "a popish recusant." Her husband has left but one hint of his possible whereabouts at this period. It is to be found in his copy of a letter dated June 6th, 1647, from himself to Father Francis Parker, S.J., which is prefaced by these lines :

This letter is very dark, as being writ in times of danger. The sense dependeth on sundry private passages betwixt the parties.

No address is given.

To Mr. Francis Parker.

Sir,

I have great reason to thank you for your loving respects and your hearty expressions of a friend. And if your SUN appear I shall be confident that the Star you talk of will decline into our Western Hemisphere, for the other course would be preposterous and Retrograde. I am confident Booker himself can foresee no ill-boding opposition; and though we have once depended on another Influence, yet that old Regent is now of a slower motion and almost fixed.

(But I should speak like a man of this world.) Sir, you have stated me your case and I have told you my own—yours I perceive doth render you at freedom (at least by the assistance of that which you want not), and mine is a relation of a debt to a dear friend, who is, I think, too well provided to call for it. But I owe so much to the party I should desire those bonds may be cancelled, which are wholly unuseful to him, and may be a Bar to my own happiness. For then I should be in hope that the powerful motives of your country and kindred might excuse a world of inconveniences in a poor and lonely abode. You have promised me your company in August (I shall look for it sooner), and before then (for aught we know), the world may look of another complexion, and *private* men's cases may be changed. Good Sir, be pleased to direct one of these inclosed to my uncle and your lady will send the other with her blessing to her Son. What news from thence? Has the cloud that hung o'er the city broke forth in thunder? You will let us know what you hear of that and I will be still

Your servant,

CICELY BURTON, Alias W. B.

June 6th, 1647.

The lady referred to was, of course, the mistress of the house which was harbouring the priest.

We may presume that the "Sun" was the King, "the Star" and "the old Regent" Cromwell, for in the summer of 1647 the hopes of the crushed Royalists were reanimated by the King's escape from the custody of the Army, and the following year found his supporters in arms in Wales, Scotland and Kent.

But it is the signature of the letter which is chiefly of interest in regard to its writer. It seems to suggest that William Blundell, the maimed soldier who had disappeared none knew whither, while his native county was ravaged by the war in which he could no longer take part, may have returned to his home after the lapse of four years, disguised as a woman. Clothed in the voluminous petticoats of the female fashion of the day, did he hobble to his own fields to supervise the progress of the plough, drawn by that oddly assorted team, upon which his children's bread depended?

When all was quiet in the house at night we may imagine "Cicely Burton," inviting some hunted priest to leave his hiding-hole in the oak-panelled room of "his poore and lonely abode," and drink a measure of mead (for the brewing of which he has left a recipe) with him to the ultimate triumph of the Royal cause.

William's next letter, written in December of this year, reveals him as a prisoner on parole in his own home, with soldiers quartered upon Crosby.

Dec. 24th, 1647.

From W. B. to his Governor making complaints of some Souldiers who had not pd their quarters to him, and his proceeding upon it.

Sr,

This morning three troopers of Sir Thomas Fairfaxes, being to remove their quarters, denyed my wife to discharge them till they receyved certaine moneys 2 myles off, which shee might send for and they would pay it in their march. My wife refused the offer as uncertaine, and complayned to me of the wronge, whoe spake with all respect to them that my wif would be content with such money as the Constable of Crosby was owing them and would rely on their promis to pay the rest in their march. When

they utterly refused to do this I denyed to lett them have thire horses out of the stable dore with 4 of my owne servants and 3 neybouris that were about the house. I stopped them for bringing forth their horses. They drew their swords, so did I myne, my servants had sticks and stones but no one blow was stricken on eyther syde, we spake them fayre and after som denyalls and great words, they were content to lett the Constable pay my wife 17*l.* 6*d.* and promis to pay the rest in their march, whither she hath sent to receyve it. Now Good Sr be pleased to lett know whether wee have don anything unanswerable in this: or what way upon the lyke case wee may seeke to right ourselves when our quarterers are going out of the Country. Or whether you think (if the thing be justifiable in civill Gouvement) will these men seeke to do us a displeasure by the assistance of som more of their troope. My appearing was in right of my wif, and I ware a sword as a free man by vertu of Sir Thomas Fairfaxes pas; otherwise as your prisoner I would not have don it.

Be pleased to tell me what you think of this to the bearer and if you please to command me to waite on you any where

I am your servant

W. B.

Dec. 24th, 1647.

He dared not claim any right of his own, it will be noticed. "My appearing was in right of my wif . . . otherwise as your prisoner I would not have don it."

He has recorded in several letters: "I was four times made a prisoner (*i.e.* under the Commonwealth) and paid my ransom twice."

It may safely be surmised that he was so liberated in this year, probably by the efforts of his sisters Frances and Winifred. The penal laws were mainly directed against the heads of families and priests. That his sisters remained in possession of their own small fortunes and placed them at his service is shown by his inclusion among his debts of divers sums owing to them.

But freedom brought little relief.

"In the year 1648," he writes, "wearied with being so often awakened at midnight to fly from the King's and Parliament's troops (both equally feared because equally plundering), and finding no shelter under the Snōwdon Hills, I resolved to banish myself voluntarily for a time in the Island of Man."

Thus he opens his introduction to his work : " Blundell's History of the Isle of Man."*

His notebook reveals that he had already visited the island in 1646—a year which witnessed the flight thither of many cavaliers.

Foley, in his chapter on the Jesuit Fathers labouring in Lancashire at that date, describes how many of the priests, after being hunted from place to place, were finally captured and died in prison, and proceeds :

During this period most of the Catholic families who had means, left this part of the country, and retired to other counties where there was less persecution ; and thus most of the Fathers of this (St. Aloysius') College, accompanying the families who had harboured them, withdrew also for a time from the district. One Father went with the family of which he had the spiritual charge, to an island not far from the coast, in which there were no Catholics before, and he succeeded in making some converts there.†

There lies in the Belgian State Archives at Brussels a letter in which the writer refers to his having been in the Isle of Man in 1646. It is included in the correspondence relating to the college of the English Jesuits at St. Omer in Flanders, having found its way into a packet labelled : " Concerning the Oates Plot " ; but it was written long before the plot was thought of, being dated 1661. It bears no address, but the small, neat and clear handwriting exactly recalls that in which William Blundell entered notes in his day-books. He had many friends and relations at St. Omer, where his three sons were educated ; the two younger were there at the time the letter was written. As we know that he visited them in 1660, it seems permissible to suppose, while evidence to the contrary is lacking, that it was he who held " the sundry imperfect discourses " concerning the Isle of Man to which allusion is made in the opening lines.

The epistolary style closely resembles his, while the zeal for the cause of the Church which permeates the

* Printed by the Manx Society in 1876.

† Foley's *Records of the English Province*. Vol. I.

letter is in keeping with the fervent Catholicism which he stoutly manifested throughout a long life passed under the ban of the Penal Laws. In short, if the document were initialed W.B. it could almost unhesitatingly be claimed as his. But as it is signed B.W. we shall never know with certainty whether or not the writer was William Blundell, alias Cicely Burton.

It must be remembered, however, that all at St. Omer, both priests and students, were known under assumed names, owing to the Laws prohibiting the education of children in foreign seminaries, and the return to England of persons who had been so educated. The letter under consideration would be an original one and not a copy, as are those which William kept at Crosby, annotated by himself and initialled W.B. The inversion of the initials with which it is signed may have been for the same reason that no place or family alluded to in its pages is given a name: *i.e.* for the baffling of a possible informer. It is here transcribed in full to show the plight of "this small flock" in the Isle of Man at the time, and how the seed of Catholicism lingered in the soil, to be cultivated here and there by the rare visit of a priest in disguise.

June ye 3rd, 1661.

Sir,

I desyre you to give me leave to show you at once all that I have told you in sundry imperfect discourses concerning ye Isle of Man. There came from thence, about two or three months agoe a young Gentlewoman of my great Acquaintance Whom I have good reason to esteem to be virtuous and discreet. She was borne in ye Island and had ye most of her education there under Judicious and good parents, who having suffered much for their loyaltyes to ye King and ye Lord of ye Island (under whom ye Father had long served in ye quality of a Judge) they were compelled, by occasion of their troubles, about 6 or 7 years since, to com over with their said Daughter into England; where they were all reconcyled to the Catholick church. And not long after, ye parents returning hom, their Daughter betook her self to serve for an honest livelyhood, in a Catholick house not far from hence, till, hearing of the death of her father (about a yeare agoe) shee went over to ye Island; from whence shee is now returned, and informes mee thus—that her Mother remayneth a Catholick,

but hath not had ye opportunity of receyving the Sacraments since her returne to ye Island ; which is 4 or 5 yeares at ye least. That two of her Sisters (whoe live with her said Mother) are wholly persuaded lykewise to ye Catholick Faith ; yet are hardly detayned by their Mother from ye Protestant Churches, being tempted much to frequent them because they do apprehend it more tollerable than to live continually without the exercise of any religion at all lyke Heathens (as they use to term it). There is another of those Sisters that is marryed to a plentiful fortune in ye Island ; and she seemeth exceeding desyrous to be taken to ye church. But this shee must do very privately for want of her Husband's Consent. There is, besydes these, a certaine other Gentlewoman (ye best in ye Island) wife to another Judge (or Dimster as they call it). Shee was bred up in England a Catholick, but lost ye Profession long agoe ; yet seemeth now to be almost pined to Death for feare she shall not be able to dye in ye Church. Her Husband som years ago, did show much civility to Mr. Pulton, whom he met at ye Spaw. He had knowed him once in ye Island and promised at ye Spaw, a safe and free entertainment to him, or to any such like, for som few weeks at ye least, in case they should goe out thither. But I think he intended no more by this, but a civil Curtesy, though he knew right well (and did not at all dislyke) what Mr. Pulton was. This offer was made by him when the Presbyterians had a great influence upon ye Island. There is one Gentlewoman there who goeth each yeare into Ireland to serve God. Sundry others are thought to be well disposed, and a minister, among the rest. Thus far I am informed from ye Party above said : to which I may adde (on ye other syde of ye paper) my owne 6 months observation on ye same place A.D. 1646.

I found ye most of ye people (especially those of ye poorer sort and out of ye Sea ports) exceedingly tenacious of many old Catholick customs, particularly in that of abstaining from Flesh on Dayes commanded. There was there (of my special Acquaintance) a learned old Schoolmaster, whoe had read ye Antient Fathers over and over for 50 yeares together. I heard ye Archdeacon Rutter (whoe is now Bishop of ye Island and far from any enmity towards us) utter these words in relation to the said Person — *That little old man hath more learning than all we ministers together.* His lyfe was according to his learning, and his Judgments was known by all ye People to be Catholick, though he went at that tyme to ye Church. He was finally reconcyled in my Chamber by Mr. Pulton and lived 6 years after (till ye 84th of his age) at ye Dimsters house whom I last mentioned, where he finally ended his lyfe. This man, as I am well assured, (and did discern

it very evidently even before his conversion) hath left ye leavin of good Doctrine in ye minds of many of ye People. But alas, there is nobody now to mould and temper those grosse unshaped Lumps; and I doe much feare that the vertu and strength of that ingredient is no little Decayed by ye length and iniquity of ye tymes.

Sir I do wish that these particulars may make ye same impression in you that they have done upon me and others, and that you may be willing and able to assist them with tymely releefe. The cry of that small flock is exceeding great. And it cannot be feared (how few so ever they be) but the successe of a voyage thither will far exceed that which ye Apostle of Judea did once find in ye Conversion of one silly Karnidos [?] Boy, which he thought notwithstanding was a full recompense allowed for all ye paines he had taken in those endlesse travailes. The Isle of Man is but halfe a dayes saile from one of our Havens, and I do not doubt but who soever you send will be entertayned there with little expense but what must be needs layed out in ye passages over—[crossed out in text.—M.B.]. But as for other rewards he must look for none but what will be given from Heaven. All necessary furniture for ye Service of God there shall be provided in a plain homly fashion by my owne care or charge; but money I have none to spare, by way of viaticum though a very little may serve. One month well spent upon this occasion by a zealous discreet Person, may afford an unspeakable comfort to those poor soules; and so a right knowledge may be got of the state of our Little Church there in Order to a future proceeding.

Sir I do earnestly recommend ye case of this needfull provision to your owne most charitable thoughts; and so I will remain

Yours for ever

B. W.

When, in 1648, William Blundell banished himself, as he says, to the Isle of Man for the second or possibly the third time, it is no wonder that the spot which now alone held out for the King appeared to him a desirable haven indeed. His home was, as he frequently asserts, "plundered"; his purse empty. He was prohibited from practising his religion, and unable to bear his own name with safety in his native county.

"I fancied it," he writes, "as a place freed from our Island, so likewise freed from our cares and troubles, and

therefore probably I could not meet with any nightmare in Man to molest me. . . . I render most humble acknowledgments to ye Divine Disposer of all things here on earth, that hath so graciously ordained that no misery shall be immortal to a mortal man."

His description of his reception on the island reads like an extract from some legendary or fairy story :

The continual watch kept on the Scafel (the highest point on the island) . . . takes notice of your ship's approach long before your arrival ; they thence curiously observe to what part you steer . . . the Governor of the Island is presently informed, thither doth he most commonly send the controulour of the Island or some other of the Lord's officers in post, who faileth not to be there at ye same time of your ship's arrival. You no sooner set your foot on shore within the haven but ye Constable of ye fort accosteth you, and if he observe you to be a gentleman or one of greater quality, will civilly salute you . . . and although it be in effect a summons to appear, yet he inviteth and intreats you to be pleased to speak with the lord's officers, who do expect you at such a place hard by.

So are you by him conducted to a house in the town which ye lord of ye island has for such and ye like occasions. . . . There you shall not fail to find sitting at a table not only ye controulour of ye Island, or other officers of ye Lords, but 6 or 8 more of ye best sort of ye inhabitants of ye town where you land. All bid you land, all bid you welcome thither, but you are more or less respected according to your quality. . . . They will endeavour to pump you of all you know, but your discretion should advise you to reserve the chiefest and choicest until such time as you shall and must appear before the Lord of the Island. The Controulour will say little, but will observe who you are, whence you come and wherefore, etc. . . . Thus are you entertained by these with very familiar conference, wine, beer and tobacco, and in the close of all they will recommend you to some convenient lodging.

The degree of convenience afforded by the lodging is not concealed from us :

The houses in all these towns are of one fashion, low built. The materials of these structures are of small stones and lime as those in the country, and thatched as those also, with this only difference that they have an upper room above ye lower ; some of

these are let out unto passengers for lodging-chambers ; the dooms and windows of these lofts are made very low, and ye walls very thick, so as these rooms are not commonly as lightsome as you may desire, but of purpose are they thus contrived, and for warmth. . . .

In such a "lodging-chamber" was the little old schoolmaster secretly received into the Church after his many years of lonely study of the ancient Fathers, with the young cavalier, as it is irresistible to suppose, as his sponsor.

William Blundell's description of the island itself reads like that of some unreal elfin-land.

These towns are all of them very little, an ox hide cut in little thongs measured out the ground whereon the famous citadel of the Carthegenians was seated. . . . I suppose a cat's skin so extended would treble encompass the greatest of these four towns.

You may travail securely in any part of the Island, there being no woods and the cottages so contiguous, the thief is not sooner discovered but may be pursued by ye view.

For generations successive Earls of Derby had been styled Kings of Man. James, the seventh Earl, known in the history of the Island as the Great Stanley, had withdrawn thither in 1645 in obedience to the Royal command, to save the Isle from falling into the hands of the King's enemies. His is one of the most romantic figures of that turbulent day. At one moment, when victory for the Royal cause in the North had seemed to be within his grasp, his detractors whispered in Charles's ear that his power and popularity menaced the King's own sovereignty. Lord Derby, however, in a personal interview, is reported to have convinced Charles of his loyalty by this declaration :

"If any man living, your Majesty excepted, shall dare to fix the least accusation upon me that may tend to your disservice, I hope you will give me leave to pick the calumny from his lips with the point of my sword."

While the King's enemies subsequently overran England and dictated to the Parliament, and Charles himself was hurried from one scene of captivity to another, the Isle of Man held out for him to the last. Even after the execution of Charles I, when Lord Derby's children, held prisoners in England, were subjected to ill-usage, and their liberty was offered to their father as the price of his ceding the Isle, he indignantly refused, as he said, to prove traitorous to his sovereign, concluding his letter of reply to the summons to yield with these words :

Take this final answer and forbear any further solicitations ; for if you trouble me with any more messages upon this subject I will burn the paper and hang the bearer.

This is the immutable resolution and shall be the undoubted practise of him who accounts it his chiefest glory to be

His Majesty's most loyal and obedient servant

DERBY.

Castle Toen, July 12th, 1649.

Friends, supporters and retainers of Lord Derby followed him from Lancashire, their number increasing as the Royal cause waned in England. This influx of strangers revolutionised the mode of life of the Manxmen by introducing money as a purchasing medium, where hitherto the method of doing business had been by the barter of goods.

William Blundell had been brought up as Lord Derby's neighbour in Lancashire, and had fought under him ; he was also a friend of the Lancashire governor of the island, John Greenhalgh. He found himself in a very different position in Man, therefore, to that which he had left in Lancashire, but no doubt anxiety for his family drove him back to Crosby, for he was there again within a year.

Although he has not recorded that he met in Man his young cousin, Sir Roger Bradshaigh of Bradshaigh, the fact may be surmised. The boy, as a Catholic minor, had, according to the dictates of the law, to be educated by a Protestant guardian. He was consequently brought up by Lord Derby, and would have been a

member of his semi-Royal train in the Isle of Man, while his Catholic mother, at the cost of we know not what sacrifices, secured the Catholic education of his younger brother upon the Continent.

It may have been in conversations during the festive gatherings at the Lord of Man's castle that the Catholic squire of one Lancashire estate first confided his sore distress to the Protestant heir of another. However that may have been, Sir Roger Bradshaigh it was who five years later bought back the Crosby lands from the sequestrators, and held them for his cousin in his own name and that of the lawyer, William Crouch, who transacted the business. Little by little the money was paid back, the cavalier's strenuous efforts to discharge his debt being interrupted by those four terms of imprisonment for "being a delinquent and a papist," as he says.

We would like to be able to picture that "wif" of his who clung to the helm of "the little cock-boat at Crosby" through the storm. Her husband makes frequent affectionate allusions to her, but no description of her is to be found. He has, however, as it were, outlined her for us in one of his letters, written from Crosby in an interval between two terms of imprisonment, when he was joyfully expecting her return from Haggerston.

"I shall see my little round wif," he says, "come tumbling home to her brats."

MARGARET BLUNDELL.

ART. 5.—A FORGOTTEN DOMINICAN CONVENT:
OETENBACH, ZÜRICH

1. *Nuremberg MS. Cent. v. 10* (printed in "Zürcher Taschenbuch," Jahrgang, 12, 1889).
2. *Pez. Bibliotheca Ascetica*, Vol. 8, 1723-40.

SISTER ELISABETH STAGEL'S famous little book containing the life of Suso and the lives of the Sisters of the Dominican Convent at Toss, near Winterthür, showed the world the high spirituality attained by the Order and the mystical life granted to not a few of its members. The different MSS. in which this work has come down to us generally contain also a similar record of the Dominicanesses at S. Katharinenthal, near Diessenhofen, or of those at Unterlinden, near Colmar, but the history of yet another convent of the same Order and Province, namely, Oetenbach, in Zürich, has remained hidden in a single MSS. of the Convent of St. Catherine, at Nuremberg, now in the town library. A transcript of the MSS. was made by Drs. Zeller-Werdemüller and Baechtold, in 1889, and published as a pamphlet for a local historical society. It is rare now, but its contents are worthy of a better fate than oblivion, even were it only because no less a person than the great Master Eckhart, and later Suso, visited and directed some of the Nuns.

The manuscript dates from the fifteenth century. The original version was the work of a thirteenth century nun and seems to have consisted of five chapters of chronicle followed by a few lives, the whole forming an introduction or epilogue to the life and works of Sister Elisabeth von Oye. This must have been compiled before 1285, *i.e.*, before the community moved to Neu-Oetenbach. In the following century another sister continued the history until about 1300, and added to the biographies, which cover a further period of fifty years. The whole was edited, probably recast by the Dominican Johann Meyer (b. 1422, d. 1485), in whose hand and among whose other works the manuscript is.

Father Meyer had every opportunity of knowing

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these nuns. He was a native of Zürich, entered the Order there, was transferred to Basle in 1442, and in due course became a celebrated director and writer on the spiritual and mystical life. In 1482 he became confessor to the Adelhausen Community. There, and indeed wherever he went, throughout his life, he collected verbal and written testimony concerning the lives of the members of the Order, and carefully preserved all the records and narratives he could find. We have, therefore, an account that goes back to the wonderful days of the mystical Renaissance of the fourteenth century, or earlier, which is valuable in proportion to its great simplicity and the witness it unconsciously affords to theories of mystical theology developed much later. Father Meyer was interested in the records of the Order, and we have several collections of documents, constitutions, chronicles, etc., still to be found at Basle, Leipzig, Freiburg, Nürnberg.

The lives are not in chronological order, but a few dates are given and some facts and names are to be found in the Zürich archives. For S. Elisabeth von Hohenfels, who stands first, we have no data, but internal evidence seems to point to the first period. Chapter 5 concludes with "among these were S. Ita von Hutwil . . . S. Hilti von Opfinkon and Adelheit Schwarzin. The holy life of all the others is hid from us and only opened to Him who is the Rewarder of all things." Nevertheless, to this period belong also S. Elisabeth von Oye, who was present at the death of S. Hilti von Opfinkon and recorded a divine communication about her. S. Elisabeth von Beggenhofen forms the link between the first two generations. She is mentioned as in fellowship with von Oye in some penances, and we hear that she entered about 1281 and died in 1340. The writer of the second part of the chronicle was her contemporary, being present at her death and asking her for an account of her prayer, and she adds: "*We* have often experienced that this sister became an intercessor for us . . ." It was this sister who consulted Eckhart (probably during his Strassburg period, 1314-1317).

S. Juzi Goldstein was elected in 1317 and appears to be the youngest Sister mentioned.

We may now pass to the contents of the historical section.

If to-day you wander perchance across the Limmat by the fine modern Urania Brücke and turn up steeply to the left, you find yourself in the Oetenbach Gasse. It stretches up over the incline towards the modern town. There stood the last home of the community, the Neu-Oetenbach Convent. But if you turn under an old archway below the upper part of the Schipfe building, and come down through a slummy back-street, you are also in the Oetenbach Gasse. On your right, old houses and an overhanging garden sloping down from the height above, where the lovely elms of the great Lindenhof give shelter. On your left, tumbledown wooden houses backing on the river or the river itself. This must have been part of the Convent grounds. But we know not whether it was here or elsewhere, across the river, near the Church of the Friar Preachers that stood "the narrow small house" where Dame Gertrude von Hilzingen, sick of delays and refusals, enclosed herself in 1234 with two or three companions and began her life of oblation under the direction of the Dominicans. The Friar Preachers had settled in Zürich in 1229 and were arousing the whole world to penitence by their teaching and example. In 1237, Pope Gregory IX, who was staying at Viterbo, at the request of some interested persons, ordered a collection to be made for the building of a proper Convent. In 1239, the Sisters sent two Sisters with a priest, on foot to Rome, to obtain a papal approbation for their Rule. The record says "they commanded these three persons to seek a confirmation from the Pope. And they set out immediately, relying on God's providence. Now they had no means of riding, so they went on foot towards Rome and had all their confidence in God. And the Convent called upon Our Lord very earnestly and promised Our Lady that for evermore . . . after Matins, the prayer *Salve Regina* should be said. . . . So they came near to

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Rome, where at this time very many great lords were assembled, who had great riches to give to whomsoever was of service to them in their affairs. But the poor little ones of Oetenbach had nobody but the two Sisters. So God helped them, who never abandoned those who trusted in Him, so that they speedily obtained the end of their desires. And the Holy Father Gregory IX gave them their Confirmation on the Feast of St. John before the Latin Gate, in the year 1239. So they left, long before many a great lord who had been waiting before them, and were received with great joy at home."

Within a few years sufficient funds were forthcoming to buy a small property by the mouth of the Oetenbach, on the left side of the lake, near the Zürichhorn. The purchase was heralded by a dream-vision of a pious benefactor, who saw a flock of birds settle quietly on this estate and then rise and fly away in a body; by which he understood that a community would settle there but eventually go elsewhere—as indeed it happened in 1285, when Neu-Oetenbach was built. We hear that the migration from the town to this first Convent took place about 1239. The Sisters then numbered 64 "and had not one gold mark between them and they lived there for more than 40 years in great poverty." In the very early days, in the town, the real poverty of a house that let in the rain and food that depended on the remains of the rich, was outbalanced by spiritual joys and by the affectionate care of the local Prior, Hugo Riplin, of Strassbourg.* Soon after, however, the edict of General Jordanus was issued forbidding the Brothers to undertake the direction of Nuns, and then the infant community was left deprived of spiritual counsel, of instruction, and apparently of sacramental confession. Moreover, they lacked the temporal means which were essential. The Sisters were greatly dismayed, for no one seemed inclined to take them over. However, a rich benefactress, Elisabeth von Kloten, a widow, desired to join them, and her friends, the Franciscans (established in Zürich in 1240), tried to persuade her to enter a Poor Clare Convent and suggested they would

* Hugo was Prior from 1232-1259—probably Hugo Riplin of Strassbourg.

take over the care of Oetenbach if the Sisters would be affiliated to the Order of the Poor Clares. This came to the ears of the Dominicans, who returned in haste to their Nuns, and to the great joy of the Sisters arranged matters with their superiors, to the effect that in 1245 Pope Innocent IV placed the Convent definitely under the direction of the Friar Preachers of the Province of Germany.*

Thus firmly established, spiritually and temporarily, the Nuns could extend their primitive buildings and we hear how they dragged stones from the hillside in an ox-cart kindly lent by a neighbouring peasant, and had their foundations laid "wide and strong and deep, reaching so far down to the lake that the folk of Zürich said, 'those Sisters of Oetenbach want to push back the lake.'"

Nevertheless, their interests were not in material buildings, and the greater part of the chronicle is concerned with the lives of the Sisters. In this Alt-Oetenbach they suffered great want of means, yet found their poverty to be their glory. At first "they had no outside helpers but one woman, one lay-brother and one labourer and a Mass-priest. They could find no baker, so one of the noble Nuns did her best and turned out loaves so wet that they had to be put to dry in the sun, and as they dried the crust fell apart from the crumb, and even so there was not enough for the Sisters' needs. They made up with large dishes of cabbage and green-stuff, and for a treat they had small cakes baked in lard by the side of the vegetables."

While the narrative of their involuntary and voluntary poverty resembles all the conventual records of the time, certain other stories are as simple and charming as those of the Fioretti.

Sister Agnes of Zürich had the office of begging at Rapperswil. "She was a very simple soul, and one day when she was asking for alms a man mocked her, saying, 'I'll give you Schurwetzlen,' that is, the milk which comes from a goat. But she did not know what it was, and stretched out her neckerchief to receive it. The noble Count Rudolf of Rapperswil favoured the Sisters greatly and was specially kind to Sister Agnes,

* July 12, 1245.

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even though she was somewhat simple. That pleased him so well that he had great joy and refreshment in her company. One day he asked her if the community drank wine. 'Yea, Sir, oft,' she replied, 'when the Sisters receive Our Lord, they drink wine.' But she meant the wine they drank out of the chalice.* And when he commanded them to give her bread she said: 'Sir, you may keep that, for I cannot carry it.'† So he had a boat made ready for her and laid therein wine and bread and bacon, and sent it to them often and specially at festivals. Whenever this simple Sister came he sent the community a piece of cloth, and he laid many before her and commanded her to choose which she would have. Then was she very glad, and in her simplicity, she as often chose a poor piece as a good one, and that pleased him. But his wife, who was a 'von Montfort,' was also very fond of the Sisters. And she instructed her not to choose any piece but that which she would point out. So she secretly made a sign which of them was a good roll. So Sister Anges took that. And he was very good to us, and whatever we asked he always granted, and fed us abundantly with food and with drink."

In the year 1278, Count Hugo von Werdenberg enclosed his three-year-old daughter and gave the Sisters the possession and revenues of a large estate in Vorarlberg, thus acquiring certain privileges as benefactor. The noble family objected that the Convent was not comfortable or large enough for the present number of Sisters. Many of them agreed, and a search was made for a suitable house within the town itself. This caused a division among the Sisters, a minority desiring to remain in their poverty by the lake-side, the others preferring the worldly advantages of being in the town. Their counsel prevailed; a site was obtained in the present Oetenbach Gasse; two Chapels and part of a choir of the Church, with a small temporary wooden Convent, were begun, and in 1285 the 120 nuns sailed in two veiled boats from Zürichhorn to the town. They

* Presumably as an Ablution after Communion.

† Rapperswil was some 16 miles from Oetenbach, at the far end of the Lake, on the same side.

had sent on their books and possessions and brought with them the bones of the Sisters who had been buried at Alt-Oetenbach. In Zürich they were joined by ladies from the best houses of the land, and while enjoying general favour they remained faithful to their primitive ideal of an austere life. In 1293, when a new Convent of Dominicanesses was being founded at Bern, the Friar Preachers decided that four of the experienced Oetenbach Sisters should go to the new house to train the young community. One of them became Prioress, and the fourteenth century authoress of our chronicle bears witness that the house in Bern still kept the rule faithfully. She is also at pains to show that this good fruit was the outcome of the transference of Oetenbach to the town, and that the community was therefore justified in its decision and had not perished by its primitive ideal of poverty. There was evidently still some controversy on the point at the time of writing, owing no doubt to the increase of riches and influential connections.

Here ends the story of the foundation of Oetenbach and thereafter begin the lives of seven of the first Sisters. In these records, the authoresses make no distinction between higher and lower mystical graces. They place side by side all the facts concerning both the ascetical and mystical lives of the Sisters. We are left to form our own conclusions, and we note a naïve fidelity in these stories which guarantees of itself for their veracity. The writer must have had a true appreciation of the essential factors of the spiritual life, though she seldom makes a comment. The last chapter, a prologue to a life of Elisabeth von Oye which is missing in MS., is stilted and conventional in style, a piece of ambitious literary effort, intended perhaps as a prologue to the whole work. When, however, our nun is carried away by her admiration and love of her Sisters and is narrating their lives, we recognise the tone and style of truth, and this literary artifice is wholly absent.

One other factor contributes to our acceptance of the account, namely, her evident ignorance of the difference of value between the speculative and mystical experience of the first two Sisters and their imaginative

visions and auditions ; and again, the want of distinction between the same phenomena in the different stages of the development of one individual. There must have been great purity of spirit, and a truthful, simple, adequate, yet not critical introspection, in the community to enable the subjects of the biographies to tell their stories so accurately, their successors to hand down the tradition so carefully, and the biographer to describe it so simply. Our belief in the veracity of the record rests on the correspondence of the mystical development recorded in some cases, with the mystical theology which was analysed and tabulated much later by the Latin School of spirituality. The genius of Teutonic Mysticism of the 13th-14th century is not analytical, and we cannot trace any direct school of thought beyond the general influence of St. Mechtilde and St. Gertrude. Nevertheless, the influence of Eckhart and his school was beginning to be felt, and perhaps experts may find some trace of this in the lives of the Sisters. The different elements which we recognise as the speculative school of Eckhart, the school of the Passion of Christ of Tauler and the school of the Divine Love of Suso are all represented. In the two longer lives we shall find mystical experience reaching a higher degree of pure spirituality and differentiated from that of the others. These fourteenth century nuns developed spontaneously, or under instruction, all the spiritual traits of the German fourteenth-century mystics, and when Suso came to them he must have found a fruitful vineyard.

We can group the lives round certain main features which are characteristic of the Order. Common to all is the narration of ascetical practises and the earnest pursuit of the conventual virtues and of Prayer. In common, too, with other contemporary accounts, the imaginative and sensible elements are found in the tales of the nuns' visions, auditions and revelations, in some cases reminding us of the visions of the Mechtilde school and of St. Gertrude. Yet, on the whole, these are subordinated to the spiritual interpretations and are never merely emotional. These women had a Dominican training in theology, and their meditation and contempla-

tion are focussed on the mysteries of the Faith and on the attributes of God. Their experiences vary considerably, but they clearly indicate some of the special problems with which the newer theology of the thirteenth century was dealing.

An edition of the complete text would enable those who are qualified, to adjudicate between the conflicting tendencies in each character. On the whole I have the impression that Sister Ita von Hohenfels belonged to the earlier school. Her visions are external and imaginative, full of sensible images. Nevertheless, her spiritual life, as indicated by progressive temptations and experiences, centres round the Will of God and the problem of His union with the Soul on earth and in heaven, the nature of the Blessed Trinity and the Blessed Sacrament. In these respects she seems to be moulded by the Victorine and Eckhartian theology, and the stages of her Prayer are most interesting in view of later theories of mystical theology on the subject.

Ita von Hutwil is simpler and perhaps more influenced by Eckhart and Tauler. She clearly states that her experiences are *within* her soul, and has fewer sensible images and imaginative visions. A definite ethical trend is combined with a strongly-developed personal love for Our Lord and His Passion. The will of God is the subject of her contemplations, and her graces are those of spiritual auditions and the discernment of spirits.

Together with her we must class the two fragments about Sister Hilti von Opfinkon and Sister Elisabeth von Oye (Eycken?). They clearly were occupied with the higher mysteries of the Faith, and the expressions used in the posthumous revelations imply definite theological conceptions. Of the former at her death it was revealed to St. Elisabeth von Oye: "She is enclosed in the secret treasure-house of my Divine Trinity. She has been revealed and transformed to the Beatific Vision before the eyes of my Majesty. Her want has been turned to plenty, her sorrow to a joyful play in the sight of my divine nature. I have drawn her soul's inmost sense of hearing to the music of harps playing, which is the sound of my eternal Word. Even as I desire always

with loving desire to drink of the streams of blood shed forth by my crucified Son, even so burning was my thirst for the playful and joyous presence of her soul before me."

On the other hand Elspeth von Beggenhofen is entirely devoted to the Person of Christ and to union with Him through His Humanity by intimate sharing of His Passion in poverty, self-abandonment and obedience. She is certainly influenced by Tauler and Suso.

With her go accounts of the simple graces and understandings vouchsafed to two simple souls, also deeply imbued with devotion to the Holy Passion. One was Juzi Goldstein, healed "by the most honoured Martyrs SS. Felix and Regula"; the other, Adelheit Schwarzin, one of the early nuns, who was strengthened in the burdens of her office by a sight of the Passion which has affinities with that of our Juliana. "She saw Our Lord in the gravity of demeanour that He had when Judas kissed Him." The vision disappeared and "He opened His Heart to her and let her see the abundance of all virtues in the perfection that they are in Him. And three virtues shone out . . . The first that when He willed to go to His Passion, His Heart was so loving and kind towards His enemies, without any bitterness, simple as that of a new-born child. . . . The second, that He was so humble that His Heart was so bowed down deep below all creatures that out of love He willed to bear more contempt than all the creatures may devise. . . . The third, that His love was so great towards man that He desired more to suffer through us than all the evil that all men could inflict on Him. . . ."

The last life, which we have already referred to, that of St. Elisabeth von Oye, is missing in the MSS. It was extant, together with her spiritual works at the Carthusian house at Freiburg, and was mentioned by M. Tanner, who is quoted by Pez. Bib. Ascetica, tom. 8, in his brief account of this nun's life among those of other Dominican convents. The esteem in which both she and her works were still held is most marked, so that the eulogy of her sister in religion, which alone survives in our MS., may be justified. In exalting her virtues and example, and in

speaking of the supernatural revelations which she received, the writer says: "She came to this state by three things: by the free aloofness from all creatures which she practised; by her intense simplicity and introversion of spirit; and above all by her fervent love and desire for likeness to the suffering of Our Lord Jesus Christ."

Matthew Tanner describes her favours in much the same terms that she had used in speaking of the graces of St. Hilti von Opfikon. "(Deus) affirmavit se animam ejus efficere purum speculum sanctissimam and splendidissimam imaginem in qua oculi Majestatis suae sese pro immenso desiderio jucundissime aeternum sint oblectaturi. Voluit ipse unus esse amor ejus. Non permisit illo ullius hominis amorem aut favorem, nec ullius creaturae solatium, ut nusquam cor ejus haereret, aut in ulla re creata delectationem perciperet, sed in Deo solo."

We may now consider in a little detail the three longer lives mentioned above.

The most remarkable feature of Sister Ita von Hohenfels' life is the periodical recurrence of temptations followed by spiritual experiences leading to progressive states of Prayer. These temptations to fear and despair came and apparently lasted five years each. At first it was fear of mortal sin which seemed to tinge all she did. "Nevertheless in all her . . . humble duties she tried to keep her heart always *in* God and to work earnestly while she was at this exercise." Thereafter for five years she was in doubt concerning the faith; "whether God had such a nature as was said of Him . . . and whether the soul was *anything* at all." She persevered in virtue and great austerities, and at the end of the period she heard a voice saying: "The living spirit is in thee and God knows thee." The doubt disappeared. Then she had a vision of hell and purgatory. She recognised the distinction between the pains of clerics and laymen, and she experienced the pains for a short time. "From this she learned the living power of God and how He gives power to the spirit" [soul] "to

suffer eternally." She was then rapt to heaven and saw Our Lord "in His living power according to His divine nature and His eternity and so . . . understood how the angels and souls are in God in this living power and how God is in them." This vision was "out of the body," and was followed by grievous sickness, but the fruit thereof was "three things which she held and practised with the virtues. The first was "the light of truth in which God let her know secret things, both spiritual and temporal. The second, a conversation yet without mortal words, by which God was present in her soul. The third, a knowledge of God most hidden, yet she recognised it to be as true as if she had seen it with mortal eyes." After enjoying this favour some time, a vision of two faces occurred, which Our Lord interpreted to her as being those of the Evil One and the forerunner of trial. She was subjected then to a temptation to despair "so great that she thought nobody could be saved. . . . It seemed to her at all times that hell was open before her and that she must come thereto and that her place was set next to Lucifer." After five years of this, during which her devotion never faltered and during which she received the Holy Sacrament, "not because she had no comfort from God, but in order that she might possess God here as much as ever she might," she passed by rapture into experience of complete "quiet." She could never express "how great a divine holiness and sweetness this Quiet is." Thereby, she was given "The certainty of eternal life" and never lost this assurance again. With it she lost also the fear of death and gained the knowledge "That no soul is lost who is of goodwill." The temptation to despair, however, recurred in a new form later, so that for five years everything that she did "was bitter to her" and she had to fight "very hard and persistently to overcome herself, as if she had only just entered on the spiritual life." She seems to have lost also the power of contemplation, for later, after five years, "Our Lord gave her again the light of truth and freedom so that she might think on God, when she desired to do so, without error."

Her next rapture showed her "How the blood and flesh of Jesus Christ is united with the Saints and with souls, so that in each it shines with wonderful beauty; and their holy lives as they were on earth, in their martyrdom and purity or their special virtues . . . shone wondrously through Our Lord's body and blood. . . . She saw St. Catherine and St. Dominic and St. Augustine in great honour and dignity, shining out from God and God outside them." The peace and freedom consequent upon this vision was followed by another visitation of the Evil One tempting her with regard to the problem of evil and God's foreknowledge, namely: "That God knew when he created the Angel that he would become an Evil Spirit and that even Eve and Adam and the whole human race should fall through his counsel." For five years she endured "great trouble of heart herein and no one could help her" until in another rapture she saw "Our Lord's sufferings, in a sweet *quiet*," and realised the generosity of His love, a solution to the problem of predestination, namely: "How much greater is the joy that we have by His sufferings than what we would have had if Adam had not fallen." In this ecstasy she experienced the presence of Christ in her soul as He was at the Deposition, and on her return to herself it remained with her. Her Confessor, Albrecht Von Bello, affirmed that she was granted the supernatural virtue of purity. In this last period a vision of Our Lord's right hand on the Cross, which she had had before she entered Religion, recurred, but this time the hand, instead of being "flesh-like and red-brown of colour," was transfused with light, and she saw the right hand taking the Hosts out of the priest's hand and administering them to the Sisters. She was able also to recognise the change in the consecrated Host and at the Elevation saw both It and the arms of the priest shining with supernatural light. She was given the gift of tears, but only at Mass, for "otherwise she was of a hard disposition, whatever trouble befell her she never wept, and was so united in heart with the will of God that she never asked comfort of any of her friends or any man. She liked to be despised . . . and whatever was given her she offered it

for the common use." Before her death she was again troubled by the Evil Spirit in the likeness of a ravening wolf. As he assaulted her a voice passed through her, crying: "Thou art lost for evermore." Nevertheless she became so accustomed to these diabolical manifestations that the Evil One at last was reduced to the device of hiding her clothing.

She made a most holy end, "cheerfully and content, without any fear, though she had a very hard death."

The life of Ita von Hutwil presents many of the same phenomena. She was also tempted for periods of six years, first to despair in fear of damnation, and later by a complete spiritual abandonment. Nevertheless, she does not appear to have suffered the same frequency of diabolical visitations. Her record is less marked by imaginative visions and more by intellectual and spiritual ones and by auditions. Throughout her life she had a great devotion for Our Lord's Passion, and the Blessed Sacrament was the very essence of her being. Quite early in a trial, "Having received Our dear Lord, she complained that she would willingly have comfort of God, yet when He comforted her, she would not take it for comfort." Her editor remarks: "This was through the darkness of her troubled soul," but we see by the further record that it was a manifestation of her desire for spiritual self-abnegation. Her progress was as follows. She received a series of revelations. First, concerning the perfections of virtue in the Prior of Strassbourg and a lay brother, namely, "that this virtue is, that a man wills nothing except what God wills." This phrase recalls the maxim of Tauler. Later, in a vision of Our Lord on the Cross, in which she first stood by His side and then took His place, a fourfold change was made in her soul. This was explained to her later, together with the meaning of other visions: "That when she was troubled He was bearing as His own what would have been a grievous load on her . . . nor would she have been able by her own effort to will to carry it." Moreover, she was shown the self-oblation of Christ to the Father as He was on the Cross praying for her. When she saw Him standing below her arms and leaning upon her as

in the Descent from the Cross, this signified "that He preserved her from falling into sin through suffering . . . and showed his desire to have His rest in her." Whenever God offered her consolation she chose to share her suffering with Him, yet once having felt abandoned, she complained, and a loud external voice startling her in body and soul, answered her: "When was I ever unfaithful to thee?" and the voice was so sweet that she forgot all her trouble. It was right as if He spake: "What I do to thee that I do in true fidelity," and her soul received it in this manner. Twenty years before her death she received the promise of Union, and with it great enlightenment, so that she never doubted again in her distresses "and recognised the will of God in all things." She could not express the nature of this illumination, but perceived it in others and knew the graces of others.

She had a great devotion to the Passion and desired to participate in it by inward vision. Apparently there was some impetuosity in her desire, for she was shown the vision of a little star rising in a great fog and dispersing the darkness, with the words: "Just so does true humility disperse everything that may make man err against God." On the witness of her sisters a story which she told of a third person was true of herself. Our Lord spoke three words: "Prepare that I may do with thee whatever I will," signifying detachment. "Take heed what I desire," signifying "That a man must take pains and make an inward harmony within himself that he may perceive God." "Notice how I will it," signifying "complete union of the will and watchfulness for God." Later, as comfort for a sight of her sins, unspeakable things were seen in a vision of heaven, "Not heaven where the souls of the blessed are, but Our Lord Jesus Christ as He was on earth." Again we remember the words of Juliana: "Thou art my heaven." The sight of the Sacred Wounds marvellously transfigured, fulfilled her with divine sweetness and joy. She learned that like the souls in heaven, she was receiving all that she could receive, but perceived also that had she been better prepared, she would have been able to receive

more. The editor says: "This vision and experience was not in the body, for she saw her body standing there. But she saw a picture within her which reflected and received all these wonders, and she knew well that it was her soul, but she could not describe its likeness." Further interpretations follow concerning the Blessed Sacrament, the Hypostatic Union, the way in which our graces are received from the Sacred Heart. The vision or its effect was experienced for five days, and fresh interpretations were vouchsafed for nine weeks until the Wednesday of Holy Week, when the picture was changed to that of Our Lord's Resurrection lit up like that of the Wounds. "So, therefore, Our Lord arose gloriously in her just as He rose from the dead . . . thereafter when she thought of His Passion, the eyes of her soul *saw* the shining light so that she could not *think*, and she was so united with it that she did not know whether it was Our Lord or herself." The sequel is interesting. It appears that this vision was always "drawing her upward, without any harm, but when her heart was sad *then* she rejoiced, and was always drawn back again to earth with a desire to have compassion with the sufferings of Our Lord."

The third life, that of Sister Elspeth von Beggenhofen, shows how the same lessons were taught in a simpler way to a very simple child of God. We have the story of her childhood when she practised mortification and prayer beyond the measure of natural piety. At her earnest request she received Holy Communion earlier than was usual and continued in great devotion, in fastings, watchings, scourging herself, praying, yet always in secret. "When it was time for her to choose a state of life . . . she was greatly exercised in her mind whether she ought not to live in poverty and great misery. She had prepared herself much for this. Then she thought that she should ask God . . . to find out His will . . . It was revealed to her that she ought to give herself up to Obedience, and this would be best. So she abandoned her first plan and betook herself to the worthy, holy Convent of Oetenbach." These conflicts

between her natural inclinations to poverty and an independent access to God and the claims of obedience continued all through her life. She began by practising the virtue of obedience in every detail, choosing nevertheless always the poorest, the humblest tasks, and as Infirmarian, the most unpleasant duties. God's graces increased in proportion to her zeal.

Obedience became difficult again later, when, as Sub-Prioress, it was her duty to reprove the Sisters and carry out reforms. The opposition and hostility that she met with were transformed in her soul so that she was never disquieted, but found Our Lord united to herself in the same purpose of service to others which He had exhibited for our salvation. This union was the fulfilment of a constant desire for likeness to Our Lord and she came to know that external suffering puts an end sometimes to interior distresses. The virtue of obedience grew also at the expense of very small sacrifices and once "She offered a thing to Our Lord in which she had great pleasure and she gave it through God's help. Then the heavenly Father said to her 'I give thee my Son.'"

She had frequently to be restrained in her desire to give away everything that she had. "When her Superior would not allow her to do more, her suffering was so great that she called upon God with all the powers of her soul asking what He meant by it. . . . She spent the night in the Refectory since she could not rest at all. And there Our Lord appeared to her . . . and said "I mean thereby that thou shalt have the fruit of each pain and enjoy it with me in eternity." At another time she asked God to take away everything and give Himself. "And thereby her senses were so rapt in God that she noticed no outward things at all. And when she had to go to eat or drink she bethought herself 'What doest thou? Thou hast no need of this!' yet by a secret doing of God she went to table with the other Sisters and attended to all that pertained to the body. Nor did she sleep for more than a month . . . and at another period of 13 years scarcely at all."

The life abounds in graphic and simple stories.

Elizabeth's love for the Passion grew until she could never speak or hear of it without great emotion, which she tried to hide. Apparently, this desire merited the gift of discerning "Who were the true friends of God" and she saw "How He gave Himself to His friends on the other side of the lake." Later in life "she had a great light from God so that she recognised all men on earth who were in this light—as she stood there she knew all their spiritual practices and what God was working in them." We have already seen that Sister Ita had this gift in lesser degree.

Having once offered herself to practice some voluntary penances with Sister Elisabeth von Oye and others, Our Lord made it clear that He did not wish this from her, and, instead, gave her interior suffering "So immeasurably painful that she could never put it into words even to her Confessor." It was only when the great Eckhart came to Oetenbach that she received comfort, and he replied: "'No worldly wisdom is needed for this matter. It is purely a work of God and nothing will bring relief except to commend oneself to the faithfulness of God in a free act of abandonment' and she experienced that it was indeed so." Twice at least she was at pains to conceal the favour of levitation. At one time she seems to have suffered some mental derangement when she was tempted by the Evil One, dragged about her room, swung from a rope, apparently drawn through the floor and trodden in the wine press. This last experience was near her death.

We quote from the last period. "Kneeling before the altar she heard a voice "It is with thee as with those in heaven, they may never be nearer God than they are already. And because she wanted to be nearer God . . . she desired to withdraw herself from the enjoyment of God and divine pleasures and begged God to take away these graces. And that happened at once. Then she was afraid (of what she had done) and confessed it to Brother John, the Penitentiary who was Prior there. He said it was the most perfect act he had ever heard of in a human being." At another time she begged to be prepared for the utmost that God had done to any saint

"and in this love and desire God drew her beyond all ordinary powers of the soul into an extraordinary beatitude . . . the most unspeakable grace ever given . . . being a pure union with God in everlasting bliss without any mediacy." Immediately a diabolical reaction set in and she was left wondering whether God had any such being as was said of Him. Even this trial became sweet to her in a new illumination. "In time the *light* diminished greatly but her *will* grew in strength so that she had no desire to will anything but what God willed and this remained with her until her death and increased evermore in her and at that end was the strongest thing in her. . . . She had a most compassionate heart and would gladly have come to the aid of all men in their sorrow."

Towards the end, her Sisters begged her to tell them about her prayer. "Then she spake, 'I cannot pray any more, for there are always new wonders in me, as in those who are in everlasting bliss who for ever enjoy new wonders from God.'" That she was thus referring to a high state of contemplation is quite clear, for the editor adds "so, on that account she had no leisure to pray [vocally] except what belonged to Mass and what was of Obedience."

This Sister died in 1340 and apparently the community found in her a powerful intercessor for them "and for other folk also who were in other lands whom she relieved of their spiritual sufferings."

We have noticed a certain rhythm in these lives. It is first a close connection between suffering and the visitation of God's favours in prayer; secondly, the recurring sequence of periodical alternation between suffering, whether of a temporal or purely spiritual kind and the fruition of God: and, lastly, the gradual growth of mental illumination as to the meaning of earlier revelations and favours; the recognition of God's dealing with a soul as the working out of a simple plan, the pursuit of a single purpose.

CLAIRE KIRCHBERGER.

ART. 6.—JERÓNIMO GRACIÁN

IN the entire history of Spanish mysticism there is no single figure presenting greater interest than that of St. Teresa's disciple and confessor, Jerónimo Gracián. Others will be longer remembered for the content of their writings, but none was a more striking character or is more difficult to interpret at the present day; while few can be said to have written on themes more diverse—if indeed Gracián wrote any large proportion of all the books that are attributed to him. In this article our aim is to give a general account of the man and his work, passing thereafter to consider one particular aspect of it.

I

The third son of a family of thirteen children, Jerónimo Gracián was born at Valladolid on June 6th, 1545. His father had been a secretary successively to Charles V and Philip II, and several of his brothers followed him in entering the royal service. Jerónimo, however, found his vocation at an early age in a higher calling: he was ordained in 1569 and joined St. Teresa's reformed order of Discalced Carmelites, three years later, as Fray Jerónimo de la Madre de Dios.

The beginnings of the storms which were soon to overwhelm him may be traced to his character and temperament. So precocious was he that he is said, while still a student at Alcalá de Henares, to have deputized on occasion for his teachers. As a novice at Pastrana, he was promoted above the heads of professed monks to the position of novice-master. Hardly had he himself professed than a still more astonishing promotion was thrust upon him: the appointment to be Visitor to the Carmelites of the Observance in Andalusia. We can well believe that he had no taste for such honours. "Here I am," he writes, "twenty-eight years old and professed but six months since, given the office of prelate in . . . the most undisciplined province of Carmelites in the country. A heavy burden indeed. . . ."

The discontent aroused by the appointment of one so young and inexperienced ended in Gracián's returning to Castile. On the way thither he had the great joy of meeting St. Teresa, by whose influence he had entered the order. The interview was the beginning of a deep intimacy which is reflected again and again in the Saint's letters. She writes of him with an enthusiasm which scarcely knows limits. "He has been here for over three weeks. . . . For all I have had to do with him, I have not yet realized his great worth. He is perfect in my eyes, and better for us than anyone else for whom we could have asked God." This opinion she never lost. Gracián became her friend, confidant, and most intimate companion during the last years of her life. All readers of her letters will remember how affectionately she writes to him, identifying his interests and opinions with her own, defending him with warmth and vigour, and perhaps at times running the risk of turning his head with eulogy.

The faults and the virtues of Gracián, as I was able to show in my *Studies of the Spanish Mystics* (Vol. I, pp. 238-9), stand out clearly in the life-story of the two Carmelite Saints. His great talent, his evident sincerity, his profound spirituality, and his unfailing charm of manner made a striking impression upon all who met him, which, in some cases, a deeper acquaintance strengthened. His very brilliance, on the other hand, the early success which it achieved, his intimacy with St. Teresa, and his somewhat impatient energy made him enemies where he might have expected friends. Then, again, though he was fully capable of enduring hardships, and had of his own volition joined an austere Reform, he feared lest the Reform might be killed by its extreme severity, which he was accordingly anxious to lighten. This laxity of disposition and a tendency to indulge in too many external activities are the two chief faults alleged against Gracián by his enemies. Yet he can hardly have strayed very far, or very long, from the spirit of the Reform, for there is no trace of disagreement between himself and its founder.

After the division of the Carmelite Order, Gracián

became Vicar-General of the Discalced Province and Prior of its monastery in Seville. At the first general chapter (1581) he was elected, by the narrowest of majorities, Provincial. For all the misgiving with which many regarded him, his talent was undoubted; he was in close touch with St. Teresa; and he was zealous for the extension of the Reform both in Europe and through missions to heathen lands.

In his zeal for progress, St. Teresa herself can scarcely have been said to have surpassed him. His tirades, sometimes deprecated, against "those who think that Carmelite perfection consists in never leaving one's cell or missing a single choir office though the whole world be burning" are but the complements of his own activity. Within a few months of the chapter of 1581 he had founded religious houses at Valladolid, Salamanca, Soria and Lisbon, and after a preaching tour in Castile was at Beas, where he had first met St. Teresa, when the news of her death (1582) reached him. A manuscript, published only in modern times, reveals to us the grief which it caused him. "It was the greatest and most fearful blow," it says, "that he had ever suffered in his life. He stood there . . . trembling and, as it were, numbed with cold, and he would have gone to throw himself upon his bed had he dared to be alone. . . . There fell upon him a mist and a solitude so great that it descended upon him like a heavy burden." He might well feel lonely and forsaken among his enemies, for with the death of St. Teresa the storm that was gathering over his head grew more threatening every year.

After four years of increasing dissension the provincialate of Fray Jerónimo came to an end (1585), and he was succeeded, on his own proposition, by Fray Nicolás Doria. Doria, a Genoese by birth, and as capable a man as himself in a very different way, had entered the Order when nearly forty, after a successful career as a banker. When St. John of the Cross heard of the retiring Provincial's proposal, he is said to have exclaimed: "He has elected the man who will strip him of his habit." If the prediction be authentic, it shows that Doria's ambitious and determined character had already revealed itself.

During his provincialate, Doria introduced a system of centralized government called the *Consulta*, which deprived the priors of their votes at chapters and gave their authority into the hands of a tribunal of seven persons. Had this body been formed in Gracián's provincialate it might have worked in a way less satisfactory to Doria than it did during his own. It soon became clear, to Gracián as well as to others, that the *Consulta* recognized in him a powerful enemy with ideas very dissimilar to its own, who, at whatever cost, must be quelled. In the past he had been freely criticized; now we find him reprimanded for contumacy, somewhat weakly submitting and entreating humble pardon, and as a consequence being deprived of his offices and influence in the Order (1587-8). At this severe sentence, he appealed from the *Consulta* to the King, but in vain. The sentence only became heavier: on February 17th, 1592, the *Consulta* pronounced on him the extreme penalty of expulsion from the Order.

Gracián now left Spain for Rome, but with results no happier than those he had obtained in his own country. An interview with the Pope proved unavailing; and, when he decided to seek entry into another order, Carthusians, Dominicans, Capuchins, and Discalced Franciscans all rejected him. He travelled from Rome to Naples, but, receiving permission to join the Discalced Augustinians, set off again for Rome almost immediately. On his way new misfortunes befell him. He was captured by the Turks (October 10th, 1593) and carried off to Tunis in captivity.

His strikingly individual autobiography, entitled the *Pilgrimage of Anastasius*, describes with great vividness the miseries he suffered in Tunis. He was branded with red-hot irons and stripped to the skin, "so that none could take more from me without flaying me alive." All his possessions, of whatever kind, were taken from him. The bread served out to him was black, fetid and verminous; the water so foul as to be undrinkable save by a man dying of thirst. For seventeen months, loaded with chains, he was imprisoned under the vilest conditions in a subterranean bath with sixteen hundred

comrades. But he was a worthy follower of St. Teresa. "Sometimes," she had written to him years before, "the body grows weary when trials are heaped one upon another and the soul becomes a little cowardly; but I think the will remains true." Fray Jerónimo's will was invincible. Daily, even in such straits, he contrived to say his Mass, and continually, by word as well as by example, he preached to his companions in captivity. We are not surprised to learn that he made many converts.

Ransomed early in 1595, Gracián walked in his rags from Genoa to Rome, begging food by the way, and went straight to the General of the Augustinians to ask for the promised habit. But, after so long an interval, difficulties were now raised, and the unwanted friar appealed once more to the Pope, relating his whole story. "This man is a saint" is said to have been Clement VIII's only comment on receiving the petition, and, despite arguments to the contrary, he resolved to attempt his reinstatement in the Carmelite Order. On March 6th, 1596, was issued a brief allowing him to enter a monastery of the mitigated rule and wear its habit while following the rule of the Reform, and to enjoy the status and privileges of the Calced which would have been his had he professed among them. The compromise was probably a wise one, and the Calced Carmelites of Rome appear to have treated Fray Jerónimo with all the kindness to which his sufferings, both physical and spiritual, had entitled him.

The rest of his life was spent in comparative comfort. Until 1600 he remained in Rome; then, returning to Spain, he spent the greater part of seven years there, before passing to the Low Countries, where he remained until his death at Brussels on September 21st, 1614. The Discalced Reform had extended from Spain and Italy to France, Belgium and Holland, and, the governor of the latter countries being the personal friend of Jerónimo Gracián, he was enabled to play an important part in their religious life while he lived there. At one aspect of these activities we shall be able to glance in a later section.

Gracián's energy and zeal, so conspicuous in the story of his life, are no less manifest in his bibliography. It is hardly possible to suppose that he wrote all the 445 works attributed to him by Nicolás Antonio, who gives neither date nor place of origin for most of them, and makes him responsible for treatises on medicine, law, philosophy, history and politics, as well as for all kinds of theological writings. But we may be perfectly certain of his authorship of about thirty works, and reasonably sure that he wrote a considerable number more, some of which, as he tells us himself, he had no intention of publishing.

It seems probable that Gracián began writing on mystical themes before he had long been a Carmelite. As early as March 2nd, 1578, we find St. Teresa commenting on the "little book" (*cuadernito*: a manuscript book is meant) which he has sent her, apparently in order to have her opinion on it, and protesting at his statement that he "knows nothing of Union." "What he says of 'bright darkness' and 'impetus,'" she writes, "implies the contrary, but, since the states which he describes pass away and are not ordinary experiences, their nature is not completely realized." Gracián had therefore completed at least one book when he was thirty-two years of age; he did not, however, publish any writings, so far as is known, till he was over forty.

In 1586 appeared Gracián's *Burning Lamp*, or *Book of Religious Perfection*, "wherein is explained how a religious should act towards God, his neighbour and himself, and keep perfectly the rule of his order, together with the three vows of obedience, chastity and poverty." This was one of the most popular of all his books, and the only one ever translated into English. A second part, "On Mental Prayer," added to it in 1588, may well have been the *cuadernito* referred to by St. Teresa. Two further parts, less important than this, were published with later editions.

In the same year as the *Burning Lamp* appeared a book entitled *A Stimulus to the Propagation of the Faith*,

which is an interesting commentary on the missionary interests of Gracián's provincialate. The preface gives an account of a joint Discalced Carmelite and Franciscan missionary expedition to various parts of Africa (1582-5) and the text of the agreement between the two Orders under which they worked. The main part of the book (which is very rare, and consists of but seventy small folios) contains an "exhortation and stimulus to go and preach the Holy Gospel to the heathen." Undivided into chapters or sections, full of lengthy paragraphs, almost unending sentences and innumerable quotations from the Scriptures and the Fathers, it is of great interest nevertheless for the knowledge which it reveals of the history of Christian missions as well as for the insight which it gives us into its author's ardent spirit.

We must pass over many of Gracián's less important books in the interest of our main subject. Holy Year falling during his sojourn in Rome, he wrote "a large book" (*Jubilee of the Holy Year*, 1599) to "give light" to pilgrims. In 1602, while in Valencia, he published a panegyric of St. Joseph known as the *Josephina*. A more unusual treatise on the discernment of spirits, commonly referred to as the *Elucidation*, was written in Rome, but not published until 1604, in Madrid. In the words of its lengthy title, it "treats of union, ecstasy, rapture, visions and revelations" and "proves and expounds the doctrine of the books of the Mother Teresa of Jesus and other spiritual writings."

A group of books which can also be passed over quickly may be described as text-books on mystical theology based on the writings of St. Bonaventura and others: these will take their proper place in the history, as yet unwritten, of Spanish mysticism. Another group consists of works which are still unpublished, and some of which I have been enabled to examine, with a view to possible publication, in the National Library at Madrid. Such are the *Arbor Salutis*, a manual on confession, and the *Seven Treasures of Perfection*, which, based on the Seven Words from the Cross, is deeply devotional in spirit. A more striking opusculum is the collection of *Dialogues on the Death of St. Teresa*, first published by

P. Silverio de Santa Teresa, O.C.D., in 1913, and rightly described by him as "lively, animated and very readable; written in the purest of styles and with a freedom both singular and charming."

Active to the very end of his life, Gracián was still writing when death overtook him, and the last group of books to which we shall refer is that published in the Low Countries. Besides republishing nearly all his principal works in Brussels, he wrote there continuously. The *Life of the Soul* (1609) attacks "those who set perfection in total annihilation." The *Catholic Soldier* (1611) is a series of conversations between a Protestant and two Catholics which "proves with histories, examples and clear reasons, in a pleasing and profitable style, that those who have no learning must not dispute concerning the faith with heretics." The *Ten Lamentations on the Miserable State of Atheists in Our Times* (1611) attacks illuminists, quietists, and various heretical sects; while the *Virtues and Foundations of . . . Teresa of Jesus* (1611) shows that Gracián was eager to spread a knowledge of his devoted coadjutor and friend, no doubt the more so in view of her approaching beatification. In the following year he returned to theology with his *Discourses on the Mysterious Name of Mary* (1612) and the *Conceptions of Divine Love*, the latter treatise being inspired mainly by the *Song of Songs* and St. Teresa's similarly entitled work upon it. In 1613 he wrote the *Pilgrimage of Anastasius*, from which we have already quoted; while the *Leviathan* and the *Art of Holy Dying* bear the date of his death.

III

Gracián's writings may be studied from various aspects. One can isolate the more directly mystical of them and assign him a very definite place in the history of Spanish mysticism. It is very natural, again, to find attraction in studying the relations between his teaching and that of St. Teresa, and, in particular, the points at which he diverges from her. His missionary writings have been examined in some detail, alike with erudition and sympathy, by P. Florencio del Niño Jesús; and all

students are looking to P. Silverio de Santa Teresa, to whom they already owe so much, in the hope that, when his labours on St. John of the Cross are ended, he will attack the historical problems raised by Gracián's writings, as a preliminary to preparing a collected edition of these. The aspect of the teaching of Gracián with which I wish to deal here, however, is concerned mainly with one of his less known single works already alluded to—the *Life of the Soul*.

One of the principal attractions of studying the lesser Spanish mystics is that of comparing the various attempts which they make to describe the life of contemplation, and remarking to what extent they utilize the descriptions of precursors and contemporaries. The two greatest mystics of Spain, St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross, give organic accounts of the mystical life so intensely personal and experiential, that their successors, even where they expound and comment upon them, do not attempt to make them their own. Both these accounts, however, can readily be squared with the traditional threefold scheme, which they in no way contradict, but on the contrary confirm and amplify. Of their contemporaries, some, such as Francisco de Osuna, Luis de Granada, and Juan de los Angeles, are interested chiefly in some particular aspect of the mystical life and do not elaborate any systematic description of its entire course.

But other of the lesser mystics consider it definitely advisable to outline that course, and often fill in portions of it in some detail. García de Cisneros, the sixteenth-century Benedictine abbot of Montserrat, in his *Book of Exercises for the Spiritual Life*, which I have recently translated into English (Montserrat, 1929), gives us what at first glance appears to be the usual threefold partition of Purgation, Illumination, and Union. But in reality, as a more careful reading of his *Book of Exercises* shows, he subdivides his Purgative Way according to the same tri-partite formula, and superimposes upon it the two higher Ways, themselves somewhat vaguely and artificially divided, but characterized in the main by the soul's receptivity. Bernardino de Laredo, again,

the Franciscan lay brother who has become famous in Spain as the author of the *Ascent of Mount Sion*, envisages both the Purgative and the Illuminative Way as primarily devoted to systematic exercises in meditation, reserving the stage of receptivity for what we must call his Unitive Way, though this hardly appears to go beyond St. Teresa's fourth Mansion, the Prayer of Quiet. Of these two writers, Laredo is the more original, and we can hardly doubt that, in parts of his book at least, he is describing his own experience.

Jerónimo Gracián, in the works of his early and middle life, is generally content either to follow St. Teresa's description of the mystical way, or to ignore it, as such, and write of "contemplation" in general, and its "twelve effects," or of the "six aims" of "true spirit." In his *Life of the Soul*, however, which, as we have seen, is one of the books published towards the end of his life, in Brussels, he gives an account of the mystical way corresponding approximately to the traditional scheme, but showing a curious feature which demands some investigation. There are, according to this book, "two kinds of union." The first is "active, which the soul compasses by means of meditation and the imitation of Christ's Divinity." The second, "called by some passive," comes directly from God "in the soul prepared for it by purity, light and love." The soul has not here "to labour with meditation," but "forms within itself an image of Christ, as when the sun strikes a mirror." The second kind of union, adds Gracián, "we call deification of the soul, like the great Dionysius, who describes souls practised in this manner of prayer as Deiform."

That Gracián is indebted to Dionysius is further clear from the three stages into which he divides each of these three kinds of prayer: annihilation of self, "Divine darkness," and a "multitude of concepts called light ineffable." It is not, however, the extent of his dependence on any authority that is of interest in this division, but the partition of the entire mystical course into two portions exactly symmetrical, and the bold antithesis between "active" and "passive" contemplation which was taken up at a later date by other writers.

The bi-partite arrangement of the six stages which Gracián proposes must not obscure either the fact that he follows the traditional scheme, or the close, though by no means apparent, correspondence between his system and that of St. John of the Cross. The annihilative stage of "active union"—the phrase, let it be remembered, is, though not a very happy one, Gracián's own—corresponds to the Purgative Way, the stage of "Divine darkness" being equivalent, if we slightly force the original application of the term, to St. John of the Cross' "Night of Sense." This leads to the third stage, which is evidently that of Illumination, and, though supernatural contemplation begins only with the new "annihilation of self," which will also come within the Illuminative Life, this means no more than that Gracián places the beginning of receptivity between the positions which it takes in Cisneros and in Laredo. The second period of "annihilation" and that of "Divine darkness"—i.e., the fourth and fifth stages—correspond to St. John of the Cross' Dark Night of the Spirit, and this leads in due course to the "light ineffable," which may be taken as approximating to Union.

This arrangement of the life of contemplation is adumbrated by Gracián only briefly, one part of it alone being developed—the meditations which are to be practised during "active union." During the rest of his progress the mystic is left very largely to look after himself, and this absence of counsel, together with the vague use of the terms above cited, and of the term "deification," makes it impossible for the description to have much practical value. But historically it is of importance, and, when the definitive history of mysticism in Spain comes to be written—an event, at nearest, many decades distant—it seems likely that Jerónimo Gracián will become a figure of greater significance than he is at present, and that one more of St. Teresa's disciples will take an honoured place which he was denied in his generation.

E. ALLISON PEERS.

ART. 7.—THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN NEO-SYNTHETISM

BY DON LUIGI STURZO

(Translated by Barbara Barclay Carter)

THIS is the first occasion on which I have written of my brother, Mgr. Mario Sturzo. United as our lives are spiritually, practically they have been independent and detached. Older than myself by some ten years, he has been to me always not only a beloved brother but a guide and counsellor. Yet, on the other hand, for the last twenty-seven years we have lived apart, I immersed in political life, in sociological and historical studies, he in the pastoral duties of Bishop of a large Sicilian diocese. The mental freedom and sincerity of intercourse in which we were brought up have led us to look upon each other's activities impersonally and critically, while the diverse experiences of each have helped the other—in my case especially—to complete and round off his own.

The British public would have no direct reason to concern itself with Mgr. Sturzo had not his studies and activities made of him the exponent of a new philosophic system to which he has given the name of Neo-Synthetism, and which constitutes a notable contribution to the solution of the problem of knowledge.

He has not been a professional philosopher. His culture and early tastes were preferably literary, and his professional studies were in Law, at the Universities of Catania and Rome. The care of the Seminary of Piazza Armerina, where he was appointed Bishop in 1903, obliged him to assume the teaching of Philosophy. It was this practical experience that led him to feel keenly the inadequacy of scholastic epistemology.

His elaboration of this problem during ten years has resulted in various publications: the first in 1925, *Il Problema della Conoscenza*; the second in 1928, *Il Neo-Sintetismo*; and the third in 1930, *Il Pensiero dell'Avvenire*. Three distinct stages, which mark the development of his theory and the consolidation of his system.

282 Theory of Knowledge in Neo-Synthetism

During the first quarter of the present century philosophic currents in Italy were dominated by Croce's Neo-Idealism and Gentile's Actualism. Croce has worked his Idealism into Historicism and Æsthetics, Gentile's Actualism has invaded education and politics.

But the central problem determining the movement of ideas in recent Italian philosophy and their influence in various fields of culture has been the problem of knowledge—a problem which has tormented men for centuries and will torment them for centuries more, for it is of those that are inexhaustible, in each age presenting their lights and shadows in accordance with the varying trend of thought.

However, whereas in the Middle Ages the problem troubling the philosophers was the knowledge of *metaphysical* Being, from the Renaissance onwards modern philosophy has been directed towards *concrete* Being, and to the abstractive function of the intellect has opposed the synthetic function of experience. But—strange mirage!—the closer philosophy came to concrete Being (and simultaneously we find the development of physical and natural science, history and sociology, and political economy), the further objective reality fled towards an ever-increasing subjectivity.

In the course of this process Kant's revision of the problem of knowledge marks the separation between reality as object of experience and the intellectual *a priori* forms. Hence a fundamental scepticism, which the pragmatism of practical reason cannot remedy; the way is plain for modern Idealism. And this in substance is nothing other than the resolution of the object into the subject, inasmuch as the known resolves itself into knowing, that is, into experience as one and fundamental outside which nothing can be said to exist or to be.

Italian Neo-Realism has striven to react, breaking down the circle and admitting the knowledge of external reality as it is, in its full objectivity. Its exponents take their stand on sense perception as fundamental and primal, and on common sense as collective consciousness of the real truth. Reality, as they conceive it,

dissolves into mere logical or sense elements ; it neither reduces multiplicity to unity nor affords any intrinsic connection outside the relations between given entities.

The Neo-Scholastics, on the other hand, though Realists, teach that concrete Being cannot intellectually be known save through the abstract concept of concreteness, since for them intellectual cognition attains not the particular but the universal. According to the Neo-Scholastics, concrete Being escapes us. But this aspect of the Scholastic theory of knowledge was rendered untenable the day it was possible to assert, even without full explanation and proof, the direct intellectual cognition of concrete Reality.

The central difficulty, which is, at bottom, the difficulty of all philosophy, ancient and modern, lies in the manner in which sense and intellect are conjoined in the single act of cognising the concrete, that is, the mode of operation of the cognitive synthesis and the value we should attribute to it. In other words, is there such a synthesis ? And if there is, does it serve to represent an extra-subjective world or is it merely experience of the subject itself ?

These two problems are distinct, yet at the same time closely connected, since the value of the cognitive act depends on the character of the cognitive synthesis. This, then, is the fundamental problem.

All theories of knowledge start from sense-perception, as they are bound to do by the very fact of human nature. And in sensation all discriminate between the function of cognition, or perception of the sense data, and the practical function of conation. Is this discrimination merely one of logical analysis, or does it correspond to a real and psychological distinction in the act of sensation ? The majority of theorists incline towards the latter solution. Mgr. Sturzo, on the contrary, finds sensation taken in itself to be a primary synthesis, i.e. "a process produced by inner activity."

In fact to perceive is to individuate, that is, to discriminate. One cannot perceive what is undifferentiated, confused, chaotic. To perceive shapes, sounds, smells, tastes, resistances, is not unrelated perception but

perception of what is distinct and relative. Now, what is there in the sense-life to produce this classification? Nothing else than the conative activity. Here we have not the mere simultaneity of two distinct acts but the synthesis of two tendencies or powers in the single sensitive faculty, inasmuch as there cannot be perception without conative discrimination.

One step further. At the very beginning of his system Mgr. Sturzo asks himself if in man there is such a thing as pure sensation, if human sensations in the concrete of existence are ever really pure sensations, distinct not only logically but psychologically from any intellectual function. All the spiritual philosophers admit that in man there are two worlds, on the one hand sensation and the sensitive process, on the other intellect and the intellectual process, and hence they seek for a bridge that will connect the two worlds and the two processes.

Platonists say that with the sensation comes an awakening of innate ideas. In general all *a-priorists* posit an external or sense world and an intellectual world of innate ideas, or of *a priori* categories. These two worlds remain not only distinct but separate and unrelated. Aristotle tries to solve the problem by the construction of an interior mechanism, an intellect operating without cognising (the *intellectus agens*) which passes on to the *intellectus passibilis*, the intelligible species abstracted from the sensible image. The Mediæval Schoolmen accepted the *intellectus agens*, but they held it to be assisted by special divine intervention. This mysterious element has disappeared in Neo-Scholasticism, which, however, remains faithful to Aristotle's *intellectus agens*. Hence, even according to Aristotle and the Scholastics ancient and modern, the process of cognition is twofold, on the one side sense perception, on the other that of the intellect.

Modern philosophers who maintain the duality of sense and intellect (excluding therefore pure materialists or sensationalists), while not accepting Aristotelian mechanism, have not escaped from the theory of a double and distinct cognitive process. Hence they start from

a recognition of pure sensation, devoid of any intellectuality. In the Idealist system sense and intellect work in synthesis, but here, in the same way as the object resolves itself into the subject, sense resolves itself into intellect, the phenomenal spirit into the Spirit of which the whole existential world is only a conscious, or, rather, self-conscious, dialectic process. For the Idealists, therefore, the synthesis of sense and intellect is not the synthesis of two distinct principles but of a single dialectical process. But when they speak of sensation they understand it as pure—that is, as a stage in itself of the cognitive process.

To Mgr. Sturzo's question as to whether there is such a thing as pure sensation, all reply more or less explicitly that there is. From the point of view of theory of knowledge, therefore, he calls the exponents of such systems either *separatists*, such as the Platonists and Aristotelians, or *incomplete synthetists*, such as the Psychologists, Sensationalists, and Idealists. And therefore, to his own system, which is primarily a theory of knowledge or epistemology, he gives the name of Neo-Syntheticism.

According to Neo-Syntheticism, all our knowledge begins with the intuition of the real and external object, that is, with direct cognition of the concrete. This intuition is not pure sensation, but also intellectual cognition and hence a synthesis of sensation and intellect.

Our argument is here chiefly with the Scholastics, who do not admit direct intellectual knowledge of concrete Being, whereas other modern systems, each in its own way and in accordance with its inner logic, admit such knowledge.

And how can it be denied that cognition of the concrete real is direct intellectual perception, when man from the unity of experience individuates, appraises, classifies the object experienced? The Neo-Scholastics maintain that for this an indirect intellectual knowledge is sufficient inasmuch as our mind forms the idea or abstract concept of concreteness. This way of avoiding the

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difficulty is not only repugnant to modern thought, but is contradicted by the whole of experience, which is not separative or analytic, but unitive and synthetic.

The avoidance of the issue by the Neo-Scholastics is the result not so much of the abstract standpoint of the old Schoolmen as of the fear of mixing two such opposite functions as the spiritual one of the intellect and the material one of the senses. Even in the thirteenth century the same repugnance led to attempts to maintain that in man there existed three souls, or at least two, the vegetative and sensitive, and the intellective. To such a point, that among the propositions in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas condemned by the Bishop of Paris and the University of Oxford was that of the unity of the soul—the intellective soul, presented as the single and substantial form of the body, and hence with vegetative and sensitive functions. Dante in the famous Canto XXV of Purgatory wished to vindicate the Thomistic theory; it was then one of the questions of the day.

This is not merely an historical reference but serves to illustrate the hypothesis of synthesis by an indisputable element, the nature of the cognitive subject, Man, in whom body and soul are united in marvellous synthesis.

Mgr. Sturzo does not base his theory on any *a priori* element, but attacks the problem of the cognitive process directly. After a careful analysis he reaches the conclusion that it is not the sense that feels nor the intellect that knows, nor the will that wills, but the subject, Man, who in synthetic unity feels with his senses, knows with his intellect, and wills with his will. "We say . . . that the human subject is himself a manifold capacity, this capacity being the activity of the one and manifold subject; a fundamental capacity realising itself in single activities of which each fulfils its own function, and yet all share in the synthetic functions and character of the subject, in virtue of the synthetic unity of the subject. (*La Tradizione, Palermo*, Vol. III, Nos. 1-11, 1930.)

In substance, human acts do not begin and end with the faculties, nor are the faculties the subjects of human

activity; they are only the means, and while each means is distinct in itself, the subject, Man, acts in synthesis.

This principle once established, there is no difficulty in admitting a primary, original, and basic synthesis of sense and intellect in the act of intuition. Nor is there any need to introduce an *intellectus agens*, which in any case would not be a true intellect because without cognition. The natural synthesis arising in a subject endowed with sense and intellect is sufficient; for the sensitive function is not exercised by the senses nor the intellectual by the intellect, but both in synthesis by the subject as a whole.

A careful inquiry into the nature of cognition has brought us to this conclusion—a conclusion not wholly new, for the Schoolmen had a glimpse of it, and St. Thomas asserted it when he wrote that it is man that knows and not his faculties.

The synthetic process does not stop short with sense, nor with sense and intellect; the will itself always enters in synthesis into the function of knowing, just as the intellect enters in synthesis into the function of willing. This statement is in harmony with what we have already asserted, that the agent is the subject itself acting through its faculties. Is there such a thing as a purely intellectual act? Or a pure act of will? Even the coldest and most arid speculation is in itself an act of will, containing affective values whether direct or indirect. We call it an intellectual act because it is mainly theoretical, just as we call a primarily practical act an act of will. We cannot conceive of pure *theoria* or pure practice; there are no such things. The problem before us is whether there are two processes, intellectual and volitional, each taking place in its own faculty and juxtaposed and co-ordinated by the subject, or whether there is a single synthetic process in which either *theoria* prevails over practice or *vice versa*, according to the direction given by the subject to its activity.

Just as sense, as we have seen, is originally a synthesis of perceptive and conative powers, in the same way

intellect and will are a synthesis of theory and practice. And just as there are not two processes, one sensitive and the other intellective, but a single sensitive-intellectual process in synthesis, the synthesis embraces all the faculties, even the will. Hence there can be neither cognition without sensation, nor cognition without volition, nor volition without sensation and cognition.

The highest intellectual speculation requires the inward and outward expression founded on symbols—symbols imagist or numerical, language spoken or written, gesture interior or exterior. And these elements are not juxtaposed or concomitant but inwardly synthetic, even if not outwardly expressed at the same moment. The synthetic character of volition is even plainer, for it begins and ends in concrete Being. Abstract Being does not move the will unless it presents itself as concrete or possibly concrete, that is, as a good.

We thus come back to the focal factor, that is *the direct intuition of concrete Being as starting point of cognition and as goal of will.*

What, then, is this direct intuition of concrete Being? Pure sensation? If so, there could be no cognition of the individuated object, which would remain circumscribed within sensitive conation. Is it the abstract or universal idea of concreteness? If so, we should be debarred experience of concrete reality. The basis of cognition, indeed, is an experience simultaneously sensitive and classificatory, affective and volitional, theoretical and practical. And this basis in modern parlance is called "experience"; it is one and synthetic because it is *experience of the multiple reduced to unity.* If our experience of concrete Being were solely sensitive, how could we be conscious of it? And if our intellectual experience were solely abstract, confined to the universal, how could it be reduced to the concrete? And if our volitional experience were isolated, how could we attain to an appreciation of concrete Being as desirable and good? If these three experiences were distinct, how could they be united and fused so as to become one and synthetic?

According to Neo-Syntheticism, then, the cognitive process is a process of syntheses or integrations ending up with a complete synthesis. Or, rather, it is a single synthesis of which the process of integration is only a process from potentiality to actuality. But what is its value? Does the cognitive process represent an extra-subjective world, or is it only pure experience of the subject itself? This is the second question, and for Neo-Syntheticism its solution is closely bound up with the nature of the cognitive process we have examined.

"Syntheticism is dynamism. Epistemological synthesis is epistemological dynamism. But dynamism is syntheticism. Epistemological dynamism is epistemological syntheticism." Thus Mgr. Sturzo begins a recent article which is to appear shortly in a French philosophical review. And it must not be thought that here is merely a play on words; on the contrary, it is a fundamental truth which is felt by many, but has never been so clearly formulated.

Up to the present we have considered the subjective synthesis of the cognitive process, but this would remain a useless inward game were it not possible for the outer world to enter into synthesis with the subject. The subject may know only what is related to itself; the unrelated by itself is unknowable. But in order that there may be relativity, there must be a principle of homogeneity; pure heterogeneity is unrelated and hence unknowable. But the relative can never actuate its relativity save by entering into synthesis with its co-relative, that is, by becoming immanent in it. Without immanence there is no knowledge. This the Idealists saw, and saw truly, but not finding any relativity between an outward existent world and the mind, the spirit that knows, they denied the outside world; for them everything is spirit.

Neo-Syntheticism, on the contrary, recognises the outside world as objective and therefore other than the subject, and at the same time recognises it as relative to the subject, for both find a principle of homogeneity in physical nature, equally present in both. Here is a firm foundation, which in any case belongs to all the

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systems of traditional philosophy. However, according to Neo-Synthetism, the object in physical contact with the subject becomes immanent in it, that is, it actuates its relativity as object in synthesis with the subject.

It must not be thought that the word "immanence" here serves but to give an air of novelty to traditional theory, and is only used to tickle modern ears. The Schoolmen, indeed, thought that the intellect knows by itself becoming all things: *intellectus fit omnia*. For the Schoolmen the object, being material, is unrelated to the intellect, but the latter makes up for this lack of relativity by itself becoming all things, inasmuch as it proceeds *per assimilationem* in order to reach the truth, *adæquatio rei et intellectus*.

For Neo-Synthetism "the external reality in order to be known must make itself internal by non-cognitive paths, it being impossible that it should become so by the paths of cognition which are wholly internal and cannot become external. . . . The external world, in so far as it is corporeal, cannot have relations save with kindred terms. . . . The activities of the world are not immanent in us in a co-natural manner because they are not ourselves, but other than ourselves . . . they are immanent in a processive relational and transitory manner. The whole world is an immense system of syntheses and relations. Every being is a synthesis, and all beings are relational. Because of this, the world is organic. It is organic because every synthesis making up the world takes and gives; it takes by resolving the kindred activities radiating from other syntheses into itself; it gives, radiating round itself a part of its activity. . . . Is the body of man extraneous to this dynamism? And how could it remain apart when it only lives through the elements of the surrounding world which it receives into itself and resolves into itself? Living, man lives by these elements, knowing he knows by that portion of these elements that has relation to his physio-sensitivity. Every element that is in relation to the physio-sensitivity of man acting upon his body and becoming resolved into it modifies the state of that body. . . . And as

the body lives by the soul, and by the soul is active and sentient, the modification does not stop short at the sensitive activity of the body but invests his whole being. The entry is thrown open by the nerves in so far as physiological nature is concerned, and thus far it is unconscious. But the reception does not stop short at physiological nature, for this is not isolated from sensitivity, nor sensitivity from intellectivity. And as such it becomes conscious, by means of the process we call expression." (*Op. cit.* in course of publication.)

Having thus cleared up the synthetic relationship between object and subject, let us return to our question, What is its cognitive value?

According to our premises, we must answer that its cognitive value can only be of that which is immanent. And since the object becomes immanent in the subject only through what is relative to the subject, what is known can only be this very relation. This excludes knowledge of the *thing in itself*, if by thing in itself we mean the object as it is, outside knowledge, for such data lie beyond our relationship with the object, and are therefore unknowable and unthinkable.

In substance, we know the data of the object which are relative to us, and from this knowledge we deduce other data and elements representing to us the reality we seek to comprehend.

It is well to be clear as to this twofold operation. The first, with which we have dealt up till now, is *intuition*, the direct and immediate apprehension of the concrete real in its relativity to us; called also *cognition proper*, and so the Schoolmen called it. The other, neither direct nor immediate, but indirect, is *exploration*. "It likewise is true cognition," writes Mgr. Sturzo, "for it is closely connected with intuitive cognition; since it does not proceed *a priori* by means of innate forms, as Kant would have it, but in its own way *a posteriori*, and since it proceeds by utilising the elements posited by intuition, the relationships expressed either as empirical categories (types) or as logical categories (ideas)." (*Op. cit.*)

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Therefore, ruling out any *a priori* idea or form of idea, and ruling out the adequation of the intellect to the thing, all that remains is the relative relationship, whether this be seized directly through intuition or acquired indirectly through exploration.

Here a grave difficulty seems to appear. On what, then, one might ask, does the abstractive function of the intellect base itself if not on the object? How can we know the essences of things if all we know of reality is relations?

Mgr. Sturzo writes: "St. Thomas does not discriminate between the idealisation of essences and the idealisation of relations, but speaks of them in such a manner as to make it clear that for him either of these processes, and one as much as the other, gives the universal. In fact for him abstraction '*a materia sensibili individuali*' and abstraction '*a materia sensibili communi*,' both give the universal, the first type of abstraction giving the universal of the physical essences . . . the second the mathematical universal and the transcendent universal." (*Autoformazione* III, 6, pp. 324-325.) Now, according to Mgr. Sturzo, the first cannot truly be called a universal, but a synthesis of particular and universal. ". . . When we say *vegetal* we indicate a complexus of particular data (plants), and this notion is theoretical through the concurrence of universal data, such as quantity, quality, and so forth. The idealisation, that is to say the theoretical knowledge of any real object whatever it be, is always a synthesis of particular and universal. And this universal, since it cannot derive from any particular, must derive from some other element, which can only be the element of relationship. With words technically clearer we may say that the particular is the physical, the universal the logical." (*Op. cit.*, pp. 325-326.)

It may appear to some that Mgr. Sturzo repudiates Thomistic realism; this is not correct. He holds as motto "*superare conservando*," conserving to surpass, which is a formula of progress, whereas "conserving" alone would be statical, and "surpassing" alone the sign of a fresh beginning. In fact, he agrees with the Aris-

totelian Thomists that the primary element from which the universal is derived is to be found in objective reality (and this is "conserving"), whereas he holds that this primary element is not in the essences, but in relations (and this is "surpassing"). He writes: "Terms, that is to say objects, are not susceptible of universalisation, since they are physical, particular, and individual; they are, however, susceptible of idealisation through their relations and the synthesis of these. Relations, on the other hand, in so far as they are the relationship between term and term, are at once physical and logical. They are physical in their concrete existence, inasmuch as they are those given relations, those given dependencies, those given connections . . . they are logical inasmuch as they are the relationship between term and term. Man apprehends particular terms and particular relations; apprehending, he knows these relations as the relationship between term and term. He expresses particular terms and particular relationships particularly; he expresses the relationship between term and term ideally. This is the universal." (*Op. cit.*, p. 327.)

From what we have already said it should be clear that the value of cognition, in so far as it refers to the object, must be called objective, yet not wholly objective. Only in so far as the object is relative to ourselves, either as a particular or concrete datum, or as an universal or ideal datum.

To the question, therefore, as to what is the value of the cognitive act, we may now answer: Its value is at once *objective*, *relative*, and *ideal*.

Mgr. Sturzo makes an important distinction which is here apposite. "In the cognitive act," he writes ". . . we may distinguish three aspects, the subjective, the modal, and the objective. The first we may call, with the favourite word of the Idealists, self-consciousness, the third consciousness, and the second state-of-consciousness—a term common to every system. Let us now see if these three aspects can be resolved one into the other.

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"Self-consciousness and consciousness are opposite notions, for self-consciousness is consciousness of the ego, whereas conscious is consciousness of the non-ego. If the non-ego could be resolved into the ego, in a union of consciousness and self-consciousness, it would not appear as opposite. The fact is that it so appears; therefore it is so. Since beyond the field of knowledge we cannot go . . . for man reality is such as his knowledge presents to him. . . . States of consciousness are a modal aspect precisely because they are not conceivable save in relation to some other element, but they are a subjective modality and not an objective one. . . . They may be, for instance, states of mind such as a sense of well-being or uneasiness, joy or woe, strength or languor, and so forth. They are not isolated from the object known, just as this is not isolated from the subject, but they may be considered without reference to it, and thus we consider them when we speak of them. States of consciousness assuredly cannot be resolved into the object, not even when modifying the notion we say 'this knowledge makes me glad or sorry.' Much less can they be resolved into the object when confining ourselves to the specific notion we say 'I am glad or sorry and do not know why.' They can, however, be resolved into the subject, for they are nothing other than modalities of the self-consciousness . . . and we do not consider them in themselves save by abstraction or analysis. . . . Thus we find that in our consciousness, which is our knowledge considered in its synthetic reality, there are two notions not resolvable one into the other because they are opposites, with a third which, although it may be isolated analytically, is at the same time an element admitting of resolution into the subject. If Idealism were true, what we say of states of consciousness could be said of consciousness, that is, of the cognition of the object." (Article already quoted.)

The quotation has been a long one, but could one of the most controversial and fundamental points of philosophy have been expressed with greater clarity or stronger evidence? The objective value of our knowledge becomes plain.

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But we added that it is also *relative*. Earlier in this article we ruled out the hypothesis that our cognition could reach the thing in itself or the object as it is; our knowledge is of the object in so far as this is relative to ourselves. And we pointed out that relatedness is the organic basis of cosmic life, which is a life of synthesis, and that these syntheses form themselves in so far as the related becomes immanent. Our experience is objective experience of the relative, and we usually sum it up in abstract terms as experience of the true, the good, and the beautiful. These basic categories correspond to the categories of relations between subject and object. Indeed, the object in so far as it can be known by the subject is true, in so far as it can be desired by the subject it is good, and in so far as it can be admired by the subject it is beautiful. Truth, goodness, and beauty appertain neither to the subject in itself nor to the object in itself, but to the subject's experience of the object, that is, to the relations arising between subject and object.

As one may see at a glance, this is the *ideal* factor in consciousness, which develops from the relative. In more expressive terms one may say that the subject, having an experience of the object relative to itself, transforms it by idealisation and transcends it. For this reason we may say also that cognition is a creative act; the intellect by expressing ideally the relations between subject and object creates its ideal object. All these are formulæ that may have a right and exact colouring inset in the system we are considering, but which outside this system might be wrong and inexact.

In substance, the value of our knowledge, and what applies to knowledge applies also to self-knowledge, the value, in short, of "human experience," is *objective, relative, ideal*.

We have quoted an expressive phrase of Mgr. Sturzo's that "synthetism is dynamism." Which means that it is a process. All admit that cognition is a process and speak always of the "cognitive process," but all do not fully understand the value of synthesis in the process,

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which might be described as "the dialectic of the relative which becoming immanent makes itself transcendent." And this is the same as saying that the value of knowledge is objective, relative, ideal.

And since we live by knowledge and every act of ours is always cognitive or conscious, and even our vital and unconscious movements resolve themselves into conscious acts, our whole life proceeds from synthesis to synthesis of subject and object, and is multiplied by the multiplication of other cognitive subjects with which we enter into direct or indirect contact, thus forming the social life by which each single experience is transformed and developed in the collective experience.

This process, inner and outer, individual and collective, and which we may express by the categories of space and time, the Idealists call history, and rightly, but they are forced to look upon it as a dialectic of the Absolute, the Spirit, which becomes contingent in the phenomenal ego, and this in its turn in order to know must duplicate itself into subject and object so as afterwards to return upon itself as subject, and so forth in a perpetual making and unmaking. But dialectic and Absolute are two ideas of which one rules out the other. Dialectic belongs to the contingent and only to the contingent, inasmuch as it is at once potentiality and actuality, or, better, process and resolvability, immanence and transcendence, unity and multiplicity.

It is true that the contingent postulates the Absolute, but a very different absolute from that of the Idealists, which has to suffer the dialectic of being and not being, affirmation and negation, potentiality and actuality. The Absolute postulated by contingency is above contingency, and hence not processual, above dialectic and hence not potential; it is actuality, pure actuality, absolute actuality.

Neo-Syntheticism also gives the name of history to the inner and outer individual and collective process, but for Neo-Syntheticism this is the *dialectic of the contingent*, at one and the same time subjective and objective, relative and immanent, transcendent and ideal. And hence for Neo-Syntheticism too history is philosophy,

in the sense of knowledge and experience of concrete or contingent Being in its bearings and in its dialectic.

It may be asked: Is not all this infected with the microbe of *immanentism*? Has the immanentist devil taken the frock of Neo-Synthetism and become a transcendentalist monk? Of this there need be no fear. All we have here is the vindication, on behalf of integral truth, of what partial truth modern philosophy has attained. It is a mistake to think that all modern philosophical speculation has been a loss, nor should one be afraid of words, for these serve to prospect new ways of thinking. From this point of view modern historicism, based on the binomial philosophy-history, with one resolving into the other, is an achievement that stands by itself, even though it was born with Idealism and nourished by Idealist theory. And it projects a new ray of truth if it is separated from Idealist dialectic, which we have called the *dialectic of the Absolute*, and developed within a philosophic system such as Neo-Synthetism, which is founded on the *dialectic of the contingent*. One can then see clearly that "human events are history not because they are facts, but because they are facts animated by thought. For the same reason every human thought in whatever way it is expressed is history, not because it is a thought, but because it is a thought resolved into act, that is, into fact. . . . Where there is thought there is logic, and where there is logic there is philosophy. History is a fact because wherever there is a fact there is logicity, and where there is logic there is philosophy. Hence it appears clearly that where there is history there is philosophy, and where there is philosophy there is history." (*Autoformazione* IV, 2.)

Such is the theory of knowledge in Neo-Synthetism. Mgr. Sturzo derives from it new and interesting views on ethics, pedagogy, and æsthetics, and from this standpoint he has discussed at length the problems of the soul and God. This endeavour to graft a new system on to traditional philosophy is a bold one, but one well worthy of study and discussion.

L. STURZO.

ART. 8.—MACBETH AND THE “SIN OF
WITCHCRAFT.”

WHETHER witches and witchcraft can establish intrinsic supernatural power is a question which may be left to theologians and anthropologists, not likely perhaps to agree soon upon their verdict. But the student of human nature, as it is seen to develop in the shifts of history, can hardly fail to realize that the idea of witchcraft can influence men and women by a combination of fear, shared experience, excited imagination, strange happenings, perhaps guilty recollection or intention, perhaps chicanery, all in a chequered mingling of vague thought and feeling, stirred by claims seemingly backed by substantial capacity. To persuade your victim to believe in you is, consequentially, much of a piece with deserving to be credited. That witchcraft has achieved that much, that it has imposed itself on centuries of human life as a reality, and a dread one, is indisputable; which suffices for the student, whether he be philosopher, artist, poet or dramatist.

The question of reality behind the claim, the learned Jesuit, Fr. Thurston, has handled from the theological point of view in the *Catholic Encyclopædia*, summing up thus:

The question of the reality of witchcraft is one upon which it is not easy to form a confident judgment. In the face of Holy Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers and theologians, the abstract possibility of a pact with the Devil and of a diabolical interference in human affairs can hardly be denied; but no one can read the literature of the subject without realising the awful cruelties to which the belief led, and without being convinced that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the allegations rest upon nothing better than pure delusion.

Even so, considering the vast total of cases, one per cent. makes a substantial sum. Concerning the condemnations of witchcraft in the Old and New Testaments, Fr. Thurston writes, with reason surely:

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Supposing the belief in witchcraft were an idle supposition, it would be strange that the suggestion should nowhere be made that the evil of these practices only lay in the pretending to the possession of powers which did not really exist.

The loose use of words, sometimes in unexpected places, does not help to solve this intricate question. Thus, in an edition of *Macbeth*, Professor Grierson writes :

Ghost scenes are not rare in Elizabethan drama, but there is none to equal this. Shakespeare took ghosts as he took witches from popular superstition, and psychologized them so far as the conditions of his stage allowed.

What precisely—and only precision is useful—does "psychologize" mean here? Has it some vague relation to Theseus?

give to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name,

or what does it mean? Possible alternatives can be hazarded: witchcraft may be a sham from beginning to end, or underneath it may lie the terrible ability to traffic with living, personal Evil; it may be, and perhaps that is the view of some not unreasonable people, a reality round which chicanery and sham have gathered disastrously.

But, for the student of drama, whatever alternatives others may choose or reject, there exists a nucleus of fact relevant to his purpose. True or false in itself as witchcraft may yet be proved, belief in it is substantial in effect. Hamlet was not entirely wrong when Rosencranz demurred to regarding Denmark as a prison :

Why then 'tis none to you ; for there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so.

Delusion can range from empty supposition to superstition, but a delusion's far-reaching, mischievous effect is fact, potent fact : and the more infamous the delusion the greater its capacity for working evil. Th. de Cauzons, after his carefully documented account of

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"Le Procès des Templiers," in the second Volume of *La Magie et la Sorcellerie en France*, says :

Pour que les accusations d'adoration des démons et de sorcellerie aient pu se produire publiquement contre un grand Ordre, comme celui du Temple, et prouvées ou non, l'entraîner à la ruine, il fallait nécessairement dans l'esprit publique une tendance à les admettre.

M. de Cauzons presses this point, as he passes from case to case. It is obvious to all who follow the history of witchcraft that the tendency to believe in it is widespread and ineradicable, and that, from that belief, whatever the underlying reality, dire consequences ensue.

Shakespeare's handling of witchcraft in *Macbeth* is interesting twice over; first, because it differs from his methods in the other plays; secondly, and chiefly, because it may throw light on some hitherto imperfectly explained difficulties in the play which stands, among his Tragedies, singular and solitary.

Professor Grierson asserts that Shakespeare "took witches from popular superstition"—an adequate explanation in the case of *The Merry Wives*. Falstaff angrily complains

the knave constable had set me i' the stocks,
i' the common stocks, for a witch.

Ford reveals the puzzled attitude of the Elizabethan illiterate to witchcraft :

We are simple men : we do not know what's brought to pass under the profession of fortune-telling. She works by charms, by spells, by the figure, and such daubery as this is beyond our element : we know nothing.

That is his account of "the old woman of Brentford," whom, whatever his simplicity, "he cannot abide . . . he swears she's a witch."

In *The Comedy of Errors*, through Dromio, Shakespeare shows his knowledge of the marks of a witch, and other

coarse aspects of witchcraft, which Miss Murray has set forth in her *Witchcraft in Western Europe*. His interest in the matter quickens slightly in *Henry VI*, written ten years and more before the Tragedies. In Part I, he amplifies Holinshed's meagre account, Talbot especially, Bedford and York, too, testifying to their share in the popular obsession that St. Joan was a witch. In Part II, he is more explicit, bringing Holinshed's witch and "conjurer" on to the stage, with their historic names; first in a scene that somewhat resembles the cavern one in *Macbeth*, and, later, to share in the condemnation of Eleanor, Duchess of Gloucester, and the two priests. These, as well as the active miscreants, Shakespeare gives over to death, in spite of Holinshed's remark that Hume was released, and that Southwell died in the Tower overnight; while Eleanor does her dreary penance through the London streets, carrying, in Holinshed's phrase, "a taper of waxe of two pound in hir hande."

Richard III's ascription of his withered arm to the magic of "Edward's wife" and the witch Jane Shore, is again merely popular, though Shakespeare omitted Holinshed's cutting comment: "No man was there present but well knew that his arme was euer suche since his birth."

The great Tragedies, written between 1602 and 1609, with the exception of *Macbeth*, contain occasional and quite non-committal references to witchcraft, like Marcellus' claim that at Christmastide fairyfolk and witches alike are harmless; and Iago's chance words, and the lines in the song of Cymbeline's sons. When we come to *Macbeth*, written probably about 1606, the whole treatment and atmosphere are different. There were circumstances likely to draw Shakespeare's attention to the matter. Certainly, he had found references in Holinshed to witchcraft which he had used for the "Histories," but Professor Grierson has credibly suggested that when he was creating *Macbeth* he was "moved with the tone and atmosphere of the Celtic and primitive legends of violent deeds and haunting remorse." If Holinshed's account of "the weird

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sisters," is read side by side with his story of Margaret Jourdain (II Henry VI) the likelihood seems clear.

Macbeth's century is the eleventh, in which, according to Emile Gebhart, Pope Benedict IX was popularly believed to keep magical books in his oratory, when King Cnut forbade "every heathenism," under which he expressly included "love of witchcraft"; when Burchard, Bishop of Worms, in his decretum, in its early years, and Gregory VII, in its closing decade, both publicly condemned witchcraft: one of the ages of revival of witchcraft. It is alleged that in France and Scotland members of the upper classes dealt more freely in these things than was the case in England; though Eleanor Cobham could be thought to try to compass the English crown by such means. Miss Murray asserts (*op. cit.*, pp. 23, 285), that the trial of Dame Alice Kyteler and her accomplices at Kilkenny, in 1324, is the earliest where actual names are given. In *Macbeth*, in the eleventh century, there are but three witches (not as in the sixteenth century and after, a "coven" of thirteen) and they are numbered, not named. As Shakespeare read Holinshed, several recent, even current, events would slip into his mind to strengthen his interest. In 1582 the great trial of Essex witches had taken place. Still more relevant, in 1590, six women and three men had been arraigned at North Berwick for attempting the lives of James VI (of Scotland, but I of England) and his Queen by magically raising a storm as they were crossing the North Sea. There were lesser trials; in 1593, of the Samuels in Huntingdonshire, and of Alse Gooderidge at the Derby Assizes in 1597. Between 1566 and 1620, nearly fifty books and pamphlets on witchcraft were published. Outshining the rest, by reason of the writer's rank and his connexion with the North Berwick trial, was James' own *Demonologie*, published in Edinburgh in 1597. He was as drastic as Shakespeare's Henry VI, and more circumstantial. The following, in modern spelling, is from his Preface:

The fearful abounding at this time in this country of these detestable slaves of the Devil, the Witches or Enchanters, hath

moved me (beloved reader), to dispatch in post, this following treatise of mine, not in any way (as I protest) to serve for a show of my learning and ingine, but only (moved of conscience) to press thereby, so far as I can, to resolve the doubting hearts of many : both that such assaults of Satan are most certainly practised and that the instruments thereof merit most severely to be punished.

Reading in James' reign—and James claimed descent from Banquo—Holinshed's account of these "Celtic and primitive legends," what is more likely than that Shakespeare should turn to account the influence of witchcraft upon his hero's character? The social status of several of the North Berwick criminals was unimpeachable. If, in the enlightened sixteenth century (and every century in turn thinks itself so), they could thus traffic, why not the Thane of Glamis in the eleventh? A consideration remains. Not a few critics have supposed that the years during which the great Tragedies were written were somehow dark and shadowed to Shakespeare, though Sir Sidney Lee did not agree :

To seek in his biography for a chain of events which should be calculated to stir in his own soul all or any of the tempestuous passions that animate his greatest Plays is to under-estimate and to misapprehend the resistless might of his creative genius.

So strangely little is known of Shakespeare as a man that it is probably idle to try to connect his life and work too closely. So, setting aside the causes which may have prompted him to interweave the supernatural so inextricably into the very stuff of *Macbeth*, as he did into no other play, there remains for study the way in which he did it, and the effects which he thus wrought, which give to it surely a peculiar significance.

Mr. A. C. Bradley, in his great book, classes together *Hamlet*, *Othello*, *Lear* and *Macbeth* : the last alone seems to baffle his exegesis. Some men, in all times, doubt : conjugal jealousy is so well-worn a theme that it almost takes Shakespeare to redeem it from triteness : filial ingratitude and cruelty, in one form or another, are no novelty anywhere. Those human practices and

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vices make the stuff of the first three. But, while we can at least understand doubt, human ambition, treachery and murder, there is in *Macbeth* a residuum unexplained, a wrapping pall of sinister fear and clogging power, which give the tragedy its unique place and indestructible attraction: which Mr. G. F. Bradby, in his recent book, leaves unexplained by his fresh suggestion that "our rather unwilling respect for Macbeth springs chiefly from the fact that he is never guilty of self-deception . . . he never has the lie in his soul." Does any other of Shakespeare's dramas open so startlingly, with such uncanny though wholly vague menace as this, when the three witches meet on that thunder-stricken, lightning-blasted waste? The whole scene is but a dozen broken lines; yet it presents two unsolved mysteries. What was the battle that was to be lost or won: surely not, as has been tamely thought, the fight with Macdonwald? Why did the third witch proclaim the purpose of their next meeting—to meet Macbeth? In the face of this opening scene, can we believe that he is so unaware as he would appear at that meeting; that he encounters the Weird Sisters there for the first time? Can we miss the obvious contrast between Banquo's surprise at seeing them—

What are these?

—and his elaborate comments on their strangeness, with Macbeth's casually elusive

Speak if you can, what are you?

The spectator expects an answer as little as Macbeth, nor do the witches reply to that question. Twice over, Banquo refers to Macbeth as "rapt"—not the word applicable to surprise at an unexpected encounter; having a subtler meaning, too, than mere surprise when Macbeth wrote to his wife, "I stood rapt in the wonder of it."

In a general way, Banquo is familiar of course with the idea of bad spirits:

to win us to our harm
The instruments of darkness tell us truths,
Win us with honest trifles, to betray's
In deepest consequent.

That goes no further than theological commonplace.

The nearest approach Lady Macbeth makes to traffic with Evil occurs in her apostrophe :

Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here.

But that is far removed from her husband's attitude. He is definitely concerned with witches and their craft :

I have learned by the perfectest report they have more in them than mortal knowledge.

So he wrote to his wife, and the letter leaves her singularly lacking in interest in the witches as witches. Her anxiety centres round the contradictions in Macbeth's temperament and character. Throughout the play her feminine practicalness is marked. For example,

A little water clears us of this deed,

which, in its place, is practical good sense ; however, by Shakespeare's comprehensive artistry, it turns to poignant irony when the somnambulist sighs,

all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand.

Though her terrible apostrophe—

murdering ministers,
Wherever in your sightless substances
You wait on Nature's mischief—

shows that she is aware of magical practices round her, the moment her husband enters she is concerned, not with any sorcery, but with the pressing need of "screwing" this vacillating man "to the sticking-place," to carry

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out her plans so that they shall not miscarry. All through, before and after the murder, Macbeth is "hag-ridden"—obsessed by evil promises, distracted by hallucinations—and yet, by starts, repentant, straining to get free and act the part of an honest man as his sovereign's host. He is really "possessed," and with no new possession. In his soliloquy, he murmurs,

Now o'er the one half-world
Nature seems dead ; and wicked dreams abuse
The curtain'd sleep : witchcraft celebrates
Pale Hecate's offerings—

words which do not suggest a point of view recently forced on him. His wife is free from any such bondage : her self-mastery is complete until the physical strain destroys her nervous force. Her purpose does not falter nor her mind fail in executing the plan she saw clearly from the first. When it is achieved, and Macbeth is

lost
So poorly in (his) thought,

she still is bent on action :

why, worthy thane,
You do unbend your noble strength to think
So brainsickly of things. Go get some water.

Not once does she refer to the witches or their power. To supply "strength for two murderers" is her sufficient burden.

Banquo's attitude, too, is totally unlike Macbeth's. A less worthy figure in Shakespeare than in Holinshed, he seems shaken in *morale* by Macbeth's success. Yet, though he "hopes" the oracles may prove true in his case, too, he shows no sign of previous dealing with or thought of them, before the meeting on the heath near Forres. But Macbeth harps constantly on the supernatural : a true Celt, he is undone by the "terror of the night"—

these terrible dreams
That shake us nightly.

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Has not the man trafficked often with Evil who cries

For Banquo's issue have I

.

mine eternal jewel

Given to the common enemy of man ?

When floundering from one crime to another, significantly now concealing the details from his partner, his mind ever runs on the Weird Sisters. Night's approach for him is "black Hecate's summons" to "the shard-borne beetle." Night falls, to him the time when

Good things of day begin to droop and drowse
Whiles night's black agents to their preys do rouse.

His next words—

Thou marvell'st at my words—

show his concentration on and his wife's forgetfulness of the supernatural. He cannot rid himself of the remembrance; she cannot keep it in mind. Even when, a desperate man, he exclaims :

I will to-morrow—

And betimes I will—to the weird sisters—

she brushes all that away with her counsel of plain commonsense :

You lack the measure of all natures, sleep ;

so different is the natural business of the night to her and to him ; so ironical is the dreadful issue, when it is she, finally, who cannot sleep. His last reference to the witches—

be these juggling fiends no more believed—

possibly indicates not only his disillusionment, but more subtly Shakespeare's own conclusion about the intrinsic

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worth of witchcraft. He has demonstrated its reality as a force leading to crime and ruin.

Now, perhaps, he chooses to leave it with a faint flavour of Montaigne's *Que sais-je?* In the only Essay (*Des Boiteux*) where the latter deals with sorcery, he is more inclined than Shakespeare to negative witchcraft's reality, without denying it outright. Florio's Montaigne, appearing in 1603, would be fresh in Shakespeare's memory—not least the famous epigram :

Après tout c'est mettre ses coniectures à très hault prix que d'en faire cuire un homme tout vif.

Certainly, Shakespeare, lacking Montaigne's cheap rating of average mortals, would not endorse his caustic avowal :

How much more naturall and more likely doe I finde it that two men should lie then one in twelve houres pass with the Windes from East to West. How much more naturall that our understanding may by the volubility of our loose-capring minde be transported from his place ? then that one of us should by a strange spirit, in flesh and bone, be carried upon a broome through the tunnell of a chimny.

Shakespeare's Weird Sisters are creatures of mystery. They have the "classical" familiars—the toad, the grey cat ; even the vermin, detestable to a Celt, appears in the shard-borne beetle—but they have none of the cheap spectacular apparatus. Shakespeare did not shake off the "Celtic and primitive" mystery he had found in Holinshed. He sees its quite indisputable influence, whatever the worth of its credentials ; and so he leaves it at last with a faint hint that its potency depends on the state and nature of the mind encountering it : that it asks for ill-balanced mind and emotion, where intellect will "palter," and desire will play with dangled possibilities. The one sentence in Montaigne imaginative enough perhaps to influence him seriously is :

if sorcerers dreame thus materially, if dreames may sometimes be thus incorporated into effects—

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which might stir response from him whose Hamlet knew that

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy ;

whose Prospero put off his magic robes, declaring :

we are such stuff
As dreams are made on ; and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.

Long before, and long after Dr. Bucknill's analysis in *The Psychology of Shakespeare*, discussion has been incessant over the relative merits, the contrasted temperaments, the possible tendency to insanity—easy egress from so many difficulties—of those two great figures ; so evil yet so engrossing, so unworthy, yet, in Shakespeare's almost universal fashion, partially redeemed at last—Lady Macbeth by anguish, Macbeth by Seyton's fidelity, the one follower who, like Richard II's "poor groom" of the stable, did not desert, and by his own final flicker of proud courage, only less superb than Cleopatra's,

I will not yield
To kiss the ground before young Malcolm's feet,
And to be baited with the rabble's curse.

Yet, somehow, all discussion seems to fall short of accounting for the whole of the facts. Does the key lie in the varying effect of the supernatural, as used by Shakespeare this once only, on a wavering, sensitive, poetic nature like Macbeth's, and on his wife's essentially practical, well-knit, far more narrowly purposeful character ? If Shakespeare, caught for a moment by witchcraft's glamour, saw its power in this Celtic life, then it is not curious that psychology, as usually handled, should stumble in trying to solve a puzzle which is insoluble unless the potency of the idea—whatever the underlying reality—of the supernatural be taken into account.

GERALDINE HODGSON.

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NOTE.—Between the acceptance and the actual publication of this paper, Mr. Wilson Knight's essay, *Macbeth and the Nature of Evil*, appeared in *The Hibbert Journal* for January. The two are not wholly conflicting in standpoint, though largely so. On p. 35, Mr. Knight writes: "An experience of something at once insubstantial and unreal to the understanding, and appallingly horrible to the feelings: this is the Evil of *Macbeth*."

If, however, the ruling force in the play is, as I have attempted to show, witchcraft, as it was regarded, with slight variations, from very early days till at least the seventeenth century, then Mr. Knight's diagnosis will not cover the facts.

He dwells with suggestive skill on the dreadful atmosphere of fear which wraps the tragedy, and, to some extent, every Scots character in it. Edward the Confessor, as he remarks, is untouched: so, too, it is significant, are the sturdy Northumbrians. There are, indeed, no more exhilaratingly sane words in this tale of chaos, terror and disaster, than Old Siward's, of his son, to Ross:

Then, he is dead?
... Had he his hurts before?

ROSS: Ay, on the front.

OLD SIWARD: Why then. God's soldier be he!
Had I as many sons as I have hairs
I would not wish them to a fairer death:
And so his knell is knoll'd.

MAL: He is worth more sorrow,
And that I'll spend for him.

OLD SIWARD: He's worth no more.
They say he parted well and paid his score.
And so God be with him.

They are like a breath of Paradisal air in the Pit's murk.

Mr. Knight traces, too, the enveloping doubt shown in the amazing number of questions asked about everything by everyone; doubt quite naturally born of this all-pervading fear. Those who have ever been genuinely afraid, know not only its disintegrating force, but

can understand also its frequent tendency to drive men to crime and violence, to anything almost. What he would seem not to account for so clearly is the cause of the fear. The reason may be that the effect of witchcraft is not to induce the general vagueness which he attributes to the chief and subordinate actors, and that it has, in fact, more intellectual force than he finds in the "Evil of Macbeth." It is true that, in Part IV of his essay, he says of the witches: "They are, within the Macbeth-universe, independent entities." A little further on he suggests that "we" may be "loth to believe in such evil realities, potentially at least alive and powerful." Then he proceeds to quote from Lafeu, in *All's Well*, about our habit of making "trifles of horrors," and ensconcing ourselves in seeming knowledge."

This is a little more than is essential to my plea. Even if this had been the extent of men's attitude to witches in *Macbeth*, it is not devoid of intellectual content and influence. "They say miracles are past," he quotes from Lafeu, "and we have our philosophical persons to make modern and familiar, things supernatural and causeless." (How like the twentieth century this sounds!)

So be it, but "philosophical persons" cannot always provide convincing proof. Even argument does not wholly destroy the possibility that, after all, the supernatural is supernatural, and not nothing. So the chance of reality remains for the understanding, as the horribleness stays for the feelings. But, since Mr. Knight admits that to Macbeth the witches are objective, the understanding has plenty to go on and to be subdued by, not "insubstantial" nor "unreal."

One other point should be noted. He repeats, but does not support by argument or quotation, the usual assumption that Lady Macbeth, "like her husband, is overpowered by the Weird Sisters and their prophecy." As I have tried to show, the play's mystery seems more easily soluble if we recognise that it is Macbeth, but certainly not his more practically ambitious wife, who is hag-ridden. In the abstract, which, in human affairs, is so distant from the concrete, he desires place and power as she does; but it is part of her character, and

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not of his, to accept the means, however terrible, without which the end is unattainable. Except to show us that, why did Shakespeare, early in the play, put that soliloquy into her mouth?

Yet, do I fear thy nature;

It is too full o' the milk of human kindness
To catch the nearest way : thou wouldst be great ;
Art not without ambition, but without
The illness should attend it : what thou wouldst highly,
That wouldst thou holily ; wouldst not play false,
And yet wouldst wrongly win : thou'ldst have, great Glamis,
That which cries " Thus thou must do, if thou have it ;
And that which rather thou dost fear to do
Than wishest should be undone." Hie thee hither,
That I may pour my spirits in thine ear,
And chastise with the valour of my tongue
All that impedes thee from the golden round,
Which fate and metaphysical aid doth seem
To have thee crown'd withal.

Did ever conjugal knowledge, in spite of affection, analyse more remorselessly?

Only here does Shakespeare use metaphysical, which commentators render by supernatural. If they are right, the line might be held to prove Lady Macbeth's belief in the Weird Sisters. But, are they? "Metaphysics" occurs once, too, in *The Taming of the Shrew*, where, beyond discussion, it means philosophy. Sir Thomas Browne held that "at first a great part of Philosophy was witchcraft, which afterwards being derived (communicated) to one another, proved but Philosophy." Further, it would seem that when Shakespeare meant supernatural he used the word like Marlowe before him in *Dr. Faustus*: e.g., in *Al's Well*, quoted above, and in this play itself, when Macbeth (1,1,130) speaks of "this supernatural soliciting." In any case, if Lady Macbeth used metaphysical to mean supernatural, and not in the sense of speculative, still, in her revealing conversation with herself, all the emphasis lies on her husband's tendency to vacillate, and therefore upon her responsibility to "pour (her) spirits in (his) ear."—G.H.

ART. 9.—BLESSED OLIVER PLUNKET
1629-1681

1. *A Memoir of Oliver Plunket.* By Cardinal Moran.
2. *Blessed Oliver Plunket.* By A Sister of Notre Dame.
3. *The Life and Times of the Venerable Oliver Plunket.* By the Rev. Dean Fleming, M.R.
4. *Blessed Oliver Plunket.* By the Rev. Myles V. Ronan (Ecclesiastical Record, October 1920).

OLIVER PLUNKET was born in Co. Meath in 1629. His lineage was noble, being nearly connected on the father's side with Lord Fingal, and on the mother's with the Earl of Roscommon. Early in life he was placed under the care of his kinsman, Dr. Patrick Plunket, O.S.B., Abbot of St. Mary's, Dublin. His boyhood was spent in an atmosphere of alternate hope and anxiety, for the Plunkets were Catholics and Loyalists with lands to lose.

Lightly pledged and lightly perjured was King Charles the martyr, like his father before and his son after him : with the fatal Stuart charm went the fatal Stuart flaw, and the Irish in particular were to suffer from these qualities.

Oliver was twelve years old when the Civil War broke out and five separate parties were disputing on Irish soil. Soon afterwards was formed the celebrated Confederation of Kilkenny, at which was present the Papal envoy, Scarampo. Unluckily, the Catholics were disunited. Father Scarampo and Owen Roe O'Neill wisely wished to insist upon a redress of grievances before giving further help to the King (£100,000 had been paid already, and the favours promised had not been granted), but the Catholics of the Pale flocked to the Royalist Standard under the Marquis of Ormond. Ormond, a pervert, thanks to the Court of Wards, was hostile to the Catholics, and no favour could be expected from him on their behalf unless it were wrested by force. In 1645 Rinuccini was formally appointed Nuncio ; and Fr. Scarampo, the saintly Oratorian, sailed for Italy, bringing with him five recruits for the priesthood. The youngest of them

was Oliver Plunket, and with him was also John Brennan, later Bishop of Waterford, Plunket's lifelong friend, who shared with him many hardships and perils. Nor was the journey uneventful. The party was chased by a Parliamentary privateer, and then taken prisoner by robbers in Flanders, but eventually they reached Rome in safety.

Three of the boys were placed at the Ludovisi, the Irish College founded by the Cardinal of that name at the instigation of the famous Fr. Luke Wadding. Unfortunately, the Cardinal died before he had time to carry through his plans for its endowment, and the college was unable to support more than eight students; but the teaching and management were in the hands of the Jesuits, and reached a very high level. Here Oliver was to spend eight years, the expenses of the first three being defrayed by his faithful friend, Fr. Scarampo. In the Ludovisi he studied philosophy, theology and mathematics, and to this was added a course in Canon and Civil Law in the Roman University, La Sapienza. In 1654 he was ordained, and should, by the rule of the college, have returned straightway to the Irish Mission.

Events had followed one another swiftly during his eight years' absence from his country, and the couriers who came to Rome bore news to sadden any lad who was the scion of Royalist houses, apart from the feeling of personal anxiety as to the fate of kinsmen. Not only was the King executed, his followers slain and their lands forfeit, but there hovered over Ireland the dark shades of extermination and despair. Of the many black hours in her tragic history, this was one of the worst. The savage massacres of Drogheda and Wexford were followed by the driving of the native Irish beyond the Shannon, and thousands of women and children were shipped to a worse fate as slaves in the Barbadoes. Oliver Plunket was of the same faith, the same flesh and blood as those who suffered these things, and his heart must have been sore within him. As to the Faith, its votaries found no mercy; persecution had scattered its priests; and of the Bishops all were in exile save one, his own kinsman, Dr. Patrick Plunket, now Bishop of Ardagh.

For the moment return to Ireland was impossible. On June 14th, 1654, he addressed the following petition to the General of the Jesuits :

I, Oliver Plunket, your humble petitioner, student of the Irish College, having completed my philosophical and theological studies, considering the impossibility of now returning to Ireland, as your Paternity well knows, in accordance with the rules of this College, humble request of you, most reverend father, that I may be allowed to continue in Rome, and dwell with the fathers of San Girolamo della Carità. I promise, however, and declare that I shall be ever ready to return to Ireland, whenever you, reverend father, or my Superiors, shall so command.

For fifteen years more he remained in Rome, being appointed professor of the College of Propaganda, where he filled the Chair of Theology and Controversy—the latter was to explain and defend the principles and doctrines of the Catholic Church against the new heresies that had arisen in the sixteenth century ; he was also appointed Consultor of the Congregation of the Index. Two years after his ordination Fr. Plunket lost a devoted friend by the death of Fr. Scarampo, who was stricken with the plague while administering to the patients in the hospital erected on the island of St. Bartholomew.

God alone knows [wrote Plunket] how affecting his death is to me, especially at the present time, when all Ireland is overrun and laid waste by heresy. Of my relatives some are dead, others have been sent into exile, and all Ireland is reduced to extreme misery ; this overwhelms me with an inexpressible sadness, for I am now deprived of father and of friends, and I should die through grief were I not consoled by the thought that I have not altogether lost Fr. Scarampo, for I may say that he in part remains, our good God having retained your reverence, who in life, as it is known to all, were so united with him in friendship, charity and disposition, so as even to desire to be his companion in death, from which, though God preserved you, yet He did not deprive you of its merit.

With the loss of Father Scarampo almost the last link with his youth was snapped. Despite his dignities and the esteem in which he was held, his position had something of loneliness and isolation. Cut off from kindred

and country, the warmth of his affections centred in his friends, and later, when he returned to Ireland, he never forgot his gratitude to his Alma Mater, nor lost his interest in the welfare of the many friends he left behind. Side by side with his activities in the intellectual field ran a deep current of spiritual life which owed its inspiration to the institution known as San Girolamo della Carità, to which he had been introduced by his friend, Fr. Scarampo. This was a brotherhood of charity formed on the advice of Cardinal Giulio de' Medici (afterwards Clement VII) in 1519; nowadays it would be called a Vincent de Paul society. The associates visited and helped the poor and sick, and looked after two prisons. They also gave personal service in the hospitals, provided poor girls with dowries, and maintained homes for penitents. Several illustrious names were numbered among their spiritual ancestry, but the greatest of all was that of St. Philip Neri, "who had impressed the institution of San Girolamo with his own character and given it a tradition. Charity entirely ruled the work that was done there."

Such was the atmosphere that Plunket breathed, and such was the manner of his preparation during the years of his residence in Rome.

In 1668, Dr. Plunket was appointed agent for the Irish clergy at Rome. At the close of the same year there were only two Catholic bishops in Ireland, Dr. Patrick Plunket and the bishop of Kilmore, the latter very aged and infirm of body and mind. There were also three in exile, including the Primate. Seeing the great need for reorganization of the Irish Church, the Holy See appointed Dr. Peter Talbot Archbishop of Dublin, and at the same time new pastors were nominated to the Sees of Cashel, Tuam and Ossory. More it would be dangerous to consecrate for fear of the cry of Roman aggression; neither would it be possible for the impoverished clergy and their flocks to find means to support more than a necessary minimum. In March, Bishop Edmond O'Reilly, of Armagh, died in Paris. Several names were sent to the Holy See, and qualifications discussed. At length the Pope said: "There is no reason why we should

spend our time dealing with uncertainties, whilst we have a certainty before our eyes. There is Oliver Plunket, a man of approved virtue, of consummate learning, of long Roman experience, with all the qualities needed for the vacant Primacy; I therefore name him Archbishop of Armagh." He was appointed July 9th, 1669.

Before taking his departure, Dr. Plunket paid his last visit to the hospital of Santo Spirito, and when bidding farewell to the Prior, Father Miesknow, the latter, embracing him, said: "My lord, you are going to shed your blood for the Catholic faith." The Primate-elect modestly protested: "I am unworthy of such a favour; nevertheless, help me by your prayers that my desire may be fulfilled." Dr. Plunket, on his arrival in Belgium, was consecrated Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of all Ireland by the Bishop of Ghent, assisted by the Bishop of Ferns, on November 30th, 1669. "Acting on the instructions of Cardinal Barberini, he called upon the Queen of England, presenting her Majesty with letters of introduction. He was very graciously received by her, and lodged by the Grand Almoner, Father Howard, in his own rooms in the palace. The good father kindly placed his own carriage at the disposal of the Primate, who thus had ample opportunity of visiting the various sights of London, the city of his future martyrdom. On his return, in March, 1670, to his native country, he was joyfully welcomed by his friends and relatives, Sir Nicholas Plunket and Lord Fingal."

He had been absent just a quarter of a century. From other sources we learn of Dr. Plunket's deep disappointment that his consecration could not take place in Rome itself, and also of the inclement weather which delayed his journey. Heavy snowfalls blocked the roads, and in London so intense was the cold that the wine froze in his chalice.

At the time of the Archbishop's return, despite the recent persecutions, there were 2,000,000 Catholics in Ireland, 1,000 secular priests and 600 members of religious orders. With the Restoration a lull had come in the storm of persecution. Charles II wished the Catholics as well as he dared, but, despite their just claim

upon his gratitude, he would run no risks on their behalf. Very few Catholic claimants received any compensation, as the Act of Settlement was drawn up to exclude the greatest possible number of Irish Catholics. Nearly all the lands were now in the hands of Protestant proprietors. In Ulster only three of the Catholic gentry and former owners still held estates, and of these two were small owners. The injustice of the Settlement, and the ingratitude of the King, were flagrant; the Primate, however, had no intention of meddling in politics, but was prepared to accept the status quo and render the full measure of civil allegiance to the Government.

The twelve years of Dr. Plunket's episcopacy are packed full of hard work in the teeth of ceaseless anxiety as to ways and means. On June 18th, 1670, he wrote to Barberini, the Cardinal Protector of Ireland: "I held two Synods and two ordinations, and in a month and a half administered Confirmation to more than ten thousand persons, though throughout my province I think there remain more than fifty thousand to be confirmed." Not a bad beginning for a person but three months in the country. The authorities can have had little inkling of the identity of a certain Captain Brown, a bravo with sword and pistols and a fashionable wig. The diocese had need of a firm hand, for there were dissensions to be healed and the germs of scandal to be remedied.

A few years previously to the coming of the Primate there had been trouble over the Remonstrance. This was a document drawn up by Fr. Peter Walsh, O.S.F. It protested loyalty to the King, and renounced all foreign power whatsoever, spiritual or temporal, that would dispense from this obligation. The Remonstrance was in practice the Act of Supremacy in another form. Walsh obtained the permission of Ormond for a meeting in Dublin of all the clergy, 1661; but though there were over eighteen hundred present he could only secure for his pamphlet the signatures of sixty-nine. The meeting, however, led to wrangling, which was just what Ormond intended, as it was his policy to weaken the Catholics by fostering divisions among themselves.

Nor was Walsh at the end of his devices. A friend of his, another friar named Taafe, next appeared with a brief appointing himself Vicar-Apostolic with faculties to regulate Church discipline ; so cleverly executed was the forgery that for a time Bishop Plunket of Ardagh was deceived by it. His suspicions were roused by the proceedings of Taafe and Walsh, and soon the imposture was exposed. These unworthy friars withdrew to the English court, where they were patronized by the Queen Mother and by Ormond. Peter Walsh was a Jansenist, and though he gained few followers in Ireland, it was largely due to the prompt action of Plunket that the insidious tenets of this heresy obtained no firm foothold. Louvain and Paris, where so many Irish studied for the priesthood, were infected with it, and on this account the Primate desired that as many candidates as possible should be trained in Rome itself. That Gallican notions had also begun to make headway is shown in the case of Terence O'Kelly, Vicar-Apostolic of Derry, whom Dr. Plunket was obliged to depose on account of his scandalous mode of life. Whereupon the Archdeacon of Derry protested that a vicar-apostolic could not be deposed by a metropolitan or Synod, and further insisted that only a native of the diocese could be appointed to govern it. There were other instances of the kind, and in his last Synod, in 1678, we find the Primate combating the principle of presentations by the lay nobility to vacant sees, and the theory that the people should choose their own pastors.

A dispute between Franciscans and Dominicans was referred by the Holy See to the Archbishop for his investigation. The latter took every pains to study the aspects of the case and to hear both sides, finally giving his judgment in favour of the Dominicans. The laity were split in two parties on the question, and the adherents of the Franciscans even went so far as to canvas Protestants on their behalf and to forward calumnies to Rome against Dr. Plunket. Nor did the worries caused him by the Franciscans end here. The lack of religious discipline among them was, to a great extent, caused by their excessive number of noviciates. Dr. Plunket advocated the establishment of one only—or, better still, that the

novices should be trained abroad. In a country liable to outbursts of persecution, where the religious could not wear their habit, nor attend choir, nor observe the discipline of their Order, it was manifestly impossible to give novices a suitable training; the other orders had recognised this fact and already sent their candidates beyond seas. The friars were outside episcopal jurisdiction, but the Primate took care to have his views forwarded to Rome, thereby incurring great hostility. The most eloquent commentary on the justice of his criticisms was his own trial and condemnation, mainly brought about by perjured apostate members of that Order, who pursued him with the most relentless enmity. The Primate throughout acted in the higher interests of religion. He had no personal grudge against the Franciscans, but on the contrary numbered many friends among them in Rome; and in Ireland itself Monsignor Tyrrell and Dr. Duffy, two of his most ardent helpers, were sons of St. Francis.

Nor did matters run entirely smoothly between Dr. Peter Talbot, Archbishop of Dublin, and the Primate. They held one another in mutual esteem. Dr. Talbot was an upright man, and in every way a worthy and zealous priest, but unfortunately he took into his head in all sincerity that the Irish Primacy belonged to the See of Dublin. When Dr. Plunket's decisions ran counter to his there was friction, and it was not always easy for Bishops to produce the documents bearing on particular cases for fear of incurring *præmunire*. Neither prelate was prepared to abate his claim, and each resorted to pen and ink for a fuller statement of his views. The laity naturally took sides in the controversy, and the Protestants were still further delighted at the factions among Catholics. The matter was by mutual consent referred to Rome, which did not issue a final decision until 1719.

In retrospect it is difficult to understand upon what grounds Dr. Talbot based his view. Armagh had been recognized as the See of St. Patrick for centuries, and in point of date Cashel was prior to Dublin. It is true that the latter had always been the leading see

within the Pale, and that Henry VIII conferred the primacy upon it because it was the capital. The argument was precisely similar to that which made Constantinople prior to Rome, and it is astonishing that a man of Dr. Talbot's integrity should have held such an Erastian view. The Archbishop of Dublin died from the rigours of his imprisonment during the persecution, and was solaced in his last hours by a visit from Dr. Plunket—who was confined in a neighbouring cell.

Not content with the heavy tasks with which he was burdened in Ireland, the Archbishop was full of plans for the evangelisation of the Highlands, where there lingered a good many Catholic families and where, owing to the Gaelic speech of the inhabitants and their strong dislike of the English, missionary work was more easily undertaken by Irish priests. He made a detailed study of the conditions of life prevailing in Scotland and the Hebrides, but lack of means prevented his undertaking a personal visitation. He mourned, too, over the fate of thousands who had been shipped by Cromwell into West Indian slavery, and longed to succour them, but had neither money nor subjects at his disposal.

With the Tories he was able to deal more successfully. These were the Catholic owners of estates who had been dispossessed by English Protestant settlers in the plantations of James I and Cromwell. Deprived of their lawful property they lived by raiding the settlers; by degrees they were joined by professional criminals and thieves, who, forming themselves into strong bands, levied blackmail and terrorised the countryside. Their zealous pastor sought them out in their hidden refuges in caves and mountains; many of them listened to his admonitions and laid down their arms, and a good many agreed to sail for the Continent, where they did good service in the armies of France and Spain. It speaks volumes for Dr. Plunket's powers of persuasion that he was able thus to influence men smarting under so keen a sense of injustice as were the original Tories!

But the first care of the Primate and his gravest pre-occupation was the cause of education, almost at a standstill in Ireland since the time of Owen Roe O'Neill.

When Berkeley was appointed Viceroy, "Captain Brown" was able to doff his fashionable wig and lay aside his sword and pistols, for Berkeley favoured Catholics and was soon on terms of cordial friendship with the Archbishop. The laws on the Statute book were most stringent against Catholic education, but during that Viceroy's term of office Dr. Plunket was able to have a school at Drogheda, under the management of three Jesuit fathers, for upwards of a hundred boys, forty of whom were the sons of Protestants. All the same it was very difficult to make ends meet, and he sent frequent begging letters on behalf of the school, besides cutting down his own expenses to a minimum in order to be able to support the Jesuit professors. Then, as now, the question of education was a most pressing one, and he laments that many of the noblest families, owing to their loss of goods for the Faith, were totally unable to afford an education for their sons. As for those with a vocation for the priesthood, it was absolutely essential for them to complete their studies abroad with the aid of burses at the foreign colleges. The school was maintained for over three years, but had to be closed at the renewal of persecution in 1674, and was unable to reopen.

At every hand's turn the Primate was hampered by personal poverty and also by the penury of his clergy and flock. In addition to appropriating all previous revenues, the Protestant clergy levied extremely heavy exactions from the poor Catholics. For instance, it was the custom at a baptism to offer the priest one shilling and the payment of two shillings to the Protestant minister was enforced by law; there were also heavy mortuary fees, etc. Dr. Plunket protested against the injustice to the Protestant Primate, who had the grace to promise that the exactions should cease. Dr. Plunket was urgent in his representations to Rome that no more Bishops should be appointed on account of the poverty of the various dioceses, which was indeed astonishing. The primatial See brought in only £62; Meath, the richest diocese in Ireland, £70; Dublin, Cashel and Tuam barely £40; and Clonmacnoise, the poorest, a pittance of £7 10s. per

annum. Truly the Catholic Bishops were often in humiliating straits in contrast with the wealth of the Protestant incumbents. The Protestant Primate derived from land and possession £5,000 and the Archbishop of Dublin about £3,000 a year.

From his £62 revenue Dr. Plunket's annual postage bill amounted to £25, so it is not astonishing that he warned his correspondents not to use envelopes, as these increased the cost. He wrote full and frequent reports, however, to the Internuncio at Brussels and also to friends in Rome, sometimes under the pseudonym of Thomas Cox and at others under that of Edward Hamon. His episcopal palace was a thatched cottage, his coat made of the cheapest material procurable, and his food at times consisted only of a little milk and oatmeal porridge.

1673 witnessed a fresh outburst of bigotry on the part of Parliament and an order was sent to Ireland for the expulsion of Bishops and religious. The Archbishops of Dublin and Tuam were expelled the kingdom, and in the midst of bitter winter weather the Primate, with his friend Dr. Brennan, fled into the mountains, where they endured tremendous hardship from cold and hunger, being destitute of means; and the lay Catholics for the most part too terrified to give them shelter. Yet, in the midst of so much suffering, Dr. Plunket's greatest grief is over the destruction of the schools; and of their personal discomfort he makes light, and is ready to jest at the fact "that from our bed we may see the stars, and at the head of our bed every slightest shower refreshes us." That autumn the harvest failed and the Archbishop wrote to Brussels: "In my diocese more than five hundred Catholics died of starvation, and the Bishop of Waterford and myself were glad when we could get a bit of bread. . . . We have already gone through so much on the hills, in huts and caves and have acquired such a habit of it that all suffering in the future will be less severe and less troublesome."

After a time the storm abated and Dr. Plunket was hard at work again, though not so openly as in the halcyon days of Berkeley. Ormond was once more Viceroy; he disliked Catholics and hated the Talbots, but he was

connected by marriage with the Plunkets, and had procured a written protection for the Bishop of Meath during the recent persecutions. This was the kinsman who had nurtured Oliver's boyhood, and towards the close of 1679 he died. The Archbishop felt his death deeply and it was after attending his obsequies that he was arrested, December, 6th, 1679.

The excitement over the Titus Oates Plot was bound to have a repercussion in Ireland. It was hard to bolster up the credit of the plot in England, when at the end of a year no witness had appeared from Ireland, where the Catholics were fifteen to one. Ormond had no belief in the plot and gave scant encouragement to informers, but under pressure from the Home Government he had to issue an edict expelling all Bishops, Jesuits and Regulars, and rewards of £10 and £5 were offered for the capture of those who remained after a stated date.

About this time three congenial ruffians—Hetherington, McMoyer and Murphy—met in Dundalk gaol. The first was Lord Shaftesbury's chief agent for coaching Irish witnesses for the Popish Plot; the second, an apostate friar, whom, at the request of his Provincial, the Primate had publicly denounced; the third, an equally knavish secular priest, also suspended and excommunicated. McMoyer and Murphy were known to the Government as paid informers. Another apostate friar, named Duffy, an associate of McMoyer, was quite willing to join in any conspiracy which afforded a chance of making money and of wreaking his spite against the Archbishop. Hetherington hastened to London and returned with pardons for his friends and special instructions for the Viceroy, who had no choice but to issue a warrant for the Primate's arrest. After six months, formal orders reached Ormond to proceed with the trial and to allow no Catholic on the jury. Ormond ordered the trial to be held in Dundalk, the prisoner's usual residence. The character of the perjurers was well known to the police there, and for two days they dared not put in an appearance. At last McMoyer arrived, half drunk, but Murphy could not be found. Dr. Plunket had thirty-two witnesses, and it is quite certain

that no jury, however Protestant, would have convicted him in Ireland, where his own character and that of his adversaries was too well known.

In London the credit of Titus Oates was on the wane, and Shaftesbury was determined to find another victim to revive the flagging interest in the plot. In the capital the upright character of Dr. Plunket was quite unknown, as were also the disreputable antecedents of his accusers. Once the scene of action was shifted to the Thames, judicial murder would be a foregone conclusion. He was, accordingly, cited to appear in London, and on arrival there was lodged in the cell in Newgate formerly occupied by the martyred Fr. Whitbread, S.J. After six months of absolutely solitary confinement he was brought to trial May 3rd; but the case was adjourned till June 8th on his representation that witnesses and necessary documents must come from Ireland. The delay was all too little in those days of slow travel, and contrary winds drove the boat back to Holyhead, so that the journey thence to Dublin took fourteen days. Most of the witnesses were Catholics who feared to stir without a pass, and the Royal Council in Dublin refused to transmit to London copies of the documents showing the offences of which his accusers had been convicted and the worthlessness of their testimony. Even so, five witnesses set out, but were unable to reach London in time. A special messenger was sent on to represent this fact and demand a further adjournment of the trial, but this most reasonable request was refused.

The months of imprisonment had given time for further scum of Ireland to join the original trio and to concoct romantic and malicious charges against the Primate: "That he had enrolled 70,000 men to unite with the French on their arrival; that he exacted money from the clergy to introduce the French and pay the army; that he had visited all Ireland and examined and explored all the seaport towns and fortresses of the kingdom, in order to introduce the French by a sure port," etc. To anyone who knew Ireland or knew Plunket the charges were ludicrous. The poverty of the Primate was no secret to the Protestants in his diocese, and the consequent

impossibility of either enrolling or supporting 70,000 fighting men in Ulster was patent ; indeed, the total population did not reach this number, and Carlingford Lough, the place cited as agreed upon for a landing, had a difficult approach and was totally unfit to harbour a fleet.

English commonsense and love of fair play had deserted the nation at the time of the Popish Plot. Plunket's defence in the absence of documents and witnesses in his favour was to deny the allegations *in toto* ; but this weighed little with the judge, Sir Francis Pemberton, with Sergeant Jefferies (later of Bloody Assize fame), or with the jury. One thing the Archbishop admitted while denying the charges of conspiracy and treason ; that he had remained in Ireland and fulfilled his episcopal functions after the proclamation ordering Bishops to leave the Kingdom. Throughout the trial the Primate was calm and dignified ; in spite of the injustice of the proceedings and the base lies of the witnesses, whose characters were so well known to him, he remained unruffled and completely master of himself.

As a specimen of the whole, we give his noble words at the moment before judgment was pronounced :

"If I were a man that had no care of my conscience in this matter, and did not think of God Almighty, or conscience or heaven or hell, I might have saved my life ; for I was offered it by divers people here, so I would but confess my own guilt and accuse others. But, my lord, I had rather die ten thousand deaths than wrongfully accuse anybody. And the time will come when your Lordship will see what these witnesses are that have come in against me. I do assure your Lordship, if I were a man that had not good principles I might easily have saved my life. But I had rather die ten thousand deaths than wrongfully take away one farthing of any man's goods, one day of his liberty, or one moment of his life."

"I am sorry to see you persist in the principles of that religion," was all the Chief Justice could find to say.

"They are those principles that even God Almighty cannot dispense withal."

His sentence was to be hanged, cut down alive, beheaded, drawn and quartered. The request that his servant might be with him and a few friends visit him was granted.

"God Almighty bless your Lordship. And now, my lord, as I am a dead man to this world, and as I hope for mercy in the other world, I was never guilty of any of the treasons laid to my charge, as you will hear in time. And my character you may receive from my Lord Chancellor of Ireland (Michael Boyle, also Protestant Primate), my Lord Berkeley, my Lord Essex and the Duke of Ormond."

Berkeley was already dead, Ormond and the Chancellor in Ireland, Essex (a former Viceroy) petitioned the King upon Plunket's behalf, declaring the witnesses perjured as the things sworn against him could not possibly be true. But the King in a rage, declared he dared pardon no one.

Oliver Plunket was remanded to prison for three weeks before the sentence was carried out. As to how his time was employed we learn from his own letters and from Dom Maurus Corker, O.S.B., who had the privilege of assisting him to prepare for death, and who held him in highest veneration. To Michael Plunket, a nephew at the Ludovisi, he wrote :

... Sentence of death has been passed against me and there is no hope of respite or of pardon. Thus those who beheaded me in effigy have attained their intent of beheading the prototype (McMoyer and Duffy, when at St. Isidore's, from which they were expelled, to show their hostility to the Primate, beheaded a bust of him which was in the College). With St. Stephen I cry out : "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge." Show this letter to all my friends and pressinglly solicit their prayers for me. I never sought to introduce the Catholic religion unless by teaching and preaching. My Conscience never reproached me with being guilty of any conspiracy or rebellion, direct or indirect. Oh ! would to God I were as free from every other stain and sin against the divine precepts as I am from this. Therefore it is needful for all my friends to pray for me, as I confide they will.

I remain, your friend,

OLIVER PLUNKET.

Both Catholics and Protestants visited him in his cell and both alike were charmed "by his manner, discourse and modesty." Father Corker gathered details from the warders of his life in prison, of how his time was spent in continuous prayer, and of how he fasted three or four days a week on bread and water and appeared without anguish or concern at his "straight confinement. . . ."

None saw or came near him but received new comfort, new fervour, new desires to please, serve, and suffer for Jesus Christ, by his very presence. Concerning the manner and state of his prayer, he seemed most devoted to Catholic sentences taken out of the Scripture, the Divine Office and the Missal which he made me procure for him three months before he died; upon these sentences he let his soul dilate in love, following herein the sweet impulse and dictates of the Holy Ghost, and reading his prayer writ rather in his heart than in a book . . . he continually endeavoured to improve and advance himself in the purity of divine love, and in contrition for his sins past; of his deficiency in both this humble soul complained to me as the only things that troubled him. This love had extinguished in him all fear of death; hence the joy of our holy martyr seemed to increase with his danger, and was fully accomplished by an assurance of death. . . . But I neither can nor dare undertake to describe to you the signal virtues of the blessed martyr . . . many Protestants within my hearing wished their souls in the same state with his; all believed him innocent, and he made Catholics—even the most timorous—in love with death. . . .

July 1st (new time 11th) was the date appointed for the execution; the route, the familiar *via dolorosa* to Tyburn, along which Catholic victims had been jolted for over a century. His speech from the hangman's cart reiterated his innocence of the charges brought against him, prayed for health for the King and royal family, and gave a full pardon to his enemies, and begged the Divine Majesty to be propitious to him through the Merits of Christ and the intercession of the Blessed Virgin, and of all the Angels and Saints of Paradise. As the cart was driven away a hand was raised in absolution, for Fr. Edward Petre, in disguise, was present among the crowd at the gallows.

The very next day Shaftesbury was in the Tower and the informers hard at work and ready to swear away the life of their old master by relating how he had paid for their perjuries. These foresworn Irishmen lived in crime and died in misery, abhorred by their fellow countrymen; though Duffy, after some years, flung himself at the feet of Plunket's successor and ended his days in penitence.

Two years after the martyr's death Dom Maurus Corker was able to remove his remains to Lansperg in Bavaria. At the present time the head is in the Dominican Convent at Drogheda, the body at Downside, and smaller relics in various other convents.

Link by link God rivets the chain of his chosen ones, binding them ever closer to Himself. Though not a member of the Congregation of the Oratory, Blessed Oliver Plunket's youth and early manhood was moulded in the School of St. Philip. The charity and serenity learned at San Girolamo stood him in stead throughout the toilsome years of his Episcopate, they form the background that explains his life and the fact that at the "bar of injustice" moral and spiritual mastery was with the prisoner. On that summer morning, at Tyburn, was riveted not only the last link in the life of Oliver Plunket, but the final one of a chain which bound the Martyrs to each other for nigh one hundred and fifty years in the heroism of a noble cause and in the service of Christ the King.

O. M. TWIGG.

SOME RECENT BOOKS

At last St. Thomas is coming into his own—and being recognized for what he is—one of the world's greatest philosophers. And Fr. D'Arcy's **Thomas Aquinas** (Ernest Benn, Ltd., 12s. 6d.), should do much to hasten that desirable event. As far as the obscurity intrinsic to all close and subtle thought will permit, it is admirably lucid. He is content to explain St. Thomas, any criticism of the philosopher or his exponents taking the indirect form of hints thrown out *en passant*. On the other hand he does not, like certain Thomists, stand over his readers with an intellectual bludgeon—thus saith St. Thomas—accept his teaching to the least detail—or you deny reason itself. Not over his desk is written the text of a Dominican hymn.* “*Ad docendum cor sincerum Solus Thomas sufficit.*” But the unprejudiced reader will be the readier to see how much, how very much St. Thomas has to teach us—how much of his system belongs to the *philosophia perennis* that “time cannot wither”—because it is based not on changing theories or scientific hypotheses but is, as Fr. D'Arcy shows, the analysis of what is implicit in the fundamental factors of experience—largely indeed in the most universal and indubitable fact of all—the fact of “being.”

Difficulties are not shirked but frankly stated, and if not always fully solved (St. Thomas is surely no “Archibald the all-right” but a man, if a man of supreme genius) the case for the Thomist view is always well put. Sometimes an apt simile throws a flood of light on a dark place. Take for example the well-known difficulty that, if the soul be the form of the body there is no room for personal immortality. Let us see how Fr. D'Arcy deals with it. It is typical of his method.

“Many of St. Thomas's contemporaries regarded the soul as a fully constituted substance inhabiting the body, directing it, and hampered by it, and, in the end, more fully real when absolved from it. . . . St. Thomas chose instead the Aristotelian

* Only in local use and long ago disuse entirely: (See Oxford Book of Medieval Verse III).

explanation according to which body and soul together constitute one human being in the manner of matter and form. The soul informs the whole body, determining it and unifying it, just as we might say that a clock has no invisible anatomy in the interior of the works but the very form of the mechanism. So far then as it falls into place with other physical examples of matter and form, there is no room for immortality, in fact, the conception of form apart is ridiculous. St. Thomas does nevertheless make an exception for the form of a human being. . . . The reason he gives for making it an exception is that the form is not merely intelligible, but intelligent, in other words, that it has the power of self-reflection. This power of holding oneself at arm's length, of standing outside oneself, involves a principle which is immaterial. The form has freed itself from the particularity of the matter it determines; if it is still localized it is also infinite in power, as it can contemplate all things and apprehend absolute values, truth, beauty and goodness. *Like the fish in the sea of Salamis, it can leap above the waters to greet the rising sun;* ("the concrete image which lights up the abstract argument so that it becomes, as it were, a visible object,") it can, in a word, become all things instead of being confined as other material forms to a circumscribed space and time."

Not even Fr. D'Arcy's explanation can render so persuasive the Thomist view of individuation, indeed of the universal and particular. It remains our belief that every object has its individual, as distinct from its generic-essence; its individual nature which is not simply a numerical difference from its fellow of the same species. We do not think it possible to multiply (in the concrete) or individuate without addition of meaning (114). And indeed, it would seem to follow from the relation between substance and essence that where there is a distinct substance, there is also a distinct essence (see p. 122). The form or essence: humanity is not simply individuated by matter but exists subsumed in my individual form. When *I know* John I apprehend more than just one example of humanity. Particular and universal are relative. The particular is, as a being of a special *kind*, a universal theoretically though not actually multipliable. In this sense we can, we think, have a concept of the particular (see p. 99) in so far as it is a complex of characters which enable us to distinguish

it from other particulars, *e.g.*, an acorn of a certain shape and colour born by a particular oak tree of a specific shape and colour growing at a particular place and time, etc. And all this formal difference is, we think, due not simply to matter but to psychic factors.

The Aristotelian emphasis on the function of abstract concepts—after all but one mode of knowledge—would seem to have unduly restricted Thomistic epistemology and to have led him, in his formulations at least—though not, as Fr. D'Arcy proves, in his intention—to confuse abstract minimal being—that which is common to all beings with Being as such—the fullness of Being which is God. Here we bespeak the reader's special attention for the brilliant passage in which Fr. D'Arcy makes this point clear—dare we say clearer than St. Thomas ever made it (105).

"Far from having an intuition of God we have not even any proper concept" (152). Again St. Thomas adopts too narrowly ratiocentric a standpoint. Intuition need not be a clear intellectual vision, as for example—the intuition of the first principles of thought. It may be a direct but obscure and totally indefinable apprehension—a spiritual sensation. Even if we are unwilling with Lossky to find an intuition—a *direct* apprehension of the individual object at the basis of all knowledge, and this the reviewer would himself accept, at least we must posit—if we are to do justice to the evidence, a direct intuition of God and the soul. We cannot therefore subscribe unreservedly to the famous dictum, *nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu* (187).

We question whether bodies are infinitely divisible (101). "Creation in time." Fr. D'Arcy calls this the doctrine of Revelation. But surely time is itself created—a mode of created being. Creation with time would seem a more accurate mode of statement.

In his introduction Fr. D'Arcy says that Abbot Joachim of Flora "deluded" many with his prophecies of a new dispensation of the Holy Spirit. No doubt these words are true in a sense—but they disguise the genuine greatness of Joachim—and may easily give the impression that he is a condemned heretic, whereas he died in the

communion of the Church and, we believe, enjoys a cultus in his Order of Citeaux. And surely *Salian* (p. 6) is a mistake for *Swabian*.

So much for points of disagreement or doubt—which, however, mostly refer to the philosophy expounded rather than to its able exposition. When all is so well-stated it is not easy to particularize. We should like, however, to invite special attention to the remarks in the introduction on the architectural nature of the thirteenth century genius—reflected alike in cathedral and *Summa*, also to the explanation of the Thomistic view of causality, cogently vindicated as a necessary implicit of intelligibility against those who deny the conception because physicists do not or may not need it in the restricted sphere of scientific description. And how can we praise sufficiently the magnificently lucid explanation of the doctrine of potency and act, one of the corner-stones, if not the foundation stone, of Thomism (pp. 106 sqq.). Notice especially a particularly felicitous touch—"the inferiority complex" from which, by its very constitution, every object of our experience is suffering. If Thomism is largely, at any rate, the *philosophia perennis*, its statement was necessarily of its age, illustrating vital principles by instances and arguments no longer valid. How then shall the student distinguish the essential from the accidental? How shall he best approach St. Thomas—and most easily understand the plan of his great philosophic edifice? By taking Fr. D'Arcy as his guide.

"Since it is impossible that a natural desire be vain, which would be the case were it impossible to arrive at the vision of God desired by all minds, it is necessary to say that it is possible for the human and angelic intelligence to contemplate God's essence." These words taken from St. Thomas's *Summa Contra Gentiles* state the problem which Dr. O'Mahony's brilliant monograph, **The Desire of God in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas**, (Cork University Press, 10s. 6d.), attempts to answer. For if the vision of God's essence is essentially supernatural how can man naturally desire it? Or alternatively, if he has a natural desire for the immediate vision

of God, and no natural desire can be vain, how can that vision be supernatural? Must not goal and tendency belong to the same order? Whether or no Dr. O'Mahony succeeds in resolving this antinomy—his study convinces us that he has grasped St. Thomas's mind on the question. Any criticism still left in the reader's mind must be directed to St. Thomas, not to his faithful interpreter. From the very nature of the special problem studied Dr. O'Mahony's book lays hold of the Thomistic philosophy at its centre. It presents the quintessence of Thomism. If, with Fr. D'Arcy, we have been circling over Thomism in an aeroplane, surveying it in a bird's-eye view from the air—with Dr. O'Mahony as pilot the machine plunges down into the heart of that metaphysical city. These two books respectively presenting Thomism from above and from within supplement each other.

The intrinsic finality of being (see p. 85), the ascent of creation through mind to God—"the anonymous object of all desire"—the unsatisfied tendency of mind till it rest in the vision of Truth—the expression by the human intellect of the divine art in nature—only thus rendered intelligible—and remotely therefore an imitation of human art. Such is the magnificent theme of Dr. O'Mahony's work.

"The universe created by God inevitably tends towards Him. Everything that exists is suspended, as it were, from God, and, as being, is necessarily an ascent towards Him. . . . We cannot regard Nature and mind as complete strangers. . . . Both are metaphysically complementary; it is in mind that Nature finds its proper integration. Reality is, as it were, but a passive reflection of God." (Reality does not seem the right term—the author means infrarational reality.) Mind is an active one, and it is by means of the active that the passive reflection will be made to reveal fully its divine origin and intelligibility. The world is saturated with idea, with spirit, with law: it is idea crystallized, thought materialized, law realized. Mind reflects back this inherent intelligibility of things. It answers to the very dynamism of reality; it is the term of the evolution of things. All Nature is, as it were, in movement; it tends, and mind is the term of its tendency. It is for the human mind to elevate and

express this inherent tendency of all creation which, on last analysis is towards God Himself. . . . Mind is the truth of Nature, God is not merely efficient and final cause of all, but the Exemplar of all created being. Nature is, properly speaking, the divine art, that is the thought of God objectified, and if the current formulæ has it that art imitates Nature we may reverse it and see in it a deep meaning. For Nature imitates art: it is the divine art. But, also, Nature is, in a certain far-off sense, all proportion observed, human art. A far-off imitation of the divine, it is at every moment an imitation of the human mind. . . . Mind integrates Nature, it reveals in art Nature's truth, beauty and goodness. But the human mind is but a moment, as it were, in the progress of being. Like Nature itself, the finite mind is naturally turned beyond itself: God is the End of all. . . . The law of finality is a law of self-expression. Within being, being is either perfect, an end unto itself, its full expression of itself to itself, or it is imperfect, tending necessarily to express itself in the highest perfection it can obtain. Creation is pervaded through and through by this desire of expression. . . . Because it is not being, as such, or perfect act, the human mind realises its position in the hierarchy of things as mediator between matter and God. It is not the end towards which all creation tends. It is neither the final end of the lower orders nor to itself its own end. It carries on the urge of all finite being, and seeks to express itself."

There is thus in mind itself a tendency the finality of which—its absolute end, is the vision of God. Yet the natural capacity of a finite mind cannot attain God's self-knowledge.

"When St. Thomas distinguishes a two-fold end of man . . . this division in the mind of the saint is really a co-division. The natural end mars the term of Nature's activity left to itself, but that very activity looks beyond itself to the only end, the final end, capable of saturating the intellectual nature whence it proceeds. When he speaks of the natural end, he has in view the *activity* of this nature, and when he speaks of the true final end, he has in mind the intellectual nature as such, source of this activity which is really only a partial expression of its own inherent tendency towards an asymptotic term. A natural end could not possibly reduce fully to act, in the sense of exhausting all its capacities, a nature whose fundamental orientation is towards the infinite of being. . . . This, therefore, is the only possible sense in which we can speak of two ends for man: one as the natural

frontier of its realization by its own unaided activity ; the other as the asymptotic limit towards which his nature tends."

That this solution is true to the mind of St. Thomas the author has, we believe, proved. But is it *wholly* satisfactory ? We may grant that from the very nature of intelligence, any intellectual being God may will to create must tend to a supernatural end beyond its powers to attain. And that in individual cases such beings, through no personal fault, fail of that end, though more difficult to accept is analogous to the failure of individuals to attain the specific end of their nature, *e.g.*, the acorn that never grows to an oak. But "if," to return to our introductory text, "it is impossible that a natural desire be vain," at any rate, for the species, and intelligence has an intrinsic tendency or desire to and for the vision of God, it does seem to follow that a good God, did he create such finite intellectual natures, would owe it to His goodness to make the attainment of that end, the fulfilment of that desire possible—that he could not, as a wise and good Creator, create a species of intelligent beings without opening to it access to the supernatural order. Thus humanity would have, not indeed a natural capacity, but a natural exigency—at least in a wide sense—for the beatific vision—and God would owe humanity that vision, at any rate *de congruo*. When full justice is done to Dr. O'Mahony's cogent arguments, we are left with this final problem to submit to St. Thomas. Will he, through Dr. O'Mahony or some other competent interpreter, answer it ?

Here and there we found points of disagreement. Even in the natural order the soul we believe enjoys a direct touch of God—though too obscure to suffice for knowledge of Him as distinct from creation (p. 181). Nor do we like the search for God described as a "vocation to heights of *abstraction*" (p. 216)—as this apotheosis of abstraction—reiterated elsewhere (p. 22) favours that confusion between the abstract concepts of being—goodness, truth, etc., and the concrete fulness of these in God which St. Thomas inherited from Greek philosophy and which obscured his expression to the end.

The statement that knowledge, properly speaking, is confined to the judgment (p. 222) calls for reservations. We believe that all experience conveys knowledge—and that the judgment does but analyse what is already given, therefore in a true sense known, *in globo*. Dr. O'Mahony appears to hold (p. 58) that Neo-Platonism excludes the direct vision of God. But immediate contemplation of the One was the apex of Plotinus's system—and the crowning experience of his life. Also one or two lapses of memory. The "stranger" of Mantua should be "prophetess" (p. 129). The date of Boethius is c. 480-524, not 470-75 (p. 131). Surely "qualitative" (p. 159, l. 18) should be quantitative? And the vocabulary is often too American, *e.g.*, "embracive," "fecund from many view points." But for the book as a whole there can be nothing but the most cordial praise. At once profound, wide and solid, it leaves the reader awed by the philosophic magnitude it reveals—a philosophy wide as man's multiform experience, deep as the springs of his being, lofty as the height of his aspiration.

Philosophers may be divided into two classes—the integrators and the disintegrators—the synthetic and the merely analytic. The latter pick the complex of living experience to pieces and admit the reality only of some or even but one of these. The former, accepting experience on all its levels and in all its forms, seek to understand the parts in relation to the whole—as being only so intelligible. Of this integral organic philosophy Professor Lossky is an able exponent.* **The World as an Organic Whole**, by Professor N. O. Lossky, Translated by Natalie A. Duddington, M.A. (Oxford University Press). For him reality is an organism of which no part can be understood without reference to the remainder. Moreover the physical, and psychical factors everywhere co-exist and co-operate. Yet the whole is not the Absolute. The contingency of the whole upon its parts compels us to seek outside it for the first principle. This is Plotinus'

* Two of his writings are available in English. One of these, which contains an all too brief outline of his world view, is the subject of this review.

One, the God of Theism—in himself beyond all predication, but in virtue of his relation to the world, susceptible of the positive predicates given by Christian theism. Within creation Professor Lossky distinguishes two orders, the world of harmony, and the world of enmity. All the members of the world of harmony mutually interpenetrate, diversity does not involve exclusion. In the world of enmity—this lower world in which we live, diversity is exclusive—we cannot be in two places or do two things at once—there is a struggle for existence involving pain and death.

So far we gladly follow the author. But we are bound to regret that gratuitous myth whereby he explains the existence of the lower kingdom with its inherent evil. For him only the world of spirit was directly created by God. The kingdom of enmity is the work of spirits fallen from the higher sphere, and in process of redemption through and in the embodiments they have made for themselves. The supposition seems to us sheer fantasy. How much simpler to explain the evil of this lower sphere by its essential finitude—here carried to the utmost compatible with any measure of being. Nor can any spirit fall from the beatific life in which every desire is fulfilled, still less seek to become the Absolute (p. 99). On the other hand, Professor Lossky's account of the spiritualised and mutually penetrable "matter" in the kingdom of spirit is valuable and helpful—as also his contention that nowhere, even in so-called inanimate matter, is a psychic factor completely wanting. But we are altogether satisfied with his treatment of relations. "Relations are not sensuous; there is something in them that testifies to their spiritual character, and the perception of them is therefore a non-sensuous act; it cannot be ascribed to the eye, or the ear." Surely some relations are sensuous, directly apprehended by the eye, *e.g.*, a contrast of colours, or the ear, *e.g.*, the harmony or discord between two notes. And spatial relations seem to us themselves spatial and distance extended (see pp. 35, 46)—indeed the phenomena from which the notion of space is abstracted. Nor does the simultaneous perception of several spatial or temporal units prove that the percipient is superspatial

or super-temporal—but merely that his space and time units are larger than those of the object perceived and therefore embrace many of these simultaneously. Not indeed that we would deny that there in fact is in man something which transcends time and space. We merely contest that this is proved by the inclusive character of sense perception.

Professor Lossky's account of memory is also unsatisfactory. If the fact of memory proves that its possessor is super-temporal, why can he not foresee the future? He does not do justice to the essentially mediate character of memory as opposed to perception. If a "derivative being" possesses "some elements entirely different from its ground" (p. 60) this proves that the latter cannot be its entire ground.

Professor Lossky's proof of the Absolute, though cogent, does not lead to the "actual contemplation" of the Absolute (p. 76). It results only in the apprehension of a border concept indicative of a Reality which it cannot give in the concrete. The only way in which God can become an object of concrete contemplation is, in the wide sense, mystical intuition. Indeed Professor Lossky admits as much (p. 80). The two passages are not altogether consistent.

Nor is repulsion always mutual, as Professor Lossky appears to hold (p. 148). There is no "unconditional duty" in which the "ought is essentially superior to existence" (p. 176). On the contrary, ought is always subordinate to is. Being everywhere precedes and grounds aim, and duty. The most universal obligation, namely to love God, is the consequence of His Nature as the *summum bonum*. Here Lossky is too Kantian. But we make these objections only because the value of his work is such that they are worth making. The union in his view of reality of the organic and hierarchic gives his system a richness and amplitude lacking to most modern philosophies. But after all, it is not modern, it is a re-statement of Neo-platonism which, while keeping all that is valuable in it, gets rid of ambiguities which at least brought it too close to pantheism, and brings it into vital contact with the results of modern science. And

Professor Lossky reaches thus a position which, if not always satisfactory—for instance, his partly mythical cosmogony—marks an enormous advance on the achievements of any of the great post-Cartesian systems.

(E. I. W.)

A good and reliable book on the ordinary ceremonies of the Church had always been badly needed, when the need was supplied in 1918 by Dr. Adrian Fortescue's **Ceremonies of the Roman Rite**. That valuable book has now been ably re-edited by the Rev. J. D. O'Connell (Burns Oates & Washbourne, 15s.), and a few additions and corrections have been made. Such an admirable piece of work should be extremely helpful to any priest who wishes to carry out the functions in his church smoothly and liturgically, for Dr. Adrian Fortescue's descriptions of the ceremonies are, on the whole, clear, accurate and simple. But in case the book may one day be again revised, we wish to make one or two suggestions of a general nature and correct a few points of detail.

First, it would be an improvement if the references to authorities in the footnotes were much fuller. *Vavasseur's Ceremonial* is excellent in this respect; the references there are full and extremely useful, whereas in the book under review they are comparatively few and far between. Then, too, we would like to see marginal headings, which would make it much easier to look up some special point. For instance, the division of the ceremony of Pontifical Mass at the Throne into such headings as "Vesting of the Bishop," "From the beginning of Mass to the Gospel," "From the Gospel to the Communion," "From after the Communion to the end of Mass," is hardly adequate, though it is a distinct improvement on the arrangement in Martinucci. It would be a great help to anyone seeking for information if each of these divisions was marginally sub-divided; for example, the part "From the Gospel to the Communion" might have such marginal headings as "Sermon," "Indulgence," "Creed," "Offertory," "Canon up to elevation," etc.

With regard to details, one of the more interesting points is concerned with the rubrics for the "*Lumen Christi*" and the answer "*Deo gratias*" during the procession into the church on Holy Saturday. In the original edition of this book, Dr. Adrian Fortescue wrote: "Genuflecting the Deacon sings *Lumen Christi*. . . . The choir, at the same pitch, answers, *Deo gratias*. All rise and the procession goes forward." The new edition has: "Genuflecting the Deacon sings *Lumen Christi*. . . . All rise and the choir, at the same pitch, answers *Deo gratias*." There is no note to say why the change has been made; it is one of the cases where references would have been valuable. The correct procedure is not absolutely clear, for the opinions of rubrical commentators differ. Vavaseur is quite explicit: "*Le Diacre chante Lumen Christi . . . on répond Deo gratias et tous se lèvent.*" Martinucci is equally explicit: "*Diaconus, dum genuflectit, cantabit Lumen Christi, et chorus canendo respondebit Deo gratias, quod faciet deinceps duabus aliis vicibus. Postquam responsum erit, ut supra, consurgent omnes de genuflexione, et processio versus altare majus progredietur.*" The rubric in the Missal is not quite clear; it simply says: "*Et Diaconus elevans arundinem genuflectit, similiter et omnes alii cum eo, præter Subdiaconum crucem ferentem, et cantat solus: Lumen Christi: R. Deo gratias.*" But this seems to imply that all remain kneeling until after the response *Deo gratias*. On the other hand, de Herdt directs that all rise to make the response, as does the *Ceremoniale Episcoporum*, when dealing with the Pontifical function, and also the *Ceremoniale Monasticum* of the Beuron Congregation. Further, both Martinucci and Vavaseur, when describing the function in parish churches, prescribe that all should rise before making the answer. We have not a copy of the *Memoriale Rituum* at hand, but we think that there, too, the same rubric is ordered. Unless, then, a most unusual distinction is to be drawn between the ordinary solemn Holy Saturday function on the one hand, and both the Pontifical function and the function in small churches on the other, it seems that the new

edition is correct. But the question surely requires a note.

Another detail which calls for attention is concerned with the rite for Benediction. *The Ceremonies of the Roman Rite* states that "it is well, if possible, that another priest or deacon expose the Blessed Sacrament," and that at the Blessing, "the priest, who exposes, hands the monstrance to him [the celebrant] both standing, or the celebrant may take the monstrance from the altar." The *Ritus Servandus*, which is the authority in England for the rite of Benediction, seems to express the matter more definitely. In the general rules laid down at the beginning it states that, where there are several priests, there must be an assistant exposing priest: "In ritu hic descripto supponitur assistentia alterius presbyteri præter principalem sacerdotem. Hujusmodi assistentia ita præscripta habeatur ut in ecclesiis quibus plures inserviunt sacerdotes numquam deesse permittatur." Then in the actual rubrics for Benediction, the rite for the single priest and the rite for the priest with an assistant are described side by side, so that at the blessing it says: "Deinde aut presbyter vel diaconus assistens ostensorium celebranti stans tanti tradit; aut celebrans ostensorium super altare positum ipse accipit." Taken in conjunction with the whole tenor of the rubrics, this sentence surely means that the assistant, when there is one, must hand the monstrance to the celebrant. The same applies at the end of the blessing when replacing the monstrance on the altar.

There remain a few small points which need correction: On page 16, when describing the use of violet "On Holy Saturday," should be put before "on Whitsun Eve," for the sake of completeness. On page 125, Dr. Fortescue says: "Just before the Pater Noster, at the words *audemus dicere*, he [the deacon] genuflects, turns to the left and goes behind the celebrant on the highest step." The rubrics of the Missal (*Ritus celebrandi Missam*, IX, 4) prescribe that the Deacon should go behind the celebrant at the words *Pater Noster*, and this is the view taken by de Herdt and Martinucci.

On page 136, in a footnote, which is not entirely

clear, it seems to be laid down that the last gospel at a High Mass should be said "loud enough to be heard"; but the rubrics of the Missal (*Rubricæ generales*, XVI, 1 and 3) state that it should be said "submissa voce."

On page 176, it should be added, for the sake of completeness, that the gremiale is spread over the Bishop's knees when he sits for the Epistle.

On page 186, it is stated that at the gospel at Pontifical Mass the Bishop "takes the crozier in his left hand, makes the sign of the cross on his forehead, lips and breast as the deacon does so, etc." The *Ceremoniale Episcoporum* says: "Episcopus autem accepto baculo pastorali, eodem modo signat se, etc."; Martinucci quotes this in a footnote, but in the text prescribes that the Bishop should first sign himself and then take the crozier, and we think that this is the custom at Rome; it certainly seems more convenient.

On page 238, at Pontifical Vespers, it seems more correct that, on returning to the throne, after incensing the altar at the Magnificat, the Bishop should give up his crozier before being incensed. The *Ceremoniale Episcoporum* is not quite clear on the point, but Martinucci considers that he should give it up before being incensed, and this seems to be more in accordance with the practice at other times, for as a rule, the Bishop does not have his crozier when incensed, as for example at Pontifical Mass.

On page 308, when speaking of the Mass on Maundy Thursday, it should be added for the sake of completeness that there is a special "Communicantes," "Hanc igitur," and "Qui pridie."

Finally, there is one point on which we would be grateful for information. On page 84, in the chapter on the manner of serving Low Mass, the server is told to kneel for the creed, and a footnote says that even where it is the custom for the congregation to stand at the creed, "the server must obey the rubric and kneel." But one frequently hears it said that in England it is the custom for both server and congregation to stand, though there seems to be considerable divergence of opinion on the point. We should welcome any authoritative information.

(C.P.)

There is unquestionably much looseness in the present-day use—frequent as it is—of the terms Value, Values and Valuation; and a corresponding vagueness in the meanings they are made to bear. This want of precision seems equally evident in all their various applications—commercial, literary, æsthetic, psychological and philosophical. Any attempt to determine their real significance should therefore be welcome; and such an attempt is **Philosophy of Value**, by Leo Richard Ward, C.S.C. (Burns Oates and Washbourne, 7s. 6d.). This little book has for its sub-title "An Essay in Constructive Criticism," and it fairly accomplishes the task its author sets himself. It goes to the root of the matter by limiting its scope to the philosophical conception of Value as a universal; Valuation and Values are only incidentally treated. The author frankly takes the Scholastic or Thomist position, and makes abundant use of St. Thomas as a guide and authority, quoting freely from nearly all his works, but especially from the *Contra Gentiles* and *Summa*, and in so doing brings out remarkably the comprehensive fertility of St. Thomas's thought. Value as an entity and object of separate consideration is an wholly modern conception; but our author finds in St. Thomas—to whom the word in its present use was unknown—a clear and coherent account of its meaning and simplifications.

The book is divided into two parts; first a criticism of current definitions and doctrines, and secondly an "Outline of Constructive Thought," in which a positive view of value as a philosophical concept is set out and illustrated.

The problem is from the outset treated as a "living" one; that is, appeal is made to the data of actual experience in common life, as realised and interpreted by commonsense, and a long series of definitions and explanations is examined and rejected, particularly of such as pretend to find in theories of value indications of the existence and nature of God, of the future of the human race, and other matters which are the subjects of other departments of philosophy, but cannot be brought into the field of value without hopeless confusion.

Value, then, is found on analysis to imply three factors—the object valued, the valuing subject and the relation between them, which may be called interest or conation, or desire or the recognition of the possibility, at least, of the objects being so desired or sought. Value, therefore, is in the object; the subject cannot create value by desiring. Nor can value exist apart from the object valued; it is really meaningless to say that values can continue to exist when the objects—persons or things—to which they originally belonged exist no longer.

But though value belongs essentially to the object, nevertheless the ultimate end of all action, and therefore of the desire which is the test and correlation of value, can only belong to the subject who acts or desires. For the purpose of action is the perfection of the subject or a nearer approach to perfection. Otherwise there could be no motive for any action, but nothing more than a bare automatism.

This being so, the supreme end of all action is God; for God is both final and efficient cause of everything. The whole universe is indeed an expression of the purpose of God so that all desire and all action is desire for God and endeavours to attain to Him. In God therefore we find absolute value. This may be so, the author says, even though God may be merely conceptual—as an idol or a dream. Reality is indeed necessary to the valued object; but such reality as belongs to a concept is sufficient to satisfy this condition. Nevertheless, it is pointed out that God as necessary being without which contingent being could never have arisen, is undeniable in a universe which is essentially chaotic. Here, it seems to us, is a slight flaw in the reasoning. It seems to be admitted that a mere concept which is no more than hypothetically existent, can be the objective basis of values. But surely a hypothetical object can have no more than a hypothetical value. It may indeed be sought or desired by way of verification; but a concept realised merely as such, seems wanting in the necessary validity, though value may no doubt belong to a concept which has only

mental and not real existence, provided that it is believed to be real. But this oversight, if it is one, does not impair the argument, which is convincingly simple, and should do much towards clarifying the ideas at present entertained on the general subject (A.B.S.)

Those who are familiar only with Abbot Butler's recent work, varied as that is and ranging from St. Augustine to the Vatican Council, will probably be astonished at the breadth of his knowledge of Christian origins as displayed in his latest published book. **Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit** (Sheed & Ward, 5s.), is a collection of essays written for the most part round and about the year 1900. Although the subjects are various, the majority are linked together by a similarity of outlook and treatment, a sympathy with the method and results of modern criticism as defined in the third of these pieces; they all in one way or another apply to questions of early Church history the judgments of critical scholarship. Thus the second essay discusses Sabatier's presentation of primitive Christianity, the fourth reviews Harnack's mature judgment on the same subject, and the fifth sifts and augments Bishop Lightfoot's last pronouncement on the whole range of the Petrine claims.

These papers have lost little, if anything, by the lapse of time. The third should, we think, be read first. It is a lucid exposition of what is implied by positive critical work in the domain of history and textual study, and it succeeds in a way that is characteristic of Abbot Butler in impressing the reader with the reasonableness, the inevitability, the objectivity of the writer's point of view.

The second essay is the Catholic reply to Auguste Sabatier's principal assumptions and conclusions. The view that Catholicism is cut off from the Galilean idyll of Christ's life (the only true Christianity, and that this severance occurred before the circulation of Pauline and Johannine writings; the alleged antagonism between the Religion of the Spirit and the Religion of Authority; the possibility of a pure "Religion of the Spirit"—all these are questions as actual now as twenty years

ago. Other prophets have succeeded to Sabatier, but the leading ideas of his system are behind much that is written to-day by religious publicists and by the higher journalism, and no topical reply can take the place of a calm and critical estimate of the sincere and learned author of *Les Religions d'Autorité et la Religion de l'Esprit*.

The fourth paper reviews Harnack's *Chronology of Christian Literature up to Irenæus*, in which he summed up the results of more than half a century's work in Germany, and pronounced that the wheel of higher criticism had come full circle and that the finest scholarship had come to accept both the authenticity and (in its main lines) the traditional chronology of the oldest literature of the Church. Abbot Butler is not, of course, in agreement with Harnack on all points. In particular, he criticises at some length the dates assigned by him to the Johannine writings and to the Epistles of St. Peter. But he rightly calls attention to Harnack's pronouncement that all literary-historical problems of early Christianity are susceptible of immediate and definite solution, and that this solution will make clear the essential truth of tradition. The essay includes a useful list of early Christian literature (as dated by Harnack, and with certain additions) up to the end of the third century. It should have been mentioned (on page 100) that Harnack has subsequently put the date of the Acts before the destruction of Jerusalem and the death of Saint Paul, and the date of St. Luke's Gospel as before the Acts.* On page 104 the Didascalia Apostolorum should have been included as certainly a third century document.

The fifth essay, *Bishop Lightfoot and the Early Roman See*, is a weighty discussion of the historical Petrine claims—the primacy conferred by Christ, the Roman visit and episcopate of St. Peter, the Roman primacy at the end of the first century. This is a remarkable essay. If we set aside that charm, half stylistic, half moral, which puts all Newman's work in a place apart, we may compare this paper with the Letter to Pusey on the position of Our Lady in the early Church as a

* Date of the Acts and the Synoptic Gospels (Eng. trans.), pp. 116, 124.

classical presentation of the Catholic position with regard to St. Peter, avoiding at once the rigidity of a professional dogmatic theologian and the heat of a controversialist. Its value is enhanced both by recent movements among Anglicans and by a consideration to which Abbot Butler himself adverts. The end of the nineteenth century marked the close of an epoch in criticism. Both in Germany and in England a group of great scholars had recently said what was, in effect, the last word on many of the questions of historical fact hitherto so hotly debated. Since the death of Hort, Lightfoot and Westcott, and the eclipsed old age of Harnack, their epigoni have done little work on the broad issues and have, for the most part, pursued more detailed investigations. Consequently there is a real danger at the present time that controversial writers without a full grasp of their subject may repudiate, or ignore the abiding achievements of thirty years since.

A striking example of this has recently been provided in the booklet *One God and Father of All* written in reply to "Father" Vernon Johnson's apology. In this the authors, without discussion, ignore the results of the work of all the greatest Anglican scholars of the last generation on the question of the Petrine claims. Abbot Butler's sixth essay, which appears here for the first time, is a most impressive corrective of this attitude, and it is to be regretted that in all probability it will reach few of those neo-Anglo-Catholics whose opinions are represented in the book criticised.

The volume ends with a brief tribute to Baron Friedrich von Hügel, written soon after his death, and a short article on Mysticism reprinted from a symposium recently organised by the *Spectator*.

It is impossible to put down this book without a momentary feeling of regret that a call to office should have deprived the Catholic intellectual world of one who had followed so closely contemporary thought and scholarship, and that when Abbot Butler returned to his studies he should have forsaken those early Christian origins whose importance he has so fully realised.

(D.K.)

After the appearance of his "Byron," his "Journal," and his "Dialogue avec Andre Gide," there is no further need to refer to the peculiar position of M. Charles Du Bos in cosmopolitan criticism. In this fourth volume of his **Approximations**, he is still surer than in the other three of his peculiar position in the world of letters. A profoundly spiritual Catholic, he is yet more of a moralist than a mystic; his subtle and sinuous phosphorescence winds slowly into the psychology of the men and women whose work he loves till, by a meditative appreciation of their technique, he finds an opportunity to throw a glow-worm light on the leaves and grass we would without him have trodden unmarked. But he does more: he bores and lays bare the root; he pierces to the very sap, and tells us whether it is morbid or medicinal. If at times he is repelled, he explains why: but for the most part he is not repelled. He bores and he digests: and he makes us acquainted with every turn of his assimilative process. There are some who might be repelled by the slow yet tireless zest with which, in Proust's manner, he elaborates his definitions and qualifications. But when we know him better, we see that this is an act of friendship. He is phenomenally sincere; he must take the world into his entire confidence: and persuade it of the truth of showing us its every how and why. At the core of his elaborateness is the courage, the frankness, and the loyalty of a Frenchman. Everyone of his critical appreciations is finer because it is at the same time an application and an elucidation of principles for the conduct of life.

In these eight essays, three are slight; one on the painting of Mlle. Odette des Garets, one on "Daphne Adeane," by Mr. Maurice Baring and one on "*Le Choc en Retour*" by Miss Hope Mirrlees. The truth is that in these things, M. Du Bos has not a subject worthy of his powers. So fine and profound a spirit, being instinctively sympathetic, will say too much unless there is very much to say. He says too much of "Daphne Adeane"; of Miss Mirrlees, he says far too much. And here he shows, as he has shown in other work, how

a foreigner can be deceived as to the value of a phrase in the language in which it was written. More often a translator misses a finesse in the original; but, on the contrary, if there is not one there, M. Du Bos, too generous in subtleties, insists on inserting one. Miss Mirrlees goes underground in Paris: she feels a little giddy as stations and advertisements rush by: she bursts out with a phrase quite suitable to the occasion:

I can't,
I must go slowly.

So far, so good. But she should have stopped there. There was no need to write it down. It was fantastic to pretend that it was literature. But what does M. Du Bos do? He takes the little banal childish phrase; he translates it into a dignified and sonorous French one; he speaks of it as an *amorce psychologique*. But what has happened? Her voluptuous ordeal, in all its rigour, was only the physical sensation which most of us feel when rushed into a station, or let down, not too gently, over a wave.

The other five essays are each in their kind great. "Marius the Epicurean," a work written by an æsthete to show the necessity of religion, is manifestly congenial. When the critic speaks of Pater's hero "*Marius est la figure ideale de ceux chez qui le besoin de religion est absolu, mais pour qui il ne saurait y avoir dignité de la personne si l'on impose silence au besoin de lumière de l'esprit, qui admirent la foi, la saluent, l'appellent, sans pouvoir s'empêcher de toujours obscurément sentir que la foi ne viendra pas tout à fait à eux et qu'eux n'ont pas tout à fait le droit d'aller jusqu'à elle,*" he tells also his own story in one of its most significant phases. Charles Du Bos writes always from his own heart. He gives, too, a new and completer picture of the inner life of Tolstoi. He traces it from a youth of blind storms of passion which left a muddy blankness behind them to a stage where he discovered that imagination was itself the habitual tyrant over the body: then comes the awakening of the moral conscience, sombre, magnificent, morose; and then a heavy but passionate preoccupation with the

life and problems of the family, and finally an apprehension of the significance and value of death. This essay on Tolstoi is one of the most searching and the most illuminating that has ever been written on him. And wherever the glow-worm bores, he throws out on the night the eerie green tint which is his wherever his golden drop of phosphorescence plays.

From Tolstoi to Hardy is a natural transition. For Hardy is, after all, the English Tolstoi. The problem of his most affecting stories, the problem which weaves grimly beneath all that is romantic and beautiful in the story of *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, and which lies like a cloud of coal smoke over *Jude the Obscure* is that same sense of the heavy burden of blind animal instinct which makes Tolstoi's movements drag. Tess and Jude, says M. Du Bos, are victims of the same fatal maladjustment; that in them both the instinct of sex and the instinct of love work at different times, when it is the very condition of salvation to a human creature that these two instincts should act as one. It has been Hardy's function to scrutinise what is partial in almost every life, its ineffectiveness. M. Du Bos says that Hardy's unique claim to greatness is in the sense of life as a whole over and above that of particular personages: we should say not of life but of doom as a whole so that man appears lost in the space through which he moves, as his bones will be buried in the earth. Like Lucretius or Euripides, he shows us that human life and human death are great things, but not that spirit and air and light are greater than the theatre of clay. Hardy's view of life has its grandeur; the grandeur of cravings and despair.

O Life with the sad seared face

I weary of seeing thee,

And thy draggled cloak, and thy hobbling pace

And thy too forced pleasantry!

I know what thou wouldst tell

Of Death, Time, Destiny.

I have known it long, and know too well,

What it all means for me.

But canst thou not array
Thyself in rare disguise
And feign like truth, for one mad day,
That Earth is Paradise ?

But though he is right to say "if Way to the better there be, it exacts a full look at the worst," Hardy's view is obscure and his guidance wrong; and his place in literature is but to mark the shadow by which the heroic spirit passes joyfully on a trail of light.

We should like to write at equal length of the essays on Hofmannsthal and Stefan Georg which show that the eye of this critic is alert for the big values in German as in English. Hofmannsthal, he says, was one of those whose mission on earth was to love what is worthy of love. He is sure that the creature instinct is to bring things into relation rather than to know them by themselves. As for Georg, it is the aim of the French critic to show how, for the German poet, the idea and its expression, the spirit and its incarnation, are indivisible. Here, as everywhere, Charles Du Bos defines his subject by intimate personal allusions to the masterpieces of Christian thought.

(R.E.S.)



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